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By the early 1960s, outstanding U.S. dollar liabilities began to exceed the U.S. gold stock, suggesting
that the United States could not completely maintain its pledge to convert dollars into gold at the official
price.  This raised uncertainty about the Bretton Woods parity grid, and speculation seemed to grow.
In response, the Federal Reserve instituted a series of swap lines to provide central banks with cover
for unwanted, but temporary accumulations of dollars and to provide foreign central banks with dollar
funds to finance their own interventions.  The Treasury also began intervening in the market.  The
operations often forestalled gold losses, but in so doing, delayed the need to solve Bretton Woods’
fundamental underlying problems.  In addition, the institutional arrangements forged between the Federal
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“There is little evidence…of any systematic effort by the Federal Reserve 
to conduct monetary policy in a manner consistent with the requirements 
of a fixed exchange rate system.  And, there is no evidence that any of the 
administrations objected to this neglect.”   
Allan H. Meltzer 1991, p. 55 
1. Introduction 
  The Bretton Woods system became fully functional after 1958 when the leading 
developed countries made their currencies convertible for current-account transactions.  At 
roughly the same time, however, fundamental flaws in the arrangement began to appear.  The 
U.S. balance of payments was deteriorating markedly, undermining the U.S. commitment to 
maintain its official gold price.  By 1961, total external U.S. dollar liabilities exceeded the U.S. 
gold stock, which encouraged foreign central banks to convert unwanted dollars into gold, 
heightened uncertainty about the entire currency grid, and fostered speculative flows.   
  In an attempt to neutralize speculative activity, the U.S. Treasury began intervening in the 
foreign exchange market in March 1961, after a 30 year hiatus.  A year later, the Federal Reserve 
began intervening for its own account with a primary focus on providing foreign central banks 
with temporary cover for their unwanted dollar exposures.   
  These operations were stop-gap.  In the early 1960s, U.S. administrations believed that 
much of the pressure on the balance of payments was transitional and largely related to the post-
war global recovery, so finding a mechanism to buy time for an inevitable adjustment seemed 
appropriate.  By the late 1960s, however, Bretton Woods’ severe structural problems, which a 
rising U.S. inflation rate severely aggravated, were apparent.  The maintenance of Bretton 
Woods required elected officials in the United States and abroad to sacrifice domestic economic 
goals for international objectives, a trade-off they would not make.  The U.S. closed its gold 
window in August 1971, and generalized floating commenced in March 1973.   
  As a delaying tactic, U.S. foreign exchange operations were often successful.  They 
raised the potential costs of speculation and provided cover for unwanted, temporary, and 
ultimately reversible dollar flows.  They delayed the drain of the U.S. gold stock.  But to the 
extent that these devises substituted for more fundamental and necessary adjustments and 
postponed the inevitable collapse of Bretton Woods, they were a failure.  In addition, the 
institutional arrangement underlying U.S. intervention operations raised important, long-lasting 
issues about Federal Reserve independence.    
  This chapter explores the events that shaped the decisions to intervene, describes the 
mechanisms that the United States established for that purpose, and chronicles the origins of 
controversies, which some 30 years later, would end the operations.   
2. Bretton Woods: Prospects and Problems 
  The officials who signed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 envisioned an international financial system based 
on close cooperation, which would foster stability, promote full employment, and prevent a 
return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the early 1930s.
1  Under the agreement, the United 4 
 
States pegged the dollar to gold at $35 per ounce and pledged to buy and sell the metal freely at 
this price.  Other nations established parities for their currencies relative to the dollar and were 
obliged to keep their exchange rates within a 1 percent band around the central value through 
foreign-exchange interventions, restraints on financial flows, and presumably the eventual 
adoption of compatible monetary policies.  When faced with a transitory balance-of-payments 
problem, a country with insufficient reserves to finance its intervention could borrow from the 
IMF instead of quickly instituting deflationary macroeconomic programs.  The ability to borrow 
reserves would also lessen the deficit country’s incentive to impose trade restraints or exchange 
controls on current-account transactions.
2   
Exchange rates were not immutable under the Bretton Woods system.  After IMF 
consultation and approval, countries facing a “fundamental disequilibrium” in their balance of 
payments could adjust their parities.  In principle, the IMF could also insist that the country 
adopt macroeconomic policies consistent with any exchange-rate realignment, but the IMF 
lacked a credible enforcement mechanism.  Deficit countries, which felt pressures to adjust more 
immediately than surplus countries, postponed devaluation to avoid the stigma—one of “failed 
economic policies”—that devaluation carried.   
Although the Bretton Woods system began operating in 1946, European currencies 
remained inconvertible for current-account transactions until late 1958, and the Japanese yen 
stayed similarly inconvertible until 1964.  Initially, these war-ravaged countries maintained 
inconvertible currencies as a means of limiting their persistent current-account deficits.  Most 
lacked sufficient international reserves to sustain growing deficits for long, even after allowing 
for IMF credits.  In 1949, the situation compelled many European countries to devalue their 
currencies relative to the dollar.  France devalued in 1957 and again as late as 1959.   
During the 1950s, however, the international position of the war-torn industrialized 
countries greatly improved.  Foreign productivity and competitiveness recovered.  Government 
grants and long-term financial outflows from the United States created persistent U.S. balance-
of-payments deficits that provided a source of international reserves to accommodate expanding 
international trade.  A general quota increase in 1959 also augmented IMF funds that were 
available for temporary balance-of-payments assistance.  Consequently, by the late 1950s, more 
than a decade after its beginning, the Bretton Woods exchange-rate system became functional.    
At about the same time, however, markets and central banks were quickly losing 
confidence in the viability of the official dollar gold price, the keystone of the entire Bretton 
Woods structure.  Two interrelated developments proved particularly corrosive:  Triffin’s 
paradox, which describes a congenital defect in gold-reserve standards like Bretton Woods, and 
an accelerating U.S. inflation rate after 1965.  A third factor, which acquired importance largely 
in conjunction with the previous two, stemmed from inevitable cross-rate adjustment problems 
among participating countries, other than the United States.  We describe each of these factors in 
turn below.   
Triffin’s Paradox 
The framers of Bretton Woods set the official price of gold at $35 per ounce, the same 
price that the U.S. Gold Reserve Act of 1934 had established.  Because of inflation during World 
War II and shortly thereafter, this official price became too low in real terms to induce sufficient 
gold production for expanding reserve needs (see Bordo 1993, James 1996, and Meltzer 1991).  
By the early 1950s, the real price of gold was only half of its 1934 value (see figure 1).
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Between 1948 and 1958, the free world’s gold stock increased only 16% while its imports rose 
68% (Triffin, 1960, table 14, pp. 72-3).   
The United States, as noted, provided needed liquidity by running persistent balance-of-
payments deficits.  Between 1950 and 1957, these deficits averaged $1.3 billion per year, as 
government grants, private remittances, and long-term financial outflows typically exceeded 
surpluses elsewhere in the accounts (figure 2).
4  Neither the United States nor the international 
financial community seemed to view these deficits with much concern because they stemmed 
from postwar redevelopment efforts and from the provision of military security.  Without the 
international reserves that these deficits provided, the postwar recovery of global trade and world 
economic activity would have proceeded more slowly, because countries facing even temporary 
balance-of-payments deficits would quickly need to deflate, devalue, or impose disruptive trade 
and financial restraints.   
By the early 1960s, however, the total external dollar liabilities associated with the 
persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits began to exceed the U.S. gold stock, implying that 
the United States could not completely fulfill its obligation to sell gold at the official price (see 
figure 3).
5  The very act of providing needed liquidity was itself creating uncertainty about the 
long-term viability of the parity structure.  This was Triffin’s paradox (Triffin 1957, 1960).  At 
the time, however, few interpreted the situation as necessarily leading to the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system.
6   
An outflow of gold accompanied the U.S. balance-of-payments deficits during the 1950s, 
but it seemed a reasonable reversal of the substantial—largely safe-haven—gold acquisitions that 
the United States experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.  The United States, which held 60 percent 
of the world’s gold reserves in 1950, lost only $213 million worth of gold on average each year 
between 1950 and 1957 (figure 4).
7  During that time, foreign countries increased their gold 
reserves mainly out of free-world gold production and through small purchases from the Soviet 
Union.  In addition, the IMF sold the United States $800 million worth of gold between 1951 and 
1957 (Board of Governors, 1963, p. 422). 
Between 1958 and 1960, however, U.S. balance-of-payments deficits widened to $3.7 
billion per year on average as surpluses on U.S. goods and services trade narrowed slightly and 
as long-term financial outflows increased sharply.  The most disturbing aspect of the expanding 
U.S. balance-of-payments deficits, however, occurred with respect to short-term financial flows 
beginning in 1960.  Heretofore, the United States had typically experienced small short-term 
financial inflows (including unrecorded items), but in 1960 the country witnessed a large outflow 
of nearly $2.5 billion.  Although U.S. balance-of-payments deficits narrowed somewhat in 1961 
and 1962, substantial outflows of short-term financial capital, often motivated by exchange-rate 
concerns, generally persisted.   
Between 1958 and 1962, the average U.S. gold loss increased six-fold to nearly $1.4 
billion per year.  The U.S. gold stock declined by $6.8 billion or 30% as foreign countries 
converted dollar reserves into gold.
8  The heavy gold losses would not have been so disturbing to 
U.S. policy makers if they had not been accompanied by evidence of a run on the dollar.  Foreign 
monetary authorities were not only converting new acquisitions of dollars into gold, but they 
were also converting—or planning to convert—a substantial portion of their existing dollar 
balances (FOMC, Minutes, 10 January 1961, p.10).   6 
 
Between 1957 and 1962, the proportion of international reserves held in gold by non-
Communist countries increased from 45 percent to 49 percent (Board of Governors, 1963, p. 
423).  European countries, particularly France, Italy, and Germany, accounted for almost all of 
this gain; most other countries kept the share of their gold reserves fairly constant (Board of 
Governors, 1963, p.424).  Despite the accelerated gold losses, the United States still held $16 
billion worth of gold reserves in 1962, approximately two-fifths of the world’s gold stock.
9   
On 20 October 1960, the price of gold on the London market shot above the official U.S. 
gold price to $40 per ounce, as private demand for gold reached record levels. This was a turning 
point in the Bretton Woods era.  Henceforth, as we will document, both gold and foreign-
exchange markets would remain vulnerable to speculative pressures consistent with Triffin’s 
paradox.   
U.S. Inflation after 1965 
In the early 1960s, the Bretton Woods system constrained Federal Reserve behavior and 
anchored inflation expectations (see Bordo and Eichengreen 2008).  Policymakers understood 
that inflation could lead to a deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments and to a reduction in 
the U.S. gold stock, which eventually could undermine the official gold price.  Between 1959 
and 1965, inflation averaged just 1¼ percent in the United States.  The Bretton Woods constraint 
did not matter prior to 1958 because of the global dollar-reserve shortage, and to be sure, U.S. 
monetary policy was not exclusively focused on the official gold price during the early 1960s.  
The System responded to inflation and business-cycle developments.  Still, all else constant, 
Bretton Woods led to more monetary restrain or less ease than otherwise would have been the 
case.  The record of dissents within the FOMC reflects this inclination (Bordo and Eichengreen 
2008, table 1).  Between 1961 and 1966, balance-of-payments considerations prompted most of 
these dissents, and they almost always went in favor of a tighter monetary-policy stance.     
In the early 1960s, as we will document, the U.S. Treasury took on greater responsibility 
for balance-of-payments developments and instituted a number of mechanisms, including 
foreign-exchange intervention, the Gold Pool, and the interest equalization tax to address 
emerging international concerns (Bordo and Eichengreen 2008).  This shift in responsibility and 
the development of these mechanisms loosened the Bretton Woods constraint on Federal Reserve 
policy.  Between 1965 and 1971, balance-of-payment considerations still arose within the 
FOMC, and during crisis periods, such as the devaluation of the British pound in 1968, they 
directly shaped policy, but overall, the Treasury’s balance-of-payments activism allowed the 
FOMC to focus on domestic inflation and business-cycle developments.   
The inflation that ensued helped end the Bretton Woods system.  Inflation in the United 
States rose from less than 2 percent in late 1965 to around 6 percent by late 1970.  It moderated 
somewhat after 1970, but remained above 4 percent through August 1971, when President Nixon 
closed the gold window, and inflation stayed between 3 and 4 percent prior to March 1973, when 
generalized floating began.  In the intervening years, as foreign countries defended their pegs, 
they imported U.S. inflation.  As inflation aggravated Triffin’s paradox, the dollar shortage 
became a dollar glut, and the parity grid eventually collapsed in early 1973.       
While the weakening of the Bretton Woods constraint surely gave the Federal Reserve 
greater latitude to pursue domestic economic objectives, it does not explain why over the next 15 
years, the System, nevertheless, failed to pursue price stability.
10  Other factors came into play.  
With the Kennedy administration, policy makers and many academic economists adopted an 7 
 
economic framework that de-emphasized the role of money in the inflation process (see Hetzel 
2008 and Meltzer 2009a).  In addition, these economists generally saw unemployment as a more 
serious social problem than inflation and, at least prior to 1970, were willing to accept higher 
inflation in hopes of a permanently lower unemployment rate.  They no longer saw inflation as 
eventually producing higher unemployment, as they had during the 1950s (Romer and Romer 
2002).  They emphasized keeping economic activity on its potential or full-employment path, 
where inflation by definition could not be a problem.  Economists read any aggregate price 
pressures that existed when the economy fell away from potential, as stemming from structural 
or uncompetitive elements in the economy.  Such price pressures were only responsive to direct 
controls or incomes policies.  Among its many flaws, such a model required that policymakers 
adequately measure potential, which was not the case.  In addition, the management of aggregate 
demand—to keep it expanding at potential—emphasized fiscal actions, especially prior to the 
early 1970s.  Monetary policy was to support fiscal policy; it did not focus on price stability.    
The ancillary role of monetary policy made it susceptible to political pressures, especially 
in the face of a weakened Bretton Woods constraint.  Meltzer (2005) argues that the Federal 
Reserve System facilitated inflation for three—largely political—reasons:  First, Chairman 
William McChesney Martin consistently delayed the System’s response to evidence of rising 
inflation because he sought consensus with the administration—and, for that matter, among 
FOMC participants—about the need for such policy actions.  This typically meant delaying a 
response until the costs of inaction became abundantly clear.  Second, as suggested above, 
Martin and most members of the FOMC did not believe that monetary policy was solely 
responsible for inflation.  With the FOMC meeting on a three-week cycle, members’ 
perspectives were instead typically short-term, often ad hoc, and often inconsistent.  FOMC 
directions to the open-market Desk were often vague with the consequence that the Manager 
focused on short-term market conditions (Meltzer 2005, p. 155).  Third, Martin’s concept of 
independence implied that the Federal Reserve needed to cooperate as much as possible with the 
administration to fulfill the goals of the Employment Act of 1946.  He viewed the Federal 
Reserve System as independent within the government, not independent of the government.  
Accordingly, the System should not frustrate the attainment of administration policy objectives 
or raise the costs of financing a budget deficit, if at all possible.  The System, for example, 
regularly helped facilitate the issuance of Treasury securities by supplying enough reserves to 
peg interest rate around the time of a Treasury financing, usually about two to four weeks.  
Martin’s view of independence contributed to his desire for consensus and his hope for non-
monetary (that is, administration) solutions to the mounting inflation and balance-of-payments 
problems.    
Cross-Rate Adjustment Problems 
  A third shortcoming of the Bretton Woods system arose because cross exchange rates 
could not quickly adjust to balance-of-payments disequilibria.  When both German and the 
United Kingdom pegged to the dollar, the mark-pound cross rate was also fixed.  Although 
cross-rate-adjustment problems arose from economic developments within specific foreign 
countries and not directly from persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits, they contributed to 
the dollar’s difficulties because they aggravated Triffin’s paradox.  They did so because the U.S. 
dollar was the key international reserve and vehicle currency, deficit countries defended their 
pegs by selling dollars, while surplus countries defended their pegs by buying dollars.  Financial 
funds flowed from deficit countries to surplus countries through dollars, adding to the large, 8 
 
often unwanted dollar positions of surplus countries and creating inflationary pressures in these 
countries.  Speculators (or their banks) fearing a pound devaluation, for example, would first sell 
pounds for dollars and then dollars for a strong currency, like the Swiss franc or German mark.  
Dollars, not pounds, flowed into these countries.  Many surplus countries, like Switzerland, 
strictly limited the ratio of dollar reserves to gold reserves in their portfolios and would sell 
unwanted dollars to the United States.  Cross-rate-adjustment problem, notably among the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and France created uncertainty about the entire Bretton Woods 
parity structure, as we illustrate below.   
3. The Policy Dilemma
11   
  If the emerging U.S. balance-of-payments problems were indeed evidence of a 
fundamental disequilibrium, the United States had to undertake a real dollar depreciation.  
Hemmed in by the perception of persistently weak domestic demand, constrained by the dollar’s 
unique role in the Bretton Woods system, and still uncertain about the true underlying nature of 
recent balance-of-payments developments, none of the standard methods for achieving a real 
dollar depreciation seemed viable or even appropriate to U.S. policy makers.  Instead, policy 
makers in the early 1960s opted for a number of stop-gap policies, of which exchange-market 
intervention became the most enduring.   
  The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations attributed the worsening U.S. balance-of-
payments position between 1957 and 1962, by and large, to transitory factors stemming from 
U.S. military and economic aid commitments, recent cyclical developments, and the re-
emergence of Western Europe and Japan as global competitors.  In response to these 
developments, the United States undertook a series of policy initiatives to hasten adjustment in 
the U.S. trade and long-term financial accounts and to improve the operation of the international 
financial system.  These initiatives, however, were not those of policy makers who interpreted 
the current situation as critical or enduring.   
U.S. policy makers also appreciated that with the maturation of the Bretton Woods 
system—economic recovery abroad, growing currency convertibility, and an adequate pool of 
liquidity—short-term financial flows could henceforth be more sensitive to international interest-
rate differentials and exchange-rate uncertainty.  They seemed to believe, however, that once the 
transitory adjustments to the U.S. trade and long-term financial accounts were complete, 
credibility in the dollar would strengthen.  After all, reserve gains in France and Italy since 1957 
illustrated how quickly countries’ international positions could change (Board of Governors, 
1963, pp. 421 – 428).  Renewed credibility in the dollar would lessen the problem of short-term 
financial flows.   
Even if U.S. policy makers had fleetingly glimpsed emerging events as evidence that the 
U.S. balance-of-payments position was fundamentally unsustainable, they were unwilling to 
make the appropriate policy adjustments in the early 1960s.  A fundamental disequilibrium 
would imply that the dollar was overvalued on a real basis and that a real depreciation was 
necessary to restore equilibrium to the U.S. balance of payments.  The United States could 
achieve a real depreciation only through a nominal dollar devaluation, a deflation in the United 
States, an inflation in the rest of the world, a general revaluation of foreign currencies, or some 
combination of all four.  Whereas U.S. policy makers might have welcomed a higher rate of 
inflation abroad, and whereas they actively encouraged the revaluation of currencies in surplus 9 
 
countries, they were unwilling to alter the official gold price or to dampen aggregate demand in 
the United States for balance-of-payments purposes.
12   
  A one-time nominal dollar devaluation was simply out of the question.  By imposing 
wealth losses on central banks and individuals that held open positions in U.S. dollars, any dollar 
devaluation could forever threaten the reserve-currency status of the U.S. dollar.  Moreover, 
short-term financial outflows might actually increase if a one-time devaluation proved 
insufficient for balance-of-payments adjustment, or if other countries simultaneously devalued 
their currencies against the dollar.  The U.S. also opposed an increase in the gold price because it 
would specifically benefit South Africa and the Soviet Union, the two major gold producers 
(Task Force Paper #3, 1990, p. 10).  For these reasons, the Kennedy administration went to 
considerable lengths to convince markets of its commitment to the official gold price.   
  Similarly, administration and Federal Reserve policy makers were unwilling to dampen 
aggregate demand for balance-of-payments purposes.  The President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Malcolm Bryan, seems to have typified the view, at least as it prevailed among 
many Federal Reserve policy makers:   
“…the last time the System reacted in its policy decisions primarily because 
of foreign developments was…in 1931.  At that time, with unemployment 
constantly increasing and with every element in the domestic economy 
calling for ease, the System responded by tightening in order to protect the 
gold supply.” [FOMC Minutes, 10 January 1961, p.41] 
He, like many other policy makers, feared a replay of the past.  The United States had 
experienced back-to-back recessions from the third quarter of 1957 through the first quarter of 
1958 and again from the second quarter of 1960 through the first quarter of 1961.  These cost the 
Republicans the election in 1960.  Kennedy pledged to “get the country moving again.”  The 
unemployment rate remained stubbornly high, and President Kennedy’s Council of Economic 
Advisors expected U.S. economic activity to remain below its potential level through 1963.  
Consequently, policy makers would not undertake deflationary macroeconomic programs.   
While the overall thrust of macroeconomic policy was to promote the growth of 
aggregate demand, international considerations did exert some limited influence on the contours 
of both fiscal and monetary policies in the early 1960s.  Under the Kennedy administration, the 
federal budget shifted from a surplus of $0.3 billion in 1960 to deficits of $3.4 billion in 1961, 
$7.2 billion in 1962, and $4.8 billion in 1963.
13  In 1962, the administration introduced an 
investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation allowances primarily to spur aggregate 
demand, but the administration also thought that these tax cuts could improve the country’s 
international competitiveness.   
For its part, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) eased policy in 1960, initially 
by cutting the official discount rate, then by injecting reserves through open-market operations 
and allowing banks to count vault cash as reserves.  Thereafter, the committee held course 
through 1963—sometimes under pressure from the Kennedy administration—and then tacked 
slowly in the other direction through 1965 (figure 5).  In 107 policy decisions between the 13 
September 1960 and the 1 November 1966 FOMC meetings, the committee voted 92 times to 
maintain the current stance of policy.
14  On 15 occasions over this period, the FOMC voted for 
additional restraint.  Most of the decisions to tighten were undertaken for a mixture of domestic 
and international considerations, with the domestic situation undoubtedly holding more weight.
15  10 
 
On only four occasions—three in 1963 and one in late 1964—did the committee tighten solely 
for international considerations.  During the early 1960s, domestic considerations usually 
motivated committee member dissents for a looser policy, while international consideration 
usually motivated committee member dissents for a tighter policy.  Nevertheless, monetary 
policy seemed relatively accommodative until late 1964 and 1965 (see figure 6).   
Short-term capital outflows did affect how the Federal Reserve conducted monetary 
policy in the early 1960s, even if they did not alter the overall thrust of monetary policy very 
much.  Since April 1953, except for brief periods of extreme market disorder, as in 1955 and 
1958, the Federal Reserve had operated under a “bills only” doctrine; that is, the Federal Reserve 
confined open-market operations to the very short end of the market for U.S. Treasury securities.  
Faced with a potential conflict between domestic and balance-of-payments objectives, the 
Federal Reserve and, later, the Kennedy administration undertook a program intended to promote 
domestic investment and economic growth through lower long-term interest rates and to 
discourage short-term financial outflows through higher short-term interest rates (Martin, 
1961).
16  After October 1960, the System began to purchase longer-term securities, while 
sometimes selling Treasury bills.  In addition, the Treasury began issuing more short-term 
securities, and government trust funds increased the portion of long-term securities in their 
portfolios (Yeager, 1966, p. 448).  In this way, policy makers hoped to twist the yield curve for 
balance-of-payments purposes while maintaining an overall accommodative policy stance.   
  Although U.S. policy makers were unwilling to devalue the dollar or reduce U.S. 
aggregate demand for balance-of-payments purposes, they instituted a number of ad hoc policies 
designed to improve the country’s competitive position and, thereby, improve the U. S. balance 
of payments.  Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, for example, attributed 
postwar balance-of-payments deficits primarily to the United States’ unusual military-assistance 
and economic-development programs.  These programs sought to achieve important foreign-
policy objectives, and cutting them could have had severe political and military consequences in 
the antagonistic Cold War environment (Gavin, 2004).  To mitigate their effects on the U.S. 
balance of payments, the Kennedy administration, often using the threat of troop redeployment, 
extended the requirements—initially developed under the Eisenhower administration—that tied 
military and development assistance to purchases of U.S. goods and services (Gavin, 2004).  The 
United States also encouraged countries to hasten the repayment of their war debts and to 
contribute aid to developing nations.   
  After European currencies became convertible in 1958, U.S. traded goods came under 
more intense competitive pressures.  In response, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
lobbied for the removal of discriminatory trade practices, which foreign countries leveled 
primarily against the United States.  The United States had long tolerated these restraints as 
means of promoting European and Japanese development and of conserving international 
reserves.  The Kennedy administration also undertook various efforts to promote exports through 
U.S. embassies and the Export-Import Bank and to reduce the duty-free allowance for U.S. 
tourists.  In 1961, the Kennedy administration also revised the depreciation schedule, hoping to 
raise U.S. manufacturing productivity, improve international competitiveness, and promote 
exports.   
While undertaking policy initiatives to improve the United States’ international 
competitive position, policy makers here and abroad attempted to shore up Bretton Woods 
institutions against short-term capital flight and destabilizing reserve losses and to foster closer 11 
 
cooperation among the major developed countries.  A major initiative was the General 
Arrangements to Borrow.  With short-term financial flows larger, more mobile, and increasingly 
driven by uncertainties about exchange rates, countries—notably the United States and the 
United Kingdom—might need to borrow foreign exchange reserves to quell temporary balance-
of-payments problems.  Under existing quota arrangements, however, the IMF might not have 
sufficient foreign exchange to meet the need for specific currencies.  In late 1962, the major 
developed countries—the G10 and later Switzerland—instituted a new credit mechanism, the 
General Arrangements to Borrow, within the IMF.  These countries collectively pledged $6 
billion (equivalent) of their currencies to meet borrowing requests through the IMF (James, 
1996, pp. 161-165).   
  To address the strong private demand for gold, President Eisenhower issued an order in 
January 1961 forbidding U.S. residents from holding gold abroad and directing any citizen 
holding gold to sell it by July.  More importantly, in 1961, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and six continental European countries formed the Gold Pool to keep the London 
price of gold in line with the official price.  (We discuss the Gold Pool in more detail below.)  
  In 1963, the United States also attempted to trim long-term financial outflows through an 
Interest Equalization Tax.  Initially, the administration levied one percent tax on interest earnings 
from foreign bonds sold in the United States.  In 1965, the tax was broadened to include U.S. 
bank loans to foreigners with a maturity of more than one year.  The tax exempted Canada and 
developing countries.  By 1967, the administration raised Interest Equalization Tax to two 
percent (see Meltzer 1991, p. 52).   
All of these initiatives attempted to address important aspects of the U.S. balance-of-
payments problem.  None, however, was capable of immediately offsetting speculative financial 
flows, which could create contagion problems and increase dollar balances in central banks 
already holding excess dollars.  To address these short-term speculative financial flows and to 
protect the U.S. gold stock, the Treasury began intervening in 1961.   
4.  The U.S. Treasury’s Decision to Intervene
17   
  In March 1961, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), with the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York acting as its agent, began to intervene in the foreign exchange market for the first 
time since World War II.
18  Increased speculative flows prompted the actions.  The Treasury’s 
operations consisted primarily of forward sales of continental currencies, which were designed to 
reduce forward premia on these currencies.  Forward premia served as barometers of market 
confidence in the dollar, and when a forward premium exceeded the level consistent with 
existing interest-rate differential, it provided a strong incentive for financial flows.   
Forward transactions offered the Treasury a number of advantages over spot trades.  For 
one thing, the Treasury, which had only $336 million in assets available for intervention in mid-
1961, did not need to commit scarce foreign-currency reserves to a transaction until the 
contract’s maturity date and then only if the position incurred a loss.
19  That, however, was 
unlikely.  Since the ESF sold foreign currencies forward at known premia over official spot rates, 
the United States could only incur a substantial loss if the foreign currencies were revalued.
20  
The ESF typically covered its forward sales against that contingency.   
The Treasury also undertook some limited spot transactions.  These were largely 
experimental, designed to learn how the market operated and to gauge the impact of such 12 
 
operations on speculative activity.  The Treasury also undertook some unusual gold swaps, 
which temporarily improved the mix of reserve assets on foreign balance sheets.   
German Mark Interventions 
  On 6 and 7 March 1961, Germany and the Netherlands, respectively, revalued their 
currencies by approximately 5 percent, a smaller amount than market participants anticipated.  
Within days, funds flowed out of British sterling and, to a lesser extent, out of dollars, and into 
continental currencies, especially German marks and Swiss francs.  In response, British 
authorities sold dollars to defend the pound.  The speculative attack and Britain’s defensive 
dollar sales inflated dollar holdings at continental central banks and threatened to push their 
dollar-to-gold reserve ratios above acceptable levels.  In addition to adding to the potential 
demand for U.S. gold reserves, the heavy speculative flows pushed the dollar to a substantial 
forward discount against many of the European currencies, which tended only to reinforce 
expectations of further revaluations.  Moreover, the limited availability of forward cover induced 
many market participants with dollar receivables to borrow dollars in New York or in the 
Eurodollar market and use these funds to buy marks in the spot market (Bulletin, September 
1962, p. 1141).  This hedging strategy added further to foreign central banks’ dollar reserves.   
On Monday, 13 March 1961, after consultations with Bundesbank and Federal Reserve 
officials, the ESF began selling German marks forward in an attempt to reduce the forward 
premium on marks, which had reached a peak of 4 percent, and, hopefully, to stabilize exchange-
rate fluctuations in both the spot and forward markets.  A so-called “parallel” agreement covered 
the Treasury’s risk exposure.  Accordingly, the Bundesbank would supply the U.S. Treasury 
with any marks that it might need to fulfill the forward contracts, and the U.S. Treasury and the 
Bundesbank would split any profits.  The forward sales reached $63 million per week by the 
second week of the operations and continued at a rate of $30 million to $40 million per week for 
several weeks thereafter.  The operations topped $320 million in mid-June, but then fell off 
quickly (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 4).   
The Treasury also concluded an arrangement with the German government whereby 
Germany would immediately prepay $100 million of a $587 million debt that was due to the 
United States in April 1961.
21  Germany paid in marks.  Of this amount, the ESF received $50 
million equivalent German marks.  The ESF used most of it as cover for forward transactions but 
made small intervention sales of German marks in the New York market during June and July to 
lift the dollar off of its floor vis-à-vis the mark.  The Treasury coordinated these operations with 
Bundesbank interventions.  In addition, the Treasury sold the remaining $50 million worth of 
German marks from the debt prepayment directly to the Bundesbank for dollars on September 1, 
1962, thereby reducing the potential claim on U.S. gold reserves (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 
1962, p. 5).  
When the Soviets built the Berlin wall in August 1961, a substantial amount of funds 
quickly moved out of Germany.  This reversal of financial flows provided a source for funding 
the U.S. Treasury’s forward commitments, which, unlike the “parallel agreement,” would not 
cause the Bundesbank to again acquire additional dollar reserves.  By mid-December 1961, the 
Treasury liquidated all of the forward mark commitments, and although the ESF incurred small 
losses on its spot transactions, the overall operation accrued a $750 thousand profit (U.S. 
Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 5). 13 
 
The German mark operations convinced U.S. Treasury officials that such cooperative 
arrangements could provide a “first line of defense” for the dollar.  With the U.S. balance-of-
payments deficit continuing, further speculative attacks seemed certain.  Consequently, the ESF 
acquired additional German marks from the market when the Berlin crisis temporarily weakened 
that currency.  The ESF made further forward mark sales in late December 1961 when that 
currency’s forward premium again rose above 1 percent against the dollar.  By the end of 
January 1962, the ESF held $55 million worth of German marks, of which $50 million 
(equivalent) were invested in German Treasury bills.  Forward commitments amounted to $10 
million worth of marks.  Of these, “parallel” agreements with the Bundesbank covered $5.6 
million equivalent, and ESF mark holdings covered the remainder (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 
1962, pp. 6-7).  The U.S. Treasury liquidated its forward commitments in German marks by the 
end of March 1962.   
Swiss Franc Interventions 
In early 1961, dollar inflows increased liquidity in the Swiss banking system and raised 
the dollar-to-gold ratio at the Swiss National Bank (SNB) above its legal limit.  Instead of 
converting the excess dollar reserves immediately into gold with the U.S. Treasury, the SNB lent 
dollars to the Bank of England to finance Britain’s pound-stabilization program.  The Bank of 
England, however, was arranging financing through the IMF and intended to liquidate its dollar 
credit with the SNB (Bulletin, September 1962 p. 1143).  The Swiss sought a mechanism to 
reduce the excess liquidity in Switzerland stemming from these dollar inflows.   
The SNB believed that the inflows of fund were temporary and that forward sales of 
Swiss francs could stem or possibly reverse them by reducing the forward premium on francs.  
Swiss law, however, prohibited the SNB from operating in the forward market.  Instead, on 12 
July 1961, the ESF began forward sales of Swiss francs in the market through the SNB.  The 
ESF intended to use $15 million worth of Swiss francs, which it had acquired earlier from the 
SNB, as cover for the operation, but the SNB also agreed to provide additional Swiss franc cover 
against Treasury gold sales at a fixed price based on the existing franc-dollar exchange rate. 
These initial foreign-exchange operations were small and mainly experimental, but after 
the Berlin crisis in August 1961 sharply increased dollar flows into Switzerland, the ESF’s 
forward Swiss franc sales increased substantially to a peak of $152.5 million equivalent Swiss 
francs by the end of November.  In September, the SNB had provided the U.S. Treasury with a 
SF430 million ($100 million) credit line to cover the ESF’s forward commitments.  To draw on 
this line, the U.S. Treasury issued $46 million (equivalent) of certificates of indebtedness 
denominated in Swiss francs in October 1961—the first time that it had issued foreign-currency-
denominated debt since World War I.  The Treasury issued the certificates in two lots, at a rate of 
1.25% with a three-month maturity.  The ESF received $15 million worth of Swiss francs from 
the proceeds to meet Swiss franc forward commitments, and the Treasury’s General Fund kept 
the remaining $31 million worth of francs with the SNB.  The Treasury rolled over one lot of 
certificates and repaid the other, as pressure on the Swiss franc subsided.  In addition to these 
Treasury activities, the SNB doubled its dollar working balances to $200 million and, thereby, 
reduced the potential gold drain that the U.S. Treasury faced (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, 
pp. 7-8).   
The Treasury viewed the Swiss franc operation, as it did the German mark interventions, 
as highly successful, contending that without it, the United States would have lost somewhere 14 
 
between $250 million and $400 million in gold reserves (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 8).  
At the end of January 1962, the Treasury had $146.5 million worth of outstanding Swiss franc 
forward contracts.  Profits on the operation amounted to $450 thousand.   
In February 1962, the Swiss franc began to weaken, requiring the SNB to support it with 
dollar sales.  To acquire the necessary dollar balances, the SNB sold the Treasury $73.5 million 
in gold and $93.2 million in Swiss francs through May 1962.
22  Part of the Swiss franc purchases 
($28.1 million equivalent) were on a swap basis.
23  The Treasury used Swiss franc balances to 
liquidate forward commitments and the certificates of indebtedness as they matured (Bulletin, 
September 1962, p. 1145).  
 Netherlands guilder Intervention 
In September 1961, the U.S. Treasury purchased $15 million worth of Netherlands 
guilder, most of which it invested in guilder securities.  With these funds providing cover, the 
Treasury undertook $4.9 million (equivalent) in forward sales of guilder through the Netherlands 
Bank in the Dutch market beginning in January 1962.  In February, the Treasury acquired an 
additional $15 million worth of guilder, raising its total to $30 million, and expanded its forward 
operations (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 10).  Treasury forward guilder sales in January 
and February 1962 reached $20.8 million (equivalent) (Desk Report, 1963 p. B-22).  In July 
1962, Britain made a large drawing of guilder from the IMF, which it used to buy dollars from 
the Netherlands Bank.  To replenish its dollar reserves, the Netherlands Bank sold $20 million 
guilder (equivalent) to the Treasury under a temporary swap agreement (Bulletin, September 
1962, p. 1145).  Hence, the Treasury’s operations were more than covered and any excessive 
inflow of dollars had ended. 
Italian Lira Interventions 
In 1961, strong dollar inflows pushed the Italian lira to its upper parity limit and kindled 
rumors of a revaluation.  As Italy’s dollar-to-gold reserve ratio rose, Italian authorities undertook 
dollar swaps with domestic commercial banks that covered the latter’s dollar exposure.  (We 
discuss the mechanics of these market swaps below.)  The temporary cover that these swaps 
provided to the Italian commercial banks encouraged them to hold dollar balances instead of 
converting them to lira at the Bank of Italy.  The transactions could be renewed.   
In January 1962, the U.S. Treasury took over $200 million of these swaps, obligating it to 
deliver lira forward.  The Treasury obtained some cover for its commitments through a $150 
million (equivalent) credit line with Italian authorities.  The Treasury acquired an additional 
$100 million of these swap obligations in March.  In early 1962, the Treasury also undertook 
some experimental spot lira transactions (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, pp. 10-11).     
Gold Swaps  
In addition to these foreign-currency transactions, the U.S. Treasury undertook a series of 
three-month gold swaps with the Swiss National Bank and with the Bank of England in 1961.  In 
March, the Treasury sold gold to the SNB for $25 million worth of Swiss francs under an 
agreement to reverse the transaction on June 30.  At maturity, the Treasury rolled the swap over 
until 29 July 1961, and also undertook a second $25 million gold swap, which it reversed on 13 
July 1961.  The Treasury undertook a $50 million (equivalent) gold swap with the Bank of 
England in April 1961, which matured in equal parts in May and July of that year.   15 
 
The purpose of these gold swaps is not entirely clear.  The Treasury reports that: “These 
gold transactions were undertaken at U.S. initiative and were designed to smooth out random 
short-run fluctuations in the Treasury’s gold stock.” (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, pp. 11-
12).  That may be, but another objective—particularly in the Swiss case—may have been to keep 
the ratio of dollar reserves to gold below levels that may have required these countries to 
exchange dollars for U.S. gold.   
5.  The Federal Reserve’s Decision to Intervene
24   
Both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System viewed the Treasury’s exchange-
market interventions in 1961 and early 1962 as unmitigated successes (FOMC Minutes, 
September 9, 1961, p. 44).  The Treasury had acted against short-term speculative movements 
of funds and easily—and profitably—unwound its positions when those speculative pressures 
reversed.   
The ability of the U.S. Treasury to mount another broader dollar defense, however, was 
severely limited.  By late 1962, the ESF had assets equal to approximately $340 million, but a 
large portion of this was committed to stabilization agreements with Latin American countries.  
This left the ESF with a paltry $100 million equivalent in European currencies and only about 
$20 million to $25 million available for acquiring additional foreign exchange.
25   
The Treasury welcomed and encouraged the Federal Reserve’s participation in foreign-
exchange-market interventions primarily because it would increase the amount of funds 
available for such operations.
26  Since March 1961, the Federal Reserve had sharpened its 
expertise in the area as the agent for the U.S. Treasury and foreign central banks, but the 
Treasury already had access to the Desk’s expertise.  What the Treasury needed was the Federal 
Reserve’s seemingly boundless capacity to create reserves and to acquire additional foreign 
exchange.   
On 13 February 1962, the FOMC authorized intervention in the foreign-exchange market 
for the System’s own account.  By participating with the Treasury, the Fed hoped to reassert, and 
possibly extend, its dormant influence in this area.  In fact, Chairman Martin may have wanted to 
bring the entire foreign-exchange operation into the Federal Reserve’s domain (FOMC, Minutes, 
March 6, 1962, p. 72).  Foreign-exchange transactions closely paralleled and often interacted 
with domestic monetary-policy operations, so much so that many countries viewed intervention 
as solely a central-bank function.  The Federal Reserve Act did not explicitly preclude such 
activities, and indeed the System had undertaken foreign-exchange operations in the past.  One 
way or another, U.S. foreign-exchange operations were going forward, and the System wanted to 
shape their development.   
  To be sure, support for intervention within the System at the time was not unanimous.  
The debates at the FOMC meetings in late 1961 and early 1962 raised issues that would 
resurface periodically over the next 35 years, with the exception that as time went on, dissenters 
became more concerned about the adverse interactions between intervention and monetary 
policy and less concerned about its legality than they were in the early 1960s.  Nevertheless, a 
clear majority of FOMC members have always favored System foreign-exchange operations, 
provided that they did not make the Fed in any way subservient to the Treasury, that they did not 
raise the ire of Congress, and—eventually—that they did not interfere with the domestic 
objectives of monetary policy.   16 
 
Legal Authority for System Interventions 
  At their 12 September 1961 meeting, FOMC participants first formally discussed System 
participation in foreign-exchange operations.  Chairman William McChesney Martin, with strong 
support from the New York Federal Reserve Bank, advocated the System’s participation.  To his 
mind, there was “no question but that this country was going to be in the business of foreign-
exchange operations,” and he wanted the Federal Reserve involved either alone, or in 
conjunction with the U.S. Treasury (FOMC, Minutes, 12 September 1961, p. 44).   
Martin contended that the public did not distinguish between the Federal Reserve and the 
U.S. Treasury in foreign-exchange operations.  Moreover, congressmen had already asked him 
informally if the Fed approved of the Treasury’s actions, which he interpreted as indicating that 
the Fed’s opinion was important in these matters.  To Martin, participating was imperative, even 
if the Fed’s role was very limited.  He realized, however, “that the primary direction must come 
from the Treasury and that everything done by the Federal Reserve must be coordinated with the 
Treasury.” (FOMC, Minutes, September 12, 1961, p. 49)  Martin did not think this threatened the 
System’s independence.  He always contended that the Federal Reserve was independent within 
the government and was not independent of the government.  His distinction implied that the 
System must coordinate and cooperate with the Treasury as far as possible and particularly in 
government actions that did not directly interfere with monetary-policy decisions (see Bremner, 
2004, and Meltzer, 2005).  Intervention, he believed, was just such an action.   
The FOMC’s primary concern was Congress, whose opinion about Federal Reserve 
intervention in the foreign-exchange market had never been unequivocal and firm.  In the current 
climate, if all went smoothly, Congress probably would acquiesce.  Congress was aware of the 
balance-of-payments problem and sympathetic to the policy dilemma that it posed.  If the Fed’s 
operations incurred a substantial loss or appeared to interfere with foreign policy, however, the 
System’s relations with Congress could deteriorate.  Legislative support for the operations, 
which Congress never explicitly offered, would have eased the FOMC’s concerns.  At a 
minimum, however, the FOMC wanted to be sure that its actions were legal.   
The Federal Reserve Act did refer to specific types of foreign-exchange transactions, and 
at least seven times between 1924 and 1929 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York extended 
credits to foreign central banks to shore up their reserves in defense of their currencies (Task 
Force Paper #1, 1990, pp. 4-5).  In 1925, for example, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
made $200 million worth of gold available to the Bank of England with the understanding that 
the Bank of England would place proceeds from any gold sales in a sterling investment account 
for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see chapter 2).  In 1933, however, Senator Carter 
Glass, whom many regarded as the father of the Federal Reserve Act, criticized these 
transactions, indicating that such “stabilization operations” were inconsistent with the original 
act.  At that time, as discussed below, the Board of Governors took a position that was not 
inconsistent with Senator Glass’s view.  In 1934, Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act, 
establishing the ESF specifically for the purpose of intervening (see chapter 3).  But, in passing 
the Gold Reserve Act, did Congress mean to preclude the Federal Reserve from this arena?  
  In 1961, Howard Hackley, the Board of Governors’ general counsel, provided a legal 
interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act that the FOMC would now adopt (see Hackley 1961, 
Todd 1992).
27  The often-cited “Hackley Memo” argued that various sections of the Act—when 
considered together—authorized the Federal Reserve System to hold foreign exchange, to 17 
 
intervene in both the spot and forward markets, and to engage in swap transactions with foreign 
central banks and with the U.S. Treasury. 
Section 14 of the Act seemed the key.  It allowed the System to purchase and sell both 
spot and forward “cable transfers” in both domestic and foreign markets.  Since cable transfers 
were the standard means of acquiring foreign exchange in the early part of the century, section 
14 seemed to sanction—according to Hackley’s interpretation—both types of foreign-exchange 
intervention.  More generally, however, section 12A(c) instructed the Federal Reserve System to 
undertake open-market operations—including transactions in foreign exchange—that 
accommodate commerce and business by promoting sound credit conditions in the United States.  
Defending the dollar, cooperating with foreign central banks and the IMF, and promoting trade 
certainly seemed consistent with this general objective.  Section 12A(b) of the Act also 
specifically required the FOMC’s authorization for all such open-market operations.   
In addition, section 14(e) allowed the Federal Reserve to hold foreign exchange in the 
form of open accounts in foreign countries, to appoint correspondents, and to establish 
agencies.
28  These are necessary aspects of an intervention operation, particularly if the Federal 
Reserve hoped to operate through a foreign commercial bank or a central bank in a foreign 
market.  In the 1930s, however, the Board of Governors interpreted this clause narrowly, arguing 
that the Act allowed the System to open accounts only to facilitate direct intervention 
transactions, but that it did not allow the System to hold foreign currency beyond what was 
immediately necessary for intervention.  This interpretation seemed to preclude holding foreign-
currency positions acquired outright or through swaps.  In 1961, Hackley broadened the 
interpretation, arguing that the FOMC instead could construe the Act as allowing the System to 
maintain such accounts provided that it had a reasonable expectation of using them to finance 
intervention (Hackley, 1961, p. 13).  Accordingly, the System now regarded section 14(e) as 
authorizing it to undertake swaps with other central banks and eventually to amass a huge 
portfolio of foreign exchange.  Hackley’s interpretation was a clear change in the Board’s 
attitude and was in agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s original actions in 
the 1930s.
29   
More problematic for the System, however, was finding legal authority for purchasing 
foreign exchange from the ESF on either a permanent or temporary (warehousing) basis.
30  The 
Banking Act of 1935 prohibited the Federal Reserve from purchasing government obligations 
except in the open market.  Although Congress had permitted some direct purchases of 
government securities during World War II, and although the Fed retained some very limited 
authority to do so after the war, Congress clearly did not want the System lending resources to 
the Treasury “in a manner that might be inconsistent with the System’s monetary and credit 
responsibilities” (Hackley, 1961, p. 18).  Hackley argued that swap agreements with the Treasury 
did not violate the open-market provisions of the Banking Act of 1935.  In contrast to 
government securities, foreign currency was not a liability on the U.S Treasury’s balance sheet; 
therefore, that agency was part of the open market for foreign exchange.  Moreover, Hackly 
asserted, the United States was a “domestic corporation.”  This was a necessary criterion because 
the Federal Reserve Act also limited open-market operations to domestic corporations.  In 
Hackley’s opinion, the System could lawfully buy and sell foreign exchange from the ESF or the 
Treasury.
31  Unlike most of the legal controversies associated with Federal Reserve intervention, 
the debate about the appropriateness of warehousing would never quite disappear (see Broaddus 
and Goodfriend, 1996, and Hetzel, 1996).  Opponents would consistently argue that warehousing 18 
 
constituted a System loan to the ESF using foreign exchange as collateral and was, therefore, 
inappropriate.  It contravened principles of central-bank independence and thereby impinged on 
the credibility of monetary policy.  Proponents would eventually argue that warehousing did not 
constitute a loan, but instead was a straightforward and permissible asset swap between the two 
agencies.   
Other FOMC Objections   
  Aside from the question of the Federal Reserve’s legal authority for intervention, four 
other key issues arose during the FOMC’s discussions in late 1961 and early 1962.  One was 
political:  Some members of the FOMC feared that even if the Federal Reserve Act did provide 
legal authority for intervention, Congress might interpret the Federal Reserve’s involvement as a 
budgetary bailout for the Treasury.  Congress established the ESF specifically for the purpose of 
intervening in the foreign-exchange market, and capitalized the fund with an appropriation of 
$2.0 billion.  In 1945, Congress used $1.8 billion of ESF funds to pay the U.S. contribution to the 
IMF.  Karl Bopp, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, argued that these 
events suggested that Congress intended to limit the amount of funds that the ESF could devote 
to foreign-exchange operations (FOMC, Minutes, 12 September 1961, pp. 49-50).  If so, then the 
System’s unlimited participation with the ESF might appear as a method of circumventing 
Congress’s budgetary authority.  If the ESF wanted more funds for intervention, it should seek a 
larger Congressional appropriation.
32  Moreover, the ESF made loans to developing countries 
and currently had a substantial amount committed to Latin America.  These were essentially 
foreign-policy actions related to State Department functions.  Might Congress view the Federal 
Reserve’s foreign-exchange operations as a back-door means of financing these foreign-policy 
operations?  Could the Federal Reserve become embroiled in a dispute among Congress, the 
Treasury, and the State Department about foreign policy?   
  A second FOMC concern focused on the bureaucratic authority for intervention and its 
implication for Federal Reserve independence.  Congress created the ESF and vested the 
Treasury with primary responsibility for intervention in part because of its dissatisfaction with 
Fed interventions during the 1920s and 1930s.  If the Treasury had primary responsibility for 
intervention, as Chairman Martin acknowledged, could it direct how the Federal Reserve 
operated for the System account?  The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the nation’s primary 
financial officer, is responsible to both the president and the Congress of the United States for 
formulating and implementing all U.S. financial policies, and the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 gave 
the Treasury primary responsibility for intervention.  If, as the FOMC now claimed, the Federal 
Reserve Act authorized the System to conduct foreign-exchange operations independently, the 
potential for conflict with the Treasury existed.  At a minimum, the System’s foreign-exchange 
operations cannot act in a way contrary to U.S. international financial policies (Task Force Paper 
#6, 1990).  In subsequent testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Chairman Martin pledged to avoid conflicts with the Treasury in conducting the System’s 
intervention operations, saying “the System will, of course, coordinate its foreign-exchange 
operations with those of the Treasury Stabilization Fund” (quoted in: Task Force Paper #6, 
1990, p. 1).  Coordination would be on a day-to-day basis.  
In addition, the Board staff assumed that the Treasury could not direct the Federal 
Reserve in operations for the System’s account (FOMC, Minutes, 12 September 1961, p. 51).  
Coombs (1976, p. 72) claims that by agreement the Treasury could veto System intervention 
operation with which it did not agree, and the System could refuse to undertake any operations 19 
 
for its own account with which it did not agree.  In an 18 December 1961, letter to Chairman 
Martin, Treasury Secretary Dillion pledged, “the Treasury on its part would naturally want to 
avoid impinging on the independence of the Federal Reserve System within the Government.”
 33 
The lines of authority were not clearly defined in the early 1960s, and experience would show 
that the Treasury’s preeminence in the area would indeed create difficulties for the Federal 
Reserve System, as when the System attempted to stop intervening in the 1990s.   
  On the surface, the third concern focused on the ability of the Federal Reserve to respond 
quickly to speculative attacks against the dollar, but underlying this may have been a deeper 
concern about who would actually run the show within the Fed and how it would affect the 
relative authority of the FOMC, the Board of Governors, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York.  Many within the Federal Reserve System thought that a special subcommittee of the 
FOMC was necessary to directly oversee foreign-exchange intervention because an emergency 
situation could quickly arise when the full committee was unavailable for consultation and 
immediate decisions.  Making a quick response time all the more crucial, the Fed needed to 
coordinate most operations with foreign central banks, which might be five or even twelve hours 
ahead.  In a memorandum dated 8 February 1962, the Board’s General Counsel, Howard 
Hackley, recommended that foreign-exchange operations be put under the supervision of the 
Board of Governors instead of the FOMC.  The Board meets almost daily and has foreign-
exchange experts on staff.  Moreover, while Hackley contended that the law allowing the Federal 
Reserve to engage in foreign-exchange operations was clear, he also argued that giving control to 
the Board of Governors instead of the FOMC was “…more defensible from a legal standpoint.” 
(FOMC, Minutes, 13 February 1962, p. 64).  Others, including Governor Robertson, who 
opposed Hackley’s interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s authority for intervention, and the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, W. D. Fulton, supported Hackley by 
arguing that the Board was more of a “public body” than the FOMC.  Apparently, because 
elected officials appointed governors, but not Federal Reserve Bank presidents, the former had 
more authority to deal with issues that touched the fringe of foreign policy than the latter.  The 
president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, Eliot Swan, however, articulated the 
underlying concern with Hackley’s recommendation:  “To shift from the Committee to the Board 
might give support to those who would like to change rather basically the fundamental structure 
of the System.”  (FOMC Minutes, 13 February 1962, p. 68)   
While most participants favored maintaining FOMC authority, many thought that a 
smaller management group was necessary to deal with emergency situations.  At issue was the 
extent of a subcommittee’s authority.  A subcommittee with broad authority might not confine its 
activities to administration, but would instead actually make policy (FOMC Minutes, 5 
December 1961, p. 71).  Ultimately, the FOMC decided to authorize a committee consisting of 
the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the FOMC and the Vice Chairman of the Board to 
conduct operations when the full committee was unavailable.  The subcommittee, however, was 
to act within FOMC guidelines, which we discuss below.  This subcommittee could, however, 
set maximum amounts of individual currency holdings, establish exchange-rate limits, review 
and approve any agreements between the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and foreign central 
banks, and take emergency actions when the full FOMC was unavailable.   
  Chairman Martin also wanted the Special Manager, who actually undertook intervention 
operations through the Foreign Exchange Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be 
an employee of the FOMC and not, as currently was the case, an employee of the Federal 20 
 
Reserve Bank of New York.  Not surprisingly, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York objected that this move would reduce the bank’s authority—specifically the authority of its 
directors—and wanted to maintain the current set-up.  The FOMC, however, accepted the 
Chairman’s recommendation and the Special Manager became an employee of the FOMC 
(FOMC, Minutes, 17 April, 1962 pp. 2-3).   
  A final issue focused on the exact role of intervention.  Policy makers at the Federal 
Reserve all seemed to agree that the broad objective of intervention was to defend the dollar, 
thereby reducing gold outflows and bolstering confidence in the dollar’s parity.  But how 
extensive should these operations be?  At one point, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
suggested undertaking seasonal and cyclical interventions to smooth out anticipated balance-of-
payments flows (FOMC, Minutes, 5 December 1961, p. 49).  Some FOMC members, however, 
were concerned that prolonged intervention might actually interfere with balance-of-payments 
adjustment and actually prolong disequilibrium.  Governor Mitchell argued that if a foreign 
country had a balance-of-payments surplus and wanted to acquire gold, the United States should 
accommodate that country.  The United States, therefore, needed a policy to facilitate an orderly 
loss of gold.  Intervention might prevent a sudden loss of gold, but the danger was that absent a 
fundamental policy change, the demand for gold would grow and eventually worsen confidence 
in the official gold price.  Similarly, Governor King feared that “people would be likely to put 
too much reliance on these operations to guard the dollar…” (FOMC, Minutes, 13 September 
1961, p. 55).  Governor Roberts also feared that if the Fed repeatedly disrupted the private 
market’s pricing process, the willingness of private market participants to make a market in 
foreign exchange might deteriorate (FOMC, Minutes, 5 December 1961, p. 60).  For these 
reasons, the FOMC favored only temporary interventions that would offset transitional, 
disequilibrating disruptions in the foreign-exchange market and that would not attempt to avoid 
fundamental market adjustments.  As time would tell, however, distinguishing between 
temporary, disequilibrating developments and those of a more fundamental nature was extremely 
difficult.   
 A Cautious Approach 
  Most FOMC members favored intervention and were sympathetic to Hackley’s 
interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act.  Nevertheless, they wanted to proceed cautiously and 
to first seek, with the cooperation of the Treasury, legislative clarification from Congress 
(FOMC, Minutes, 5 December 1961, pp. 78-79).  In the face of this hesitancy, Chairman Martin, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Alfred Hayes, and First Vice President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Charles Coombs stressed that foreign-exchange markets 
were currently very sensitive to speculative pressures.  They argued for going forward on an 
emergency basis and seeking Congressional approval afterwards.  (The Treasury made a similar 
appeal.)  The sense of urgency swayed the FOMC.  While urgency was the Chairman’s stated 
motivation, he also may have hoped to avoid a full-fledged Congressional review of the 
System’s role in intervention, especially one that might provide an opportunity for other changes 
in the Federal Reserve Act.
34  
On 23 January 1962, with two members dissenting, the FOMC approved foreign-
exchange operations for the System’s account on an experimental basis (FOMC Minutes, 23 
January 23, 1962, p. 41).  Governor Mitchell objected, contending that the System first needed 
Congress’s explicit approval.  Similarly, Governor Roberts dissented, arguing that the Federal 
Reserve Act did not clearly authorize these types of stabilization actions; that the FOMC was 21 
 
basing its decision on incidental authority in the Act, and that Congress intended to confer only 
limited authority for such actions to the Treasury’s ESF.
35   
  In late February 1962, Chairman Martin reported to the House Committee on Banking 
and Exchange that the Federal Reserve “had recently decided to reenter the field of foreign-
exchange transactions.”  He reported that the General Counsel for the U. S. Treasury and the 
Attorney General of the United States concurred with Hackley’s interpretation of the legal basis 
for the FOMC’s decision.  In general, the U.S. Congress accepted the Federal Reserve’s 
interpretation of its authority.  Representatives Henry Reuss and Wright Patman, however, did 
not agree.  Representative Reuss contended: 
Much of the operation that you are doing…seems to me to 
duplicate the foreign exchange stabilization operation that the 
Secretary of the Treasury has very properly undertaken pursuant 
to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.  To me this is a tremendous 
power you have taken upon yourself, and I must serve notice on 
you right now that I consider this an usurpation of the powers of 
Congress…  You come in here and tell us that you propose to go 
off on, if I may say so, a frolic of your own, involving unspecified 
sums without the slightest statutory guidance.”  (quoted in Hetzel, 
1996) 
  The System has since reported on its foreign-exchange operations, and Congress has been 
aware of its activities.  In the 1980s, under the Monetary Control Act, Congress amended section 
14(B)(1) of the Federal Reserve Act to allow the System to invest foreign currencies acquired 
through its foreign-exchange operations in short-term foreign government securities.
36  The 
FOMC has interpreted this as tacit Congressional approval of the Federal Reserve’s foreign-
exchange operations.  Serious concern about the legal authority of the Federal Reserve’s 
intervention activities never again arose within the FOMC.  The System continued to worry that 
Congress might view intervention and related activities as interfering with its appropriations 
power, and remained concerned about how intervention conducted in conjunction with the 
Treasury might interfere with its ability to conduct such operations independently.  Eventually, 
as we detail in chapter 6, FOMC participants worried that intervention and, especially 
warehousing, interfered with Federal Reserve independence and the credibility of monetary 
policy (see Broaddus and Goodfriend, 1996, and Hetzel, 1996).   
Rules of Engagement
37 
On 13 February 1962, the FOMC approved the Authorization Regarding Open Market 
Transactions in Foreign Currencies, the Guidelines for System Foreign Currency Operations, 
and the Continuing Authority Directive on System Foreign Currency Operations.  These 
documents provided the FOMC’s instructions to the Subcommittee of Foreign Exchange, the 
Special Manager, and the Foreign Exchange Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
undertaking foreign-exchange operations for the System’s account.   
 The  Authorization listed the goals of the operations and sanctioned specific types of 
transactions.  As stated in this document, the basic purposes of the operations were:  (1) to 
safeguard the value of the dollar, (2) to improve the efficiency of payments by avoiding 
disorderly conditions, (3) to promote monetary cooperation among central banks and 
international organizations, (4) to moderate temporary international payments imbalances that 22 
 
might adversely affect reserves, and (5) to foster growth in international liquidity compatible 
with the needs of an expanding world economy.  In addition to these basic purposes, the 
document also listed more specific aims for the Federal Reserve’s transactions.  These were:  (1) 
to protect the U.S. gold reserve from international payments flows stemming from temporary 
disequilibrating forces or transitional market disturbances, (2) to temper abrupt changes in spot 
rates and moderate forward premia and discounts judged to be disequilibrating, (3) to supplement 
exchange arrangements such as those made through the IMF, and (4) to provide a means 
whereby reciprocal holdings of foreign currencies might contribute to international liquidity 
needs.   The Authorization allowed spot and forward transactions at prevailing rates in both U.S. 
and foreign markets and allowed transactions with the ESF.   
 The  Authorization also provides guidance with respect to communications.  Besides 
keeping the FOMC informed of the operations, the Authorization required close consultation 
with foreign central banks, and also instructed the chairman to keep the Secretary of the Treasury 
fully advised about System foreign-currency operations.  The chairman was to consult with the 
secretary on all matters that related to Treasury responsibilities, and the Federal Reserve staff 
was to transmit all pertinent information about System foreign-currency operations to the U.S. 
Treasury.  A daily conference call would take place among representatives of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see U.S. Treasury, 
Memorandum, 1962, pp. 5-6).  At this call, participants would discuss current market conditions 
and any planned operations.  At the end of the day, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
would provide all principals a summary of the day’s operations.  The Authorization also 
instructed the chairman to report periodically to the National Advisory Council on International 
Monetary and Financial Problems.  The FOMC also understood that the System and the Treasury 
would consult before “either entered into any agreements with foreign central banks or 
governments regarding possible foreign-currency operations.” (FOMC Minutes 13 February 
1962, p. 93).  The Authorization established the aforementioned subcommittee for foreign-
exchange operations to instruct the special manager when the full FOMC was unavailable.   
 The  Guidelines are more explicit with respect to current operations.  On 13 February 
1962, they limited the holdings of foreign currency to an amount that would allow the Foreign-
Exchange Desk to “exert a market influence,” and to cover outstanding forward commitments.  It 
also instructed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on operating procedures.  The Desk was 
to transact at prevailing exchange rates and was not to attempt to establish rates that were 
inconsistent with underlying market forces.  Absent explicit authorization to the contrary, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York was to purchase foreign currencies at, or below their par 
values and was to lower the rate that it paid for any foreign currency as the amount that the Bank 
held approached the limits that the FOMC set.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was to 
follow a similar technique for sales of foreign exchange.  The document also required that 
operations be coordinated in the sense of not acting at cross purposes with another central bank.    
 The  Guidelines indicated that spot intervention was appropriate “whenever exchange-
market instability threatens to produce disorderly conditions” and listed some conditions (e.g., 
political tensions, wide interest-rate differentials) that might signal such developments (FOMC 
Minutes 13 February 1962, p. 88).  Forward operations were appropriate when forward premia or 
discounts were inconsistent with interest-rate differentials or when such forward operations 
“encourage[ed] the retention or accumulation of dollar holdings abroad.” (FOMC Minutes 13 
February 1962, p. 89) This latter condition allowed for swap transactions.  The Guidelines also 23 
 
allowed the FOMC to take over outstanding forward contracts that the ESF originated.  The 
System also agreed to purchase foreign currencies that the Treasury acquired under existing 
credit arrangements with foreign central banks and governments and to do likewise—after 
consultation—in the future, and to buy foreign currencies that the Treasury acquired from the 
IMF (FOMC Minutes, 13 February 1962, p. 94).  Moreover, the System agreed “to purchase 
currencies…from the Treasury either outright or under mutually satisfactory resale agreement 
[warehousing], in the event that exchange-market developments obliged the Fund to exhaust 
available resources.” (FOMC Minutes, 13 February 1962, p. 94).   
 The  initial  Continuing Authority sanctioned transactions in:  British pounds, French 
francs, German marks, Italian lira, Netherlands guilders, and Swiss francs, with total holdings 
not to exceed $500 million.  This limitation and listing of currencieswould frequently change to 
accommodate broader operations.  
Acquiring an Initial Position   
With a balance-of-payments deficit and the dollar often trading at the lower end of parity 
bands, the Fed needed foreign exchange to mount a dollar defense, but any purchase of foreign 
exchange would supply more dollars to the market, put additional downward pressure on the 
dollar, and increase the potential drain of U.S. gold reserves (see U.S. Treasury, Memorandum, 
1962).  The Fed looked to acquire a small amount of foreign exchange from the market or from 
foreign central banks whenever a fortuitous opportunity presented itself, and some occasions 
arose in early 1962.  In addition, the Treasury sold outright to the Federal Reserve System $32 
million equivalent German marks in February and March, and $0.5 million equivalent each in 
Swiss francs, Netherlands guilder, and Italian lira (Desk Report 1963).  The Treasury also agreed 
to sell to the Federal Reserve System, either outright or through repurchase agreements, 
currencies held by the ESF, if the ESF exhausted its available dollar funds for foreign-exchange 
operations.  These currencies permitted the System to open accounts with the central banks of 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy.  The System already had British sterling and 
French francs in accounts with the Bank of England and with the Bank of France (FOMC Scope 
and Character, 1962, p. 1).
38   Holding large balances in a wide range of foreign currency 
increased the risks of a valuation loss (Coombs 1976, p. 74).   
The System also established a series of reciprocal currency arrangements—the swap 
network—with major central banks.  The swap network, which became the Federal Reserve’s 
key mechanism for intervention, provided the System and foreign central banks an off-market 
means of financing interventions during the Bretton Woods era.   
6. Mechanisms of Exchange-Rate Policy   
  During the Bretton Woods era, the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury 
intervened using various mechanisms, which we review in this section.  Although the System the 
Treasury often worked in tandem, adopting the similar techniques at the same time, a clear 
division of responsibility existed between these agencies.  The Federal Reserve focused on short-
term operations, typically financed through drawings on its swap lines.  Ideally, the System 
would soon reverse these transactions, so exchange-rate exposure and exchange loss generally 
were not big concerns.  The U.S. Treasury, as noted, often engaged in similar short-term 
operations, but because of its clearer authority for intervention, the Treasury also undertook 
operations of a longer-term nature.  Most importantly, as per a 23 July 1962 understanding 
between Chairman Martin and Treasury Secretary Fowler, the Treasury stood ready to backstop 24 
 
System operations if market conditions prevented the Federal Reserve from reversing a swap 
drawing on time.  To do so, the Treasury could either issue foreign-currency-denominated 
securities—short-term certificates of indebtedness or long-term Roosa bonds—or draw foreign 
exchange from the International Monetary Fund, or sell gold for foreign exchange and then sell 
the proceeds of these transactions to the Federal Reserve.   In addition, the U.S. government 
sometimes cajoled foreign governments into holding larger dollar portfolios.   
Reciprocal Currency Agreements—Swap Lines   
  From 1962 until the closing of the U.S. gold window in August 1971, the Reciprocal 
Currency Arrangements, or swap lines, were the Federal Reserve System’s key mechanism for 
defending the U.S. gold stock, and they became an important means for temporarily providing 
dollar liquidity to foreign central banks.
39  Swaps involve the simultaneous spot purchase and 
forward sale of one currency against another.
40  The transactions provided both the System and 
participating foreign central banks with short-term credits for dealing with temporary and 
unwanted changes in official dollar reserves.  Temporary—the key operative word—implied 
reserve changes that monetary authorities expected to quickly turn around.  Countries were not to 
use swap drawings to avoid fundamental balance-of-payments adjustments, although 
distinguishing between temporary and fundamental problems proved a formidable, often 
impossible, task.   
Ideally, “the very existence of the arrangements, even when they [were] not used, [was] 
thought to have a stabilizing effect.”  (Holland, 1 February 1967, pp. 4-5; see also Solomon 13 
August 1971)  This passive influence occurred through two channels:  For one thing, the swap 
lines signaled central-bank cooperation and, thereby, mitigated uncertainty that otherwise might 
foster speculative activity.  In addition, the existence of the swaps raised the potential costs of 
speculation.  Central banks often increased the swap lines during tumultuous periods, but as 
figure 7 shows, they never drew on the full capacity of the lines.  Swaps offered a threat to 
speculators.   
The swap mechanism functioned as follows:  The Federal Reserve System would sell 
U.S. dollars spot to a foreign central bank for its own currency and immediately sell that foreign 
currency back to that same foreign central bank for delivery at a set future date (see Task Force 
Paper #9, 1990).
41   The repayment would terminate the swap drawing, but not the line.  Central 
banks, in almost all cases, annually negotiated—on a bilateral basis—overall credit limits for the 
swap lines.  Drawings initially had a term of three months, but could be renewed once if the 
parties agreed.  (The swap line with the National Bank of Belgium had an initial six-month 
term.)  Ideally, banks were not to seek a second renewal, and “every effort was made to prevent a 
facility from being in continuous use for as long as a year.” (Task Force Paper #9, 1990, p. 3)  
The System’s lines—unlike the Treasury’s—were reciprocal, meaning that either party could 
initiate a drawing.  
Because swaps provided only temporary credits under a pegged-rate system, they were 
unlikely to result in large losses.  Quite the contrary, when all things work according to design, 
the central bank that drew on the swap line tended to profit from the operation, because it sold 
foreign exchange against its own currency when its own currency was trading below par and 
bought foreign exchange to repay the line when its currency had appreciated (Bodner 1970, p.1).  
Because swaps were relatively safe, central banks did not apply conditions, such as the adoption 25 
 
of macroeconomic policies or the application for funds from the IMF, to their use.
42  This made 
them readily available.  Only a two-day notice was necessary for a drawing.   
Participants undertook the spot leg of the swap at prevailing market exchange rates.  
During the Bretton Woods era, the forward leg of any transaction was undertaken at the same 
exchange rate.  Hence, the swap itself incurred no exchange-rate risk.  The central bank that 
drew on a swap line and used the foreign exchange for intervention, however, was exposed to 
exchange-rate risk, since it did not know the precise price of obtaining foreign exchange to retire 
the swap drawing.  To protect the debtor bank should the creditor bank revalue its currency 
during the term of a swap drawing, the lines included “revaluation clauses” allowing the 
borrowing central bank to obtain from the creditor central bank sufficient foreign exchange to 
repay its obligation at a market-based exchange rate prevailing prior to the revaluation.  As we 
will see revaluation clauses proved problematic in the face of a dollar depreciation, and they did 
not apply to the adoption of a float.  The System exercised a revaluation clause on once, in May 
1971, against the Netherlands Bank.   
In all cases, the central bank initiating the swap also paid interest on its borrowings.  The 
creditor central bank invested the foreign currency that it acquired from the debtor central bank 
for the term of the swap in a time deposit or in some other interest-earning asset. (The debtor 
would do likewise with any unused balances.)  During the Bretton Woods era, both the interest 
rate that the creditor country received and the interest rate that the borrower received were equal 
to the interest rate on three-month U.S. Treasury bills.
43   If necessary, interest effectively could 
be paid by adjusting the spot and forward exchange rates on the swap.   
In March 1962, the Federal Reserve established its first swap line with the Bank of 
France.
44  The System drew on this line, renewed it once, and repaid the line in August 1962.  
The System did not intervene with the funds so acquired; the operation was a test of the 
mechanisms.  The French franc swap line then existed on standby status.  In May 1962, the 
System established a second line with the Bank of England.  Again, the System drew on the line 
to test the “telex, investment, and other technical procedures” involved with the operations 
(Coombs 1976, p. 79).  By the end of that year, the System had established lines with eight key 
European central banks and the Bank of Canada that provided up to $900 million equivalent in 
foreign exchange.
45  The network continued to grow, and it evolved from a small, very short-
term credit facility in 1962 to a large, intermediate-term facility by the closing of the U.S. gold 
window on 15 August 1971 (see figure 7).  By then, the swap network totaled $11.2 billion 
equivalent and involved 14 central banks, having picked up the central banks of Denmark, Japan, 
Mexico, Norway and Sweden over the intervening years.
46  In addition, the term of a typical 
swap drawing increased from the original 3 months to 6 months.  The expansion of the swap 
lines was a natural consequence of both the mounting threat to the U.S. gold stock and the 
growing volume of international transactions, but the increasing length of swap drawings and the 
frequent tendency to renew them suggested that the underlying disequilibrium was of a more 
fundamental than temporary nature.   
Providing Cover  
Between 1962 and the closing of the U.S. gold window in 1971, the Federal Reserve 
borrowed $11.5 billion worth of foreign exchange through its swap lines (see figure 8).  
Usually—but not exclusively—the System used these funds to provide foreign central banks 
with cover for temporary, undesirable surges in their dollar balances and, thereby, to discourage 26 
 
these central banks from quickly converting unwanted dollars into gold with the U.S. Treasury.  
To accomplish this, the System used the foreign exchange that it obtained in a swap drawing to 
acquire dollars from the same foreign central bank.  This set of transactions—the swap drawing 
and the acquisition of dollars—left the foreign central bank holding exactly the same amount of 
dollars as it did before the swap took place.  The dollars that the foreign central bank now held, 
however, were free of foreign exchange risk since the Federal Reserve contracted to buy them 
back via the forward leg of the swap at a set exchange rate.   
By far, the System undertook the largest cover operations with the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB), and these serve as an example of the pitfalls and benefits of these types of operations.  
Between 1962 and 1971, the System drew nearly $4.7 billion equivalent Swiss francs from swap 
lines with the Swiss National Bank and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).  The System 
established a Swiss franc swap line with the BIS in 1962 to supplement its line with the SNB, 
which faced statutory limits on loans to non-Swiss banks (Task Force Paper #9, 1990, p.11).  
The Swiss franc drawings amounted to over 40% of all System drawings during the Bretton 
Woods era.   
At the time, the Swiss franc functioned as a key safe-haven currency, attracting funds that 
flowed out of British pounds, U.S. dollars, and other overvalued currencies.  Because these flows 
involved dollars either directly or as a vehicle currency, they typically left the SNB holding 
unwanted dollar exposures.  Absent a mechanism to provide cover, the SNB undoubtedly would 
have shed these dollars for gold.   
In mid-1962, for example, persistent speculative inflows lifted the Swiss franc to the 
upper limits of its parity range against the dollar.  Forced to intervene, the SNB acquired U.S. 
dollars in excess of its informal limits.  Special Manager Charles Coombs feared that “Unless we 
can … mop up a sizable proportion of the dollars recently taken in by the Swiss National Bank 
we face the prospect of very large gold losses which might easily trigger off an avalanche of 
demand from other quarters.” (FOMC Minutes, 10 July 1962, pp. 52-53; emphasis added).  In 
response, the System opened the two aforementioned Swiss franc swap lines, each for $100 
million, and immediately drew $50 million worth of Swiss francs from each line to provide cover 
to the SNB.   
Because they matured in three months, shortly after making the drawings, the System 
looked for opportunities to acquire Swiss francs to repay the swaps.  A window of opportunity 
presented itself from late summer until the Cuban missile crisis in mid-October 1962, during 
which time pressures on the Swiss franc subsided.  The System bought Swiss francs in the 
market, but could not acquire enough Swiss francs to pay off all of its outstanding obligations, 
because, despite the relative calm, the Swiss franc often traded above its par value, and the 
FOMC prohibited the Desk from buying foreign exchange at exchange rates above par.
47  The 
System’s second option was to buy the necessary Swiss francs from the SNB, but with dollars 
still trickling into Switzerland, the SNB was reluctant to sell Swiss francs to the Desk and 
acquire still more dollars in the bargain.  On 2 October 1962, Coombs asked the FOMC to renew 
for an addition three months all outstanding Swiss franc swap lines with the SNB and the BIS.  
This seemingly innocuous roll-over, however, pointed to the fundamental problem with the swap 
network.  How much time was necessary to distinguish between a temporary and fundamental 
disequilibrium, or when should the U.S. Treasury settle in gold?   27 
 
In early 1963, a second window of opportunity opened, and the System managed to 
liquidate $80 million worth of its $105 million equivalent Swiss franc obligations, by buying 
Swiss francs in the market, from the U.S. Treasury, and from the SNB.  The System, however, 
also took a new tack.  On 28 May 1963, the FOMC authorized the Desk to swap $13 million 
equivalent British pounds from its portfolio for Swiss francs with the BIS.  Despite the limits on 
swap maturities and rollovers, the System did not repay this drawing until the end of 1964—well 
over one year.  Using this, so-called, third-party swap to extinguish a bilateral swap, however, 
does not discharge the System’s short position, but merely changes the currency composition of 
that position and extends the maturity of the System’s liability.  In addition, it reduces the 
liquidity of the System’s overall long position in foreign exchange (see Board of Governors 21 
March 1966, p. 35).   
By mid 1963, rising Swiss money market rates attracted renewed dollar inflows, and 
following the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, the Swiss francs again 
reached the top of the parity band.  The situation led to new rounds of intervention, with the 
System providing additional cover to the SNB.  By early 1964, the System owed the SNB $70 
million worth of Swiss francs and owed the BIS $145 million worth of Swiss francs.   
Once again the Swiss franc traded above par, and the System could not acquire sufficient 
Swiss francs to repay its outstanding commitments.  Consequently, in May 1964, the parties 
involved agreed on a series of measures to reduce the System’s outstanding debt.  The Treasury 
issued $70 million worth of Swiss-franc-denominate Roosa bonds to the BIS and sold the 
proceeds outright to the Federal Reserve, which repaid an equivalent amount of Swiss-franc debt 
to the BIS.  Through this transaction, the BIS substituted long-term dollar-denominated debt for 
short-term dollar-denominated debt on its books.  In June 1964, the Bank of Italy swapped $100 
million equivalent Italian lire for Swiss francs with SNB and sold the Swiss franc thus acquired 
to the Federal Reserve System for dollars to bolster Italian reserves.  The System retired its 
outstanding commitments to the SNB, but to do so, the SNB had substituted lira-denominated 
assets for dollar-denominated assets on its books.  In late June, the System paid down its Swiss 
franc debt to the BIS with francs that it obtained via the U.S. Treasury from gold sales to the 
SNB.   
In late 1964 and early 1965, funds again poured into Switzerland, and the System again 
drew on its Swiss franc swap lines to offer cover.  This time, however, the situation quickly 
reversed.  By spring, Swiss commercial banks began placing funds abroad, and the SNB 
eventually began selling dollars in support of the Swiss franc for the first time since 1962.  Under 
these circumstances the System was able to acquire Swiss francs in the market, from the SNB, 
and through transactions with other central banks to cover its outstanding obligations by mid-
year.  The System’s swap line reverted to standby status although the System still had a Swiss 
franc obligation with the BIS stemming from a German mark cross swap.  In 1966, funds again 
moved out of Switzerland and into the Eurodollar market, and the Swiss National Bank sold 
dollars to moderate the franc’s decline.  To replenish its dollar reserves the SNB sold Swiss 
francs to the Treasury and System.  In addition, the SNB sold gold to the Treasury.   
Operation to provide cover persisted until the closing of the gold window in August 
1971.  The System frequently encountered problems similar to those experienced with Swiss 
franc swaps and resorted to similar fixes.  All in all, however, the System’s swap lines often 
succeeded in preventing countries from converting temporary inflows of unwanted dollar 
reserves into Treasury gold.  Between 1962 and the end of 1969, Federal Reserve swap drawings 28 
 
totaled nearly $7 billion equivalent.
48  In general, reversals in flows into foreign countries—as 
described in the Swiss franc example—enabled the System to repay approximately three-fourths 
of its swap drawings.  Repayments out of gold sales amounted to only $186 million.  The 
issuance of U.S. Treasury bonds denominated in foreign currencies and U.S. drawings on the 
IMF financed the remainder.  From the end of 1969 through the 12 August 1971, the System 
drew $4.5 billion in foreign currencies through the swap lines.  Suggestive of the deteriorating 
position of the dollar, the Treasury had to finance most of the repayments through the sale of 
reserve assets.  
Temporary Liquidity 
The Federal Reserve’s swap lines were reciprocal, meaning that foreign central banks 
could initiate drawings when they need a temporary increase in their dollar liquidity.  During the 
Bretton Woods era this became an important function of the swap lines.  Between 1962 and 
1971, foreign central banks initiated drawing of $15.3 billion dollars (figures 8).  The Bank of 
England undertook over one-half of these drawings in defense of the pound’s exchange rate, as 
we discuss below.    
Canada was the first to draw on the new swap lines for liquidity purposes.  In March 
1962, the Canadian dollar, which had floated since September 1950, came under strong 
downward pressure as monetary and fiscal policies eased and speculative pressures on the 
Canadian dollar intensified.
49  In an effort to restore stability and confidence to the market, 
Canada established a par value for the dollar at US$ 0.9250 on 2 May 1966.  Intense speculative 
pressure followed because the market anticipated a rate closer to US$ 0.90 and believed the new 
peg would not hold.    
On 26 June 1962, the Federal Reserve System opened with the Bank of Canada a $250 
million swap line—five times the size of any other line then in existence.  In addition to the swap 
line, Canada received credits from the IMF ($300 million), the Bank of England ($100 million) 
and the U.S. Export-Import Bank ($400 million).  The Bank of Canada immediately drew down 
the entire amount of the swap line and used the proceeds to defend the newly established parity.  
The drawing had an initial maturity of 26 September 1962, but the Bank of Canada renewed it 
for another three months.  Financial flows into Canada had resumed by fall 1962, enabling 
Canada to repay the swap by year’s end.   
Despite the success of the Canadian operation, the System feared that the existing of 
temporary dollar liquidity through the swap lines might actually discourage foreign central banks 
from holding additional dollar balances, and indeed this seems to have happened.  “Of the eleven 
countries with which the System has concluded swap arrangements, five (Belgium, France, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom) only hold necessary working balances in official 
dollar balances.  Among the others, Germany has cut its dollar holdings in half since the end of 
1961, and Austria and Canada have kept their dollar holdings at about their 1961 levels.  Only 
Italy, Japan and Sweden have substantially increased their official dollar holdings, and only in 
the case of Italy has this behavior been clearly attributable to the cover given by inter-official 
transactions.” (Board of Governors 21 March 1966, p. 31).    
Other uses 
The System established the second swap line—in addition to its Swiss franc line—with 
the BIS in 1965 to provide that bank with a means of acquiring temporary cash for routine 29 
 
transactions and to provide the System with access to additional foreign currencies.  Previously 
the BIS had borrowed against gold that it held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  The 
System soon began using this swap line to supply funds to the Eurodollar market during times of 
strain when high Eurodollar rates would draw funds from the United States (Task Force Paper 
#9, 1990 p. 12).   The System asked the BIS to draw dollars on its non-Swiss franc swap line and 
to place the funds in the Eurodollar market.
50  Previously, the System had asked foreign central 
banks to place dollar balances in the Eurodollar market during times of stress, particularly if the 
stress threatened to affect the foreign-exchange market.  The System sometimes provided 
forward cover to facilitate such operations (MacLaury 1969, p.10).  These placements became 
fairly routine, but often were insufficient to the task.  The System intended the BIS operations as 
a supplemental arrangement.  The Federal Reserve chiefly undertook BIS interventions under 
two circumstances: a spike in Eurodollar interest rates and downward pressure on the British 
pound (MacLaury 1969, p.12).  Almost all such drawings were repaid within a month, either at, 
or prior to, their maturity date.  The only exception occurred in a November 1967 drawing that 
extended for two months.  After England, the BIS was the heaviest drawer on the U.S. swap 
lines, accounting for nearly 15% of the drawing between 1962 and 1971.   
Sterilization. 
  Swap drawings have the potential to affect U.S. bank reserves, depending on what the 
Federal Reserve does with the foreign currency that it receives—the Desk can buy dollars or 
hold and invest the funds—and what the foreign central bank does with the correspond dollars—
it can buy foreign exchange, buy Treasury securities, hold a deposit at the Federal Reserve or 
place the funds in the Eurodollar market.  In any case, however, the Federal Reserve can easily 
sterilize the transaction to any extent necessary.  The Manager of the domestic desk in 
determining the appropriate amount of open-market operations to undertake on a particular day 
regularly took account of changes in foreign accounts at the Federal Reserve, changes in 
Treasury cash balances, changes in float, and changes in currency in circulation.  Many of these 
can change following a swap drawing.  In addition, close communications between central banks 
and with the Bank for International Settlements generally kept the desk appraised of any 
prospective swap drawing and aware of the anticipated use of the funds.  At times the System has 
requested a particular use of the dollars from a swap drawing that it initiated.  The desk’s ability 
to sterilize was further enhanced because the value date of a swap drawing occurs two business 
days after the transaction date.  McLaury (1969, p. 9) summarized the System’s review of 
sterilization:   
“In practice, the size of foreign drawings, large as they have been at times, has 
not been more than the domestic trading desk could offset—for the most part 
immediately—through open market operations.  So long as the availability of 
the swap line is unconditional, the reserve consequences of foreign drawings 
are one of the operating factors that the Manager for domestic operations has 
to take into account in determining the size or direction of his own operations 
in any given day or week.  They thus fall in the category of changes in 
Treasury cash balances, changes in float, and changes in currency in 
circulation.” (McLaury 1969, p. 9) 
  The effect is no different than the normal problems that the Desk faces because the dollar 
is a reserve and vehicle currency.   
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Spot market operations   
  Spot market interventions played a comparatively minor part of U.S. exchange market 
operations between 1962 and 1971.  The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury generally did not 
regard spot market intervention as an effective means of preventing a persistent run on the U.S. 
monetary gold stock—the key U.S. objective.
51  At best, spot market interventions might 
contribute tangentially to this objective.  In addition, the Board feared that spot market 
interventions, if they successfully alter one exchange rate, might create a “broad range” of 
arbitrage incentives through other currencies, requiring simultaneous interventions across a 
broad swath of currencies (Board of Governors 21 March 1966 p.16).  Consequently, the onus of 
spot market intervention stayed with foreign monetary authorities who established par values for 
their currencies in terms of the dollar.   
Although spot market transactions did not directly forestall a drain on the U.S. monetary 
gold stock, U.S. authorities occasionally intervened to calm developments that, if left unchecked, 
might grow to threaten the existing parity structure.  The most notable occasion occurred 
immediately following President Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November 1963.  At this time, 
trading in the New York market essentially stopped.  To prevent panic selling, which seemed to 
afflict the stock market at the time, the Foreign Exchange Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY) placed large orders to sell all major currencies at the exchange rates that 
existed just prior to the assassination.  By the close of business, the Desk had sold $23.5 million 
equivalent German marks, British pounds, Netherlands guilders, Canadian dollars, and Swiss 
francs.  On that same day, the Bank of Canada bought $24.5 million to support the dollar against 
its Canadian counterpart.  (The System then acquired $14 million from the Bank of Canada 
through its swap arrangement.)  The European markets were closed at the time of the 
assassination.  When they reopened, foreign central banks intervened in their spot markets, but 
by then, markets had settled down.     
  Similarly, news of the Cuban missile crisis on 22 October 1962 generated large financial 
flows out of dollars and into Continental currencies, especially Swiss francs.  If left unchecked, 
the Desk feared, these financial flows might raise doubts about the structure of the exchange 
rates.  Moreover, by placing unwanted dollars in the Swiss National Bank, they contribute to a 
potential drain on the U.S. gold stock.  The Federal Reserve System responded by selling $8 
million equivalent francs into the Swiss spot market through the Swiss National Bank and $2.3 
million equivalent francs into the New York spot market.  (The Swiss National Bank acquired 
$50 million through intervention, and the System drew $20 million equivalent Swiss francs 
through its swap line with the BIS on 31 October 1962 and bought dollars from the Swiss 
National Bank.)  The System also sold $700 thousand equivalent Dutch guilder in the New York 
spot market at the onset of the Cuban missile crisis.   
  Interventions during international crises were relatively isolated events.  Much more 
common between 1962 and 1971 were U.S. efforts to moderate declines (lean against the wind) 
in the German mark-U.S. dollar rate through spot transactions.  These operations ultimately 
sought to reduce expectations of a mark revaluation (see below).  The System often sold German 
marks, which it acquired through the swap drawings, in the German market and after that market 
closed, in the New York market.
52   
  On at least one occasion the System intervened to reinforce an exchange-rate movement.  
In September 1965, the Federal Reserve System, in conjunction with other foreign central banks, 31 
 
bought British pounds in the spot markets.  At the time, speculators held short positions, which 
they needed to cover and were consequently buying British pounds.  By also buying sterling at 
successively higher quotes, the System hoped to reinforce the demand for sterling—to lean with 
the wind.  Sterling began to appreciate.   
  To guard against the possibility that persistent spot market transactions might create 
market distortions, the FOMC’s Guidelines to the Special Manager allow him to “purchase and 
sell authorized currencies at prevailing market rates without trying to establish rates that appear 
to be out of line with underlying market forces.”  Some opponents of intervention, for example, 
worried that interventions could actually encourage further speculative financial flow by 
signaling official concern about the seriousness of a situation.   
Forward Market Operations 
  Beginning in 1964, the Federal Reserve undertook forward-market transactions—often in 
concert with the U.S. Treasury—with the private sector and with foreign central banks.  The 
transactions sought to provide counterparties with cover and to influence the forward exchange 
rate (see Board of Governors 21 March 1966, pp. 24-29).  As noted, the U.S. Treasury found 
forward transactions particularly successful in 1961.  
  The Federal Reserve System often sold foreign exchange forward as a means of provided 
forward cover to private individuals currently holding or expecting soon to acquire, dollar 
balances.  Often this was undertaking in conjunction with a foreign central bank’s spot market 
sale of dollars.  Sometimes it was undertaking as part of a System “market swap,” in which the 
System bought foreign exchange spot and sold it forward into the market.  Lacking the cover that 
such System forward sales provided, these private individuals probably would have sold their 
dollar balances to their respective central banks, which in turn might have converted the 
additional dollar balances to gold.  An example of this type of forward transaction occurred in 
late 1964 and early 1965, when tight monetary conditions attracted funds out of British pounds, 
through dollars and into Netherlands guilder.  In December 1964 and January 1965, the System 
and the Exchange Stabilization Fund, in cooperation with the Netherlands Bank, sold $98.6 
million equivalent and $95.4 million equivalent guilders, respectively, in the forward market.
53  
This gave private individuals holding dollars spot the ability to sell them forward at a know 
exchange rate.   
According to a System analysis, these transactions were effective in holding down the 
accumulation of dollars at the Netherlands Bank over the 8 to 9 month period that they were in 
force (see Board of Governors 21 March 1966, p. 25).  Nevertheless, the transactions left the 
System and the Treasury carrying currency exposures for five and eight months, respectively, 
and raised questions about what constituted a temporary intervention.  As a rule normal Federal 
Reserve swaps drawings with central banks expire within 3 months and parties cannot roll them 
over for more than a year.    
In a somewhat similar type of forward transaction, U.S. monetary authorities sometimes 
offered to “take over” forward commitments from foreign monetary authorities.  In the fall of 
1965, for example, Italian authorities were experiencing substantial dollar inflows that were 
creating excess liquidity in their banking system.  In an effort to reduce liquidity and to shift 
these inflows forward, the Italian Exchange Offices (IEO) undertook swaps with Italian 
commercial banks.  In these transactions, the IEO would sell dollars spot to commercial banks 
for lira, which the IEO would then use to buy dollars spot, and repurchase the lira forward.  32 
 
These so-called market swaps provided commercial banks with cover for their dollar exposures 
at a favorable rate.  Moreover the IEO could roll over the market swaps if necessary until the 
conditions that created the inflow subsided.   
Despite this maneuver, the IEO was under pressure to convert the dollars, which 
ultimately presented them with an exchange-risk exposure, into gold.  In early 1965, the 
Treasury and, later, the System began to take technical responsibilities for the IEO swaps.
54  The 
Treasury started acquiring commitments in March 1965 and these rose to $1.0 billion equivalent 
by November 1965.  The System—under a new authorization—acquired $500 million in forward 
commitments with Italian banks in November 1965.  The IEO agreed to acquire the contracts at 
their final maturity and assumed the normal exchange-rate risks.  The United States, however, 
guaranteed Italian authorities against any losses associated with dollar devaluation.  This 
preferential guarantee posed a dangerous precedent for the United States (see Board of 
Governors, 21 March 1966, p. 28-9).   
Besides these two types of operations to provide cover, U.S. monetary authorities 
frequently undertook forward transactions in an attempt to influence the premium of foreign 
exchange and, thereby, to influence short-term financial flows.  In 1964, for example, the 
forward discount of sterling narrowed, creating an opportunity for covered interest arbitrage.  
Funds began to move from New York to London.  The System undertook a series of swaps with 
the market, buying sterling in the spot market and selling it forward.  The operation apparently 
increased sterling’s forward discount.  These forward contracts, however, matured during a crisis 
in the sterling market, so that the System’s eventual forward sterling sales conflicted with Bank 
of England’s objectives (see Board of Governors, 21 March 1966, p. 26).   
  Although forward sales of foreign exchange typically left the System with an exposure, 
all System forward transactions between 1964 and 1971proved profitable (Coombs 1971, p.2).  
This largely stemmed from the nature of the operations under the Bretton Woods peg-rate 
system.  The System typically undertook forward transactions only when the foreign currency 
was selling at a substantial premium over existing spot rates, which fluctuated with one percent 
of their central parity.  “In most cases” the System only undertook forward operations when the 
forward rate exceeded the spot rate’s ceiling as defined by the central parity (Coombs 1971, p. 
2).  Hence, the System was likely to profit provided that the foreign country did not revalue their 
currency.  Most countries offered the System revaluation guarantees similar to those that existed 
under the swap lines.  Sometimes the System held sufficient foreign exchange balances to cover 
the operations even without a revaluation clause.  On some occasions, as with German marks in 
1971, the System drew foreign exchange on the swap lines when it sold that same foreign 
exchange forward (Coombs 1976, p. 3).  The swap drawing covered the forward commitment, 
while the revaluation clause covered the swap repayment.  Effectively, then the revaluation 
clause extended to the forward commitment.  On at least one occasion, to avoid supplying dollars 
to the Bundesbank, the System drew on the swap 90 days forward, a time consistent with a 
forward sale of German marks.  The Bundesbank extended the revaluation clause to this 
“forward swap drawing (Coombs 1971, pp. 4-5).   
IMF Drawings  
  The ability to draw foreign currencies from the International Monetary Fund provided the 
U.S. Treasury with an additional mechanism with which to temporarily forestall the drain on the 
U.S. gold stock.  Countries that are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can buy 33 
 
(borrower) foreign currencies for intervention purposes against deposits of their own currency at 
the Fund.  The amount that any country can draw on the IMF (as well as its contributions to the 
Fund and its voting rights within the organization) depends on that country’s quota subscription 
to the Fund.  Countries initially paid 75% of their quotas in their domestic currency and 25% in 
either gold or dollars.  In February 1965, the U. S. quota in the IMF amounted to $4.1 billion or 
26% of the total (Yeager 1966, p. 348).   
  The IMF placed certain restrictions on countries borrowing, although these restrictions 
were flexible.  No members could borrow foreign currencies to such an extent that it increased 
the Fund’s holdings of the borrower’s currency in excess of 200% of that country’s quota.  Since 
each country already paid 75% of its quota to the Fund in its own currency, at most a country 
could incur foreign currency debts to the Fund of 125% of its quota.  In addition, no member’s 
borrowings in any twelve-month period may increase the Fund’s holding of its currency by more 
than 25% of its quota.  The rules implied that the Fund could not compel any country, for 
example, a surplus country, to supply additional amounts of its currency to the Fund, except in 
exchange for gold.  Similarly, the IMF could not require a country to loan its currency to the 
Fund to finance emergency borrowings (see Yeager 1966).   
  The Fund structures its loan to emphasize that they are intend for temporary balance-of-
payments problems.  The Fund charges interest on borrowings in proportion to their size and 
duration and has myriad rules regarding repayment.  Generally, however, countries must repay 
loans within 3 to 5 years.  In addition, regardless of the currency borrowed, all loans must be 
repaid in either gold or a convertible currency.  Often loans are provided under stand-by 
agreements that are in force for specific negotiated periods of time.  The United States, for 
example, negotiated a one-year stand-by agreement in July 1963, on which we did not draw until 
February 1964.  Countries can immediately borrow their “gold-tranche,” an amount equal to the 
gold portion of its quota (normally 25%), and can borrow another 25% of its quota without much 
conditionality.  Borrowings of additional amounts require members to undertake programs to 
restore balance of payments equilibrium.   
  Even though member states increased their quotas in 1959, the Fund’s resources were not 
sufficient to meet a large international crisis, particularly a speculative attack on both the U.S. 
dollar and the British pound.  The IMF, for example, lacked sufficient non-dollar, non-sterling 
funds to meet the United States notional right to borrow (James 1996, p. 162)  On 2 October 
1962, ten major industrial countries (G10) agreed to stand ready to loan the Fund their own 
currencies up to a total of $6 billion equivalent for intervention purposes.
55  The facility was 
known as the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB).  Loans would be in accordance with IMF 
policies, but required the consent of the lending countries.    
  Between 1964 and 1968, the United States undertook two types of drawings from the 
IMF, although both ultimately sought to avoid a possible drain of the U.S. monetary gold stock.  
The first, often referred to as technical, stemmed from the reserve currency role of the dollars 
and from IMF rules governing how many dollars that it could hold in its portfolio.  Most 
countries that borrowed from the IMF held their foreign-exchange reserves in dollars and repaid 
their IMF drawings in dollars.  By 1963, however the IMF’s dollar holdings had reached 75% of 
the U.S. quota, and IMF rules precluded borrowing countries from repaying in dollars.  The U.S. 
policy makers feared that if these countries could not repay their IMF obligations in dollars, they 
would do so with gold purchased from the U.S. Treasury.  To avoid this possibility, on 13 
February 1964, the U.S. Treasury undertook the first in a series of foreign-currency drawing 34 
 
from the Fund.  In the initial drawing, the Treasury acquired $130.5 million equivalent German 
marks, French francs, and Italian lira.  These currencies were sold to a wide range of, mostly 
developing, countries for dollars.  The Treasury undertook a second, $125 million equivalent 
drawing of German marks and French francs on 1 June 1964.  Over the course of 1964, the 
Treasury made five such technical drawings in seven Continental European currencies, totaling 
$525 million equivalent.  All but $75 million equivalent was disbursed.   In 1965 and 1966, the 
United States made additional technical drawings from the IMF (Desk Report 1965, 1966).   
  The United States also drew foreign currencies from the IMF to finance more normal 
adjustment purposes.  In 1965, many countries acquired dollars reserves that the System covered 
through the swap mechanism, but because of continuing pressures on dollar exchange rates, the 
prospect for repaying these swaps became slim.  On 30 July 1965, the United States made a $300 
million equivalent, medium-term, multicurrency drawing on the IMF.  The drawing consisted of: 
$180 million equivalent Italian lira, $40 million French francs, $40 million Belgian francs, $25 
million Dutch guilders, and $15 million Swedish kronor.  The Treasury made the Belgian francs 
and most of the Italian lira available to the Federal Reserve to help retire outstanding System 
swap commitments.  This was the first IMF drawing explicitly for the purpose of retiring System 
swap debts.  The Treasury used the remainder of the drawing to absorb dollars at foreign central 
banks (Desk Report, 1966, p. 39).  In August 1966, the Treasury borrowed $250 million 
equivalent Italian lira from the Fund and sold the proceeds to the System to refund swap 
obligations with the Bank of Italy and with the BIS.  Because the Fund was short of lira at the 
time of this drawing, the Fund borrowed lira from the Italian Government under the General 
Agreement to Borrow.  This was the first time that the Fund borrowed foreign currencies under 
the GAB.   In early March 1968, the United States drew $200 million equivalent in foreign 
currencies under its gold tranche with the IMF and sold these currencies to the System to cover 
outstanding swap obligations.   
Roosa Bonds 
  The Treasury often acquired foreign exchange to finance its intervention operations by 
issuing non-marketable foreign-currency-denominated securities to foreign central banks or 
foreign governments.  By holding such securities instead of dollars, foreign central banks were 
covered against the possibility of a dollar depreciation.  Prior to the fall of 1962, the Treasury 
offered short-term debt instruments—certificates of indebtedness—to foreign central banks and 
governments.  In November 1962, the Treasury began issuing longer-term non-marketable 
securities to foreign central banks and governments, so-called Roosa bonds after Under Secretary 
of the Treasury, Robert Roosa.  Initially the Roosa bonds were nonconvertible, but to make them 
more attractive to the legal and portfolio needs of foreign central banks they became convertible 
on short notices into redeemable claims (Yeagar 1966, p. 449).  Often the Treasury sold the 
proceeds from Roosa bonds to the System, enabling the latter to retire outstanding swap debts.  
The U.S. Treasury had $298 million worth of outstanding foreign currency denominated 
securities at the end of 1962.  These consisted of Italian lira bonds ($200 million) and Swiss 
franc bonds ($98 million).  The total outstanding balance of all Roosa bonds would grow to $1.7 
billion by the end of 1972.  Although the Treasury generally maintained a negative net open 
position prior to the late 1970s, the Treasury often attempted to cover the exposure associated 
with outstanding bonds.  Its early operations in Italian lira afford an example.   
  In 1962, the U.S. Treasury issued a series of 3-month certificates denominated in Italian 
lira totaling $150 million equivalent, and used the proceeds to finance forward lira sales to Italian 
commercial banks.  Later in the year, the Treasury issued $200 million equivalent in 15-month 35 
 
lira-denominated Roosa bonds to retire the 3-month certificates and to drain unwanted dollars 
that the Bank of Italy held.  In late 1963, when the lira came under downward pressure and the 
Bank of Italy wanted to augment its dollars reserves, the U.S. Treasury bought lira outright from 
the Bank of Italy.  This purchase provided the Treasury with partial cover for their outstanding 
lira bonds.    
In November 1963, Coombs asked the FOMC for permission to purchase foreign 
currency in which the Treasury had outstanding indebtedness—most immediately in Italian 
lira—at rates above par, if necessary, and to sell the currency forward to the Treasury to cover its 
outstanding indebtedness (FOMC Minutes 12 November 1963, pp. 5 – 9).  With the spot 
purchase from the market and the forward sale to the Treasury at the same exchange rate, the 
System would be “warehousing foreign currencies without capital risk until they were needed by 
the Treasury, whose resources for this kind of operation were limited.” (FOMC Minutes 12 
November 1963 p.7)
56  The lira that the System purchases and sold to the Treasury enabled the 
Treasury to redeem a maturing $50 million lira bond and pre-pay the remaining $150 million 
bonds outstanding.   
7.  Three Case Studies   
  Neither U.S. macroeconomic policy nor the dollar’s unique reserve currency role within 
the Bretton Woods system contributed directly to the devaluations of the British pound and 
French franc in August 1969 or to the revaluation of the German mark in the following October.  
Theses cross rate adjustment problems stemmed from local developments—poor British 
macroeconomic policies, French social problems, and persistent German gains in 
competitiveness (see: Solomon 1982, p. 158).  Nevertheless, changes in pound, franc and mark 
exchange rates posed a general threat to the Bretton Woods parity structure.  The associated 
uncertainty created speculative financial flows that cause other central banks to accumulate 
unwanted dollar reserves and that affected other exchange rates and the gold market.  U.S. 
operations in these markets amply illustrate the successes and failures of foreign-exchange-
market operations during the Bretton Woods era.       
The Devaluation of the U.K. Pound
57  
In addition to protecting U.S. gold reserves and shoring up the dollar, U.S. intervention 
operations between 1962 and late 1967, aimed at providing support to the U.K. pound.  At the 
time, the pound was the second most widely held reserve currency, but observers increasingly 
questioned the viability of pound’s parity because the United Kingdom’s competitive position 
had deteriorated since the war and its reserve position seemed low relative to its emerging 
balance-of-payments deficits (see Cairncross and Eichengreen, 2003).  By 1963, the pound was 
subject to Triffin’s paradox; the value of outstanding pound claims exceeded the United 
Kingdom’s foreign-exchange reserves (Bordo, et al. 2010, p. 192).  Despite being in fundamental 
disequilibrium, massive amounts of foreign assistance between 1962 and 1967 helped the United 
Kingdom to hide its low level of reserves and maintain the pound’s peg.  The peg eventually 
collapsed when foreign governments ended their rescue efforts.   
The pound’s weakness presented U.S. monetary authorities with two closely related 
problems.  First, financial flows from United Kingdom to Europe moved through U.S. dollars, 
increasing dollar balances in European central banks and the prospects that these banks might 
convert the dollars into U.S. gold.  Second, U.S. policy makers feared that if a sustained 
speculative run against the pound lead to its devaluation, other countries would quickly follow.  36 
 
Pressure would then shift against the dollar’s official gold price and seriously undermine, if not 
destroy, the credibility of the Bretton Woods system.   
After the Federal Reserve became actively involved in foreign-exchange operations in 
1962, the pound experienced a series of speculative attacks.
58  The first began after French 
President Charles de Gaulle rejected the United Kingdom’s bid for membership in the European 
Common Market in late January 1963.  The rejection quickly put downward pressure on the 
pound.  Largely by fortunate circumstance, the Federal Reserve was buying $5.6 million 
equivalent British pounds from the market to repay a January swap drawing when pressures 
against the pound started to build (see figures 9 and 10).
59  The Bank of England also began 
intervening with the dollar proceeds of the same swap drawing, but the pound continued to 
depreciate and fell below par.  In response, the U.S. Treasury entered the fray, purchasing $8.4 
million worth of pounds in the market on 29 March 1963 (Bulletin September 1963, p.1219).   
  The speculative outflow from the United Kingdom caused other European central banks 
to acquire dollars.  Consequently, instead of drawing down addition dollars from its U.S. swap 
line to defend the pound, the United Kingdom negotiated $250 million worth of short-term 
credits with continental European central banks to shore up its potential reserves (Bulletin 
September 1963, p. 1219).  Britain negotiated these credits in early February, but did not make 
them public until April 1963.  The announcement of the cooperation among central banks took 
much of the pressure off of the rate by signaling a rise in the potential cost of speculating on a 
pound devaluation.  The pound soon rose above par.   
With pressure on sterling waning, U.S. monetary authorities took opportunities to retire 
their outstanding swap debt, and in the bargain, to support the pound.  On 19 May 1963, in a 
further move to raise the potential cost of speculation against sterling, the Federal Reserve 
announced an increase in its swap line with the Bank of England from $50 million to $500 
million (Bulletin September 1963, p. 1220).  In considering the ten-fold increase in the swap line 
with the Bank of England, one FOMC member feared—quite rightly, as we have already seen—
that if the Bank of England drew on the swap lines to defend the pound, the dollars thus 
expended might show up as unwanted dollar reserves on the books of other central banks 
(FOMC Minutes 28 May 1963, p. 17).  The generous swap lines with the Bank of England thus 
presented a prospective problem for the United States down the road.   
In early 1964, the pound again came under pressure because of a deterioration in the 
British balance of payments, uncertainty about the timing and outcome of upcoming elections, 
and rumors of a possible revaluation of the German mark.  Bank of England interventions, 
sometimes undertaken in concert with the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury, increased 
markedly.  On 30 June, the Bank of England drew $15 million from the swap line with the 
Federal Reserve System, but quickly repaid the drawing in July when money market conditions 
provided the pound with a respite.   
In July 1964, covered interest arbitrage conditions favored a movement of funds into 
London.  To forestall financial outflows from New York, the System undertook a series of swap 
transactions with the market designed to increase the forward discount on U.K. pounds by 
buying pounds spot against dollars and simultaneously selling them forward.  These market 
swaps amounted to $28 million equivalent in July.  In addition, the U.S. Treasury offered $1 
billion worth of Treasury bills on July 22 in an Operation Twist effort to raise short-term interest 
rates relative to long rates (Bulletin September 1964, p. 1123).  Nevertheless, covered interest 37 
 
arbitrage conditions continued to favor placing funds in London, and the System undertook 
addition market swaps in New York totaling $26.2 million equivalent in late August and early 
September (Bulletin March 1965, p. 379).  Many of these forward sales would eventually come 
due when speculative pressures were weighing on the pound.  The System then found itself 
making spot sales of pounds in a weak market.    
In August, sterling started weakening relative to other European currencies and funds 
began to shift anew out of pounds into the Eurodollar market.  Britain negotiated a $1 billion 
standby credit with the IMF, and in September, British monetary authorities arranged a $500 
million multi-country series of swaps with several European central banks and the Bank of 
Canada.  “By the end of September, the Bank of England had drawn $200 million of the $1 
billion of [international] swap credits available.”  (Solomon, 1982, p.87).  (The $1 billion credit 
line included the System’s swap line.)  The Bank of England embarked on a series of almost 
continuous swap drawings and repayments with the System that continued through August 1965.   
Britain elected a Labour Party government on 16 October 1964 by a narrow margin.  
Although opinion within the government was divided, the Prime Minister and much of the 
cabinet opposed any devaluation of the pound (Cairncross and Eichengreen 2003).  Nor would 
the Labour government deflate the economy.  Prime Minister Harold Wilson preference for re-
nationalizing industries and expanding the welfare state, instead, sent financial funds flowing out 
of the country (Cairncross and Eichengreen 2003).    
Within ten days of taking office, the new Labour government announced measures to 
deal with the country’s growing balance-of-payments problem.  These include a 15% import 
surcharge and export tax credits, which quickly resulted in threats of reprisals (Bulletin March 
1965, p. 380).  The market anticipated an increase in the bank rate, but this did not immediately 
materialize.  Finally on 20 November 1964, following another postponement of an increase in 
the Bank of England’s discount rate, a massive selling wave began.  On that same day, England 
exhausted it credit line with the Bank of Canada and with the other European central banks and 
had drawn $350 million from its swap line with the System (Coombs 1976, p. 114).  On 
Monday, 23 November 1964, the Bank of England increased its bank rate from 5% to 7%, but 
with the market now anticipating a pound devaluation, selling pressures became especially 
heavy.   
On 24 November 1964, a $3 billion short-term credit package to back up sterling began 
to take shape (Coombs 1976, pp. 116 – 123).  The FOMC approved a $250 million increase in 
the swap arrangement with the Bank of England to $750 million.  The Bank of England had been 
drawing on its swap line since August, and had even sold $50 million in gold to the U.S. 
Treasury.  The Export-Import Bank—a frequent participant in U.S. exchange-market 
intervention efforts—authorized $250 million in credit (Coombs 1976, p. 117).  Ten other central 
banks and the BIS participated, creating a $2.5 billion short-term credit facility.  Although 
France grudgingly participated, President De Gaulle claimed it would be the last time (Solomon, 
1982, p. 89).  During late 1964—and throughout much of 1965—the Bank of England continued 
to draw on its swap line with the Federal Reserve and to make simultaneous repayments.  In 
total, the Bank of England drew $1.4 billion between June and December 1964.
60  The multi-
national short-term credit lines facilitated the repayments.  Eventually, United Kingdom made a 
$1 billion multi-currency drawing from the IMF in December 1964 to help with repayments.   38 
 
By late 1964, the United Kingdom was borrowing from some creditors to repay others.  
The country had not addressed its fundamental underlying balance-of-payments problem.  As 
Coombs (1976, p. 123) concluded:  “In any event, the provision of $3 billion of new credits to 
the Bank of England signally failed to generate a real recovery of confidence in sterling.”  
Although the crisis atmosphere lightened, uncertainty about the United Kingdom’s trade deficit 
and its economic policies left the pound under downward pressure throughout December.  Heavy 
interventions—particularly in the forward market—continued (Coombs 1976, p. 123, Cairncross 
and Eichengreen, 2003, p. 171).  The Bank of England sold an additional $75 million in gold to 
the U.S. Treasury in December to acquire dollars for intervention.   
Britain’s balance-of-payments deficits persisted in 1965 as did speculative attacks against 
sterling and heavy intervention.  On 25 May 1965, with reserves and credit lines nearly 
exhausted, the Bank of England again drew $1.4 billion equivalent in foreign currencies from the 
IMF and Switzerland, and repaid $1.1 billion equivalent in outstanding short-term credits.  The 
Bank’s $2 billion credit line with other central banks then terminated (Coombs 1976, p. 124.)  
The Bank of England increasingly found itself attempting to defend a parity that many market 
participants and even official observers viewed as untenable.   
After a brief mid-year respite, pressure on sterling returned because of tightness in the 
Eurodollar market and because the Bank of England had lowered its discount rate.  The Bank of 
England was again intervening in both spot and forward markets for sterling.  These operations 
intensified in August following the release of unfavorable reserves figures.  By August, the Bank 
of England had drawn the full $750 million on the System’s swap line.  On 31 August 1965, the 
System and Treasury extended a special one-day $140 million credit to the Bank of England that 
allowed the Bank to bolster its reserves on a single day for reporting purposes (FOMC Minutes 
31 August 1965, p. 4).  Henceforth, swaps would occasionally serve this function.   
Following notification that the government obtained some wage and price controls, the 
market again settled down, but the pound remained susceptible to downward pressure.  British 
reserves were now very low, and existing short-term credit facilities with the United States and 
with the IMF were fully drawn.  Britain entered into new credit arrangements totaling $600 
million with Canada, Japan, and the key European central banks.
61  France did not participate.  
For its part, the United States agreed to buy $400 million worth of pounds either on a guaranteed 
basis, which meant that in the event of a sterling devaluation the Bank of England would 
repurchase the sterling at the initial exchange rate, or otherwise on covered basis (Coombs 1976, 
126-127, FOMC Minutes 8 September 1965 pp. 1-6).  The announcement was made on 10 
September 1965 at the opening of the New York market.  The Bank of England in concert with 
U.S. monetary authorities immediately began purchasing sterling in New York “on a substantial 
scale and at progressively higher rates so as to convince the market of the determination and 
power of the central banks in support of sterling.”  (Desk Report 1965, p. 13).  The Desk 
operated directly with the market, not through the brokers’ market with a commercial bank as its 
agent, as typically had been the case (Coombs 1976, p.128).
62  The System purchased $21.5 
million worth of pounds on a “guaranteed basis.” The pound rose above par, and Coombs (1976, 
pp. 129 & 131) viewed the operation as a successful “bear squeeze.”  The bears did not die, they 
just hibernated for a while.   
The enlarged international credit facility and a fortuitous improvement in Britain’s 
balance-of-payments data checked the 1965 crisis.  The Bank of England repaid $275 million of 
its swap debts to the System in October and November.  By year’s end, the Bank of England had 39 
 
liquidated $760 million of its forward market commitments and $415 million of short-term 
obligations to United States.  In addition, the Bank managed to increase its official reserves 
(Bulletin March 1966, p. 321).  Nevertheless, U.K. fundamentals remained shaky.    
  When the international credit lines came up for renewal in March 1966, the foreign 
central banks, which had lost faith in the United Kingdom’s willingness to make fundamental 
adjustments, placed restrictions on their use (see Coombs 1976, pp. 132 – 133).  By then sterling-
area governments were approaching the Bank of England, looking to convert their foreign-
currency reserves out of sterling.  The central banks that had participated in the September 1965 
credit lines were willing to offer credits against the conversion of outstanding sterling reserve 
balances that foreign governments held, but not against continuing British balance-of-payments 
deficits.  Moreover, the United Kingdom’s drawings at any one time were not to exceed the 
amount of credits that the country still had available with the IMF.  Essentially, the countries 
wanted an IMF backstop.  At best, this was an insincere vote of confidence in the pound’s 
prospects.  The United States did not participate directly, but allowed the Bank of England to 
earmark a portion of the current U.S. credit lines to finance reserve losses attributable to the 
conversion of sterling balances.
63   
  In February 1966, the pound again fell below par, prompting renewed Bank of England 
intervention in the spot and forward markets.  By April, the System and the Treasury joined in, 
often covering their portion through simultaneous forward sales to the Bank of England.  
Pressure on sterling intensified following a British seamen’s strike in mid-May, tightening credit 
conditions in the Eurodollar market, and continued sharp declines in British reserves.  U.S. 
intervention purchases of pounds in the last half of 1966 were exceptionally large.   
On 20 July 1966, the British government announced a massive austerity program that 
included a wage freeze, restraints on prices and dividends, additional taxes, reduced travel 
allowances, and further curbs on public expenditures (Coombs 1976, p. 136).  To signal 
confidence in the British program, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury made huge spot 
purchases of sterling totaling $55.1 million equivalent and $89.6 million equivalent, respectively, 
in June and July.  (During the same month, however, the System and Treasury delivered $66.6 
million worth pounds sold on a previous forward contract!)  In addition, the Bank of England 
made a very large $100 million swap drawing during the last statement week of July, bringing its 
entirely monthly drawing to $300 million.  “In order that the System’s weekly statement would 
not reflect too large an increase in its ‘other assets,’ the System at the end of its statement week 
of July 27 swapped $88.2 million pounds for one day with the U.S. Treasury.” (Desk Report, 
1967, p. 10)  The System now sought to hide the magnitude of its sterling operations.  Heavy 
interventions continued throughout the summer.   
  Although pressure on sterling began to subside in late summer, the situation remained 
critical.  The prospects of once again getting the key central banks to provide the United 
Kingdom with credits to support sterling were now nil (Coombs 1976, p. 138 – 142).  
Consequently, the United States shouldered much of the burden.
64  On September 13, the Federal 
Reserve announced a substantial increase, from $2.8 billion to $4.5 billion, in its swap facility.  
The swap-line extensions included an 80% increase in the System’s line with Bank of England 
from $750 to $1,350 million.  Coombs (1976, p. 141) described increases in the other swap lines 
as a “counterbalance,” a necessary part of the sterling—and dollar—defense.  If the pound came 
under speculative attack, the dollars expended to support sterling very likely would end up in the 40 
 
portfolios of other central banks.  The System might then need to provide these banks with cover 
through swap drawings to protect U.S. gold reserves.   
  During the second half of September 1966, following the announced hike in the swap 
lines, demand for sterling increased as dealers sought to cover forward sales and to cover short 
positions.  The Bank of England began buying dollars at each opportunity to rebuild reserves.  
The Desk undertook market swaps totaling $36.3 million in November and $51.6 million in 
December, with the proceeds split evenly between the System’s and Treasury’s accounts.   
Britain posted its first post-war trade surplus in November 1966, further alleviating strains of 
sterling.  For the year as a whole, British reserves actually increased.   
In early 1967, interest-rate differentials favoring pound-denominated assets continued to 
attract a financial inflow to Britain, despite that nation’s weak trade performance.  With its 
accumulated dollar reserves, British authorities by the end of March were able to repay its $510 
million obligation to United States outstanding at the end of 1966, including $350 million in 
swap obligations with the Federal Reserve, $50 million in special overnight credits from the 
System, and $130 million in special over-night credits with the U.S. Treasury.  In addition, the 
Bank of England repurchased $33 million equivalent sterling from the Federal Reserve and a 
substantial sum from the U.S. Treasury.  This reduced the Federal Reserve System holdings of 
sterling balances to $101.8 million equivalent and the U.S. Treasury’s holdings to $120.9 million 
equivalent.  In addition, the Bank of England trimmed a November 1965 sterling-for-gold swap 
with the U.S. Treasury to $33.8 million.  As this swap unwound, the U.S. Treasury reduced a 
parallel gold for dollar swap with the Bundesbank.  Full payment of these swaps was scheduled 
for June 1967 (Desk Report, 1968, p.10, fn.1).  British authorities had also liquidated a 
substantial portion of outstanding credits from other monetary authorities.   
  This welcome break from speculation against sterling came to an end on 1 June 1967, 
when expectations of an imminent armed conflict in the Middle East caused a flight from sterling 
and a precautionary movement of funds out of the Eurodollar market.  By 5 June, the Federal 
Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury had purchased on a swap basis nearly $113 million 
equivalent sterling in the New York market, and the Bank for International Settlements drew 
$143 million from the System’s swap lines and placed the proceeds in the Eurodollar market to 
reduce interest-rate pressures.  In early July, the Bank of England reported that it lost $120.4 
million in reserves during June (Bulletin March 1968, p. 272).  This report further eroded 
confidence in the pound.  The loss would have been larger had Bank of England not drawn on its 
swap line with the Federal Reserve, and on the 1966 international credit arrangements.  In 
addition the Swiss National Bank and Swiss commercial banks shifted funds to the London 
market to compensate for funds moved into Switzerland during the Middle East hostilities (Desk 
Report 1968, p. 14, fn. 5).  The closing of the Suez Canal together with a British dock-worker 
strike helped to worsen the British trade deficit.   
  On 19 October 1967, the Bank of England, hoping to reverse the financial outflows, 
raised its discount rate.  In an effort to prevent a rise in the Eurodollar rates from nullifying the 
discount rate hike, the Federal Reserve drew on the swap line with the BIS, which then placed 
the dollar proceeds in the Eurodollar market (Bulletin, March 1968, p. 273).  The Bank of 
England intervened heavily in both the spot and forward markets.  The Treasury in concert with 
the Bank of England purchased spot sterling in an attempt to nudge the rate higher.  By the end 
of October, the Treasury purchased $47.1 million equivalent sterling.  The Treasury now held 
$194 million equivalent pounds under the Bank of England’s guarantee against devaluation.  41 
 
Despite these actions, selling pressure only intensified, prompting the Bank of England to raise 
its discount rate again on 9 November 1967.   
  On Thursday, 16 November 1967, Chancellor Callaghan, responding to questions from 
Parliament, refused to either confirm or deny rumors of plans for a massive sterling bailout, and 
prompted an unprecedented rush out of sterling the next day.  The Bank of England lost more 
than $1 billion in a single day (FOMC Minutes 27 November 1967, p. 8).  On Saturday, 18 
November 1967, the British government devalued sterling 14.3% to $2.40.  The Bank of England 
raised its discount rate to 8% (the highest level in 58 years), placed curbs on consumer 
installment credit, and asked commercial banks to channel credit toward exports.  In addition, the 
government announced plans to cut public spending and to raise the corporate income tax 
(Bulletin March 1968, pp. 273-274).   
Contrary to the expectations of U.S. monetary officials, no other major industrialized 
country followed the British devaluation.  Instead, they made more than $1.5 billion in new 
short-term credits available to defend the new parity, and the IMF established a new $1.4 billion 
standby facility.  The Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury contributed $500 million to 
this new facility (Desk Report 1968, p. 19).   
  The pound initially traded well above its new parity, but by the end of 1967, it weakened 
on news of continuing British trade deficits and because of speculative gold purchases.  On 8 
December 1967, the Bank of England purchased sterling when the rate moved below $2.41 
(FOMC Minutes 12 December 1967, p. 5).  By the end of 1967, the Bank of England had 
outstanding short-term commitments to the US totaling $1.6 billion, and large commitments to 
other monetary authorities (Desk Report 1968, p.22).   
  During 1968 and 1969, the British pound generally remained under downward pressure 
resulting in fairly persistent reserve losses.  The exchange market remained skeptical of the 
Labour Government’s commitment to the austerity measures that accompanied the November 
1967 devaluation.  In addition, the devaluation imposed losses on the reserve positions of sterling 
area countries, and these countries sought to protect themselves from another devaluation by 
diversifying out the sterling.  Concerns about the Gold Pool and the growing prospects of a mark 
revaluation or a franc devaluation heightened uncertainties about the long-term viability of the 
new sterling peg.  Consequently, the Bank of England sought major credit lines both to fund 
continuing support operations and to meet commitments arising from outstanding forward 
contracts and previous credit lines.  In 1968, England did receive additional international credits, 
bringing England’s total credit facility to $4 billion.  The Federal Reserve System increased its 
swap line with the Bank of England by $500 million to $2 billion, and the U.S. Treasury 
increased the credit facility that it extended to the Bank of England in November 1967 from $350 
million to $550 million (see figures 9 & 10).  In view of the severe strains on the official 
reserves, the U.K. elected to defer the year-end payment of principal and interest on post-war 
loans from the U.S. and Canada.  This was the fourth postponement and left three such 
deferment options remaining (Cairncross and Eichengreen 2003, pp. 193-4.)    
  The situation remained tenuous until late in 1969.  The devaluation of the French franc on 
8 August 1969 prompted heavy renewed selling pressure on the pound.  The Bank of England 
drew on its swap line with the Federal Reserve in order to finance its support operations.  
Pressure on the pound continued until September, when balance of payments data show a 
surplus.  Following the revaluation of the German mark, the pound began to strengthen, and the 42 
 
Bank of England acquired sufficient dollars to begin paying back its swap obligations.  The 
pound trade just below parity and forward discounts narrowed.  By December 1969, as 
Eurodollar rates dipped, the pound rose above par for the first time since April 1968.  The Bank 
of England acquired dollars, which it used primarily to repay international credits.  By early 
1970, the Bank of England had fully liquidated its swap debt with the System, and made strides 
at reducing other outstanding credits.  On 5 March 1970, the Bank of England cut its discount 
rate from 7.5 percent to 7 percent.  The Bank of England continued to pay down its outstanding 
debts throughout 1970.  By April, for the first time since May 1964, the United Kingdom was 
free of all official debt (Cairncross and Eichengreen 2003, p. 194).  The new exchange rate held 
until Bretton Woods ended.   
The Gold Pool 
  Although the British devaluation did not lead to speculative attacks on other currencies, it 
did heighten speculative pressures in the London gold market.  By March 1968, the Gold Pool 
disintegrated and a two-tier system of official and private gold prices replaced it.   
After the United Kingdom reopened the London gold market in 1954, it rapidly re-
emerged as the largest, most important free market for gold in the world, and its daily fixing 
price became a barometer of confidence in the Bretton Woods (Bank of England, 1964).  
Sufficiently large deviation between the London market price and the official gold price afforded 
central banks the potential for profitable arbitrage.  The lower arbitrage point—the price at which 
buying gold in London and selling it to the U.S. Treasury became advantageous—was 
approximately $34.80 per ounce.  This equaled the official $35.00 per ounce less Treasury 
charges and shipping costs.  The upper arbitrage point—the price at which buying gold at the 
official price in New York and selling it in the London market became profitable—was roughly 
$35.20, the official price plus the Treasury fees and shipping costs.
65  By and large, however, 
before 1965, the annual inflow of gold from new production and Russian sales typically 
accommodated private industrial, speculative, and official demands for gold, and if the London 
price deviated from the official price, the Bank of England could easily intervene to contain it 
within the arbitrage points (Bulletin March 1964 pp. 304).  “By and large” here being the 
operative words.   
  This tranquility first started to fade as the U.S. Presidential election approach in 1960.  
On 20 October 1960, the London gold price temporarily peaked at approximately $40 per ounce.  
This price spike followed a brief shortfall in gold supplies and rise in speculative demand 
associated with uncertainty about the Kennedy administration’s commitment to the official gold 
price.  Speculators believed that the Kennedy administration would pursue easier, inflation-prone 
policies that would worsen the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and ultimately lead to a dollar 
devaluation.  In response, the Bank of England acted to stabilize the market, with the support of 
the U.S. Treasury’s gold stock, and it drove the price down to $35.60 by the end of the year 
(Coombs 1976, p. 57).  The price of gold stabilized at approximately $35.08 by March 1961, 
following Kennedy’s pledge to maintain the dollar’s convertibility, and in the second quarter of 
1961, a series of fortuitous, but short-lived, events that added to the supply of gold in the London 
market.  These included Russian sales, Eisenhower’s limitation on private U.S. citizens’ overseas 
gold holdings, and British gold sales following the German and Dutch revaluations.  Still, events 
in October 1961 “badly jolted” confidence in the dollar, and central banks “…could no longer 
forego the privilege [of converting dollars to gold] without exposing themselves to charges of 43 
 
imprudent management of the national reserves entrusted to their safekeeping.” (Coombs 1976, 
p. 57) 
Towards the end of 1961, however, South Africa and Canada reduced supplies to the 
market as they sought to build up their own reserves.  Consequently, when the Berlin crisis 
unfolded, gold in London quickly began trading around the arbitrage point, $35.20 per ounce.  
European central banks, concerned for the viability of the Bretton Woods system, refrained from 
buying U.S. gold and selling it in London, but as demand from other central banks and from the 
private sector grew, the situation became extremely tenuous.  Concerted action seemed 
necessary.  The Gold Pool was the result.   
  The Gold Pool developed as a gentleman’s agreement following the 1960 price spike in 
the London market (Bank of England, 1964, p. 18).  After a long period of informal discussions, 
mostly at the Basle meetings of central banks, the United States in October 1961 proposed the 
formation of an informal sales consortium to limit gold-price increases stemming from political 
crises or speculative activity.  The governments of Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Western Germany, and the United Kingdom accepted the proposal and formed the 
Gold Pool.  The initial subscription amounted to $270 million worth of gold.  The Bank of 
England acted as the consortium’s agent in London and determined the appropriate amount of 
any sales.  The United States, operating through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, would 
match the gold sales of the other participating central banks, hence 50% of all Gold Pool sales 
involved U.S. gold.  The other central banks contracted to take set proportions of any gold sales 
up to their subscriptions.  In addition, they agreed not to buy gold on the London market or from 
other sources, and they agreed not to convert any excess dollars that they received from such 
sales quickly into U.S. gold.  In November 1961, the Gold Pool undertook a trial run, selling a 
moderate amount of gold in the London.  When prices permitted, the Gold Pool repurchased this 
initial amount of gold and by the end of February 1962, redistributed it to the pool’s participants.  
The operations went smoothly.   
  In early 1962, however, gold prices began to fall, and following a proposal by the United 
States, the pool began to purchase gold in the London market when the price approached the 
London gold export price.  Now, instead of operating independently, the eight member nations 
bought gold in concert through the Gold pool.  By late spring 1962, the Gold Pool had purchased 
$80 million worth of gold (Bulletin March 1964, p. 306).   
  Even before the $80 million could be distributed, a decline in U.S. stock prices and 
speculative flight from Canadian dollars again pushed gold prices up.  By mid July 1962, the 
Gold Pool had used up its accumulated surplus, and by September 1962, the Pool had sold a net 
$50 million worth of gold to the market.  The Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962 resulted in 
record demands for gold, but substantial sales from the Pool helped keep the price below $35.20.  
Subsequently, Russian gold sales helped drive the price down so that by the end of 1962, the 
pool had recovered all of its net gold sales.   
During 1963 and most of 1964, gold prices remained fairly stable.  Speculative demand 
seemed to diminish, new production increased, and Russia sold gold to the market and to the 
Gold Pool.  In both years, Gold Pool acquired and distributed to its members $600 million in 
gold (Bulletin March 1964, p. 307; Bulletin March 1965, p. 389).     
Up to this date, the Gold Pool generally functioned as a successful stabilizing speculator 
might: buying low and selling high around what appeared to be a sustainable official price.  By 44 
 
late 1964, however, the situation began to change, and it would only worsen hereafter in 
accordance with Triffin’s paradox.
66  In 1965, international tensions, stemming primarily from 
uncertainty about viability of sterling’s parity, from France’s decision to accelerate the 
conversion of its dollar reserves into gold, and from that country’s public criticisms of the 
Bretton Woods system, resulted in a very heavy speculative demand for gold.  In addition, 
Communist China bought large quantities of gold during much of the year.  Even though sales 
from South Africa ran above normal, private demand absorb almost all of this, and the Gold Pool 
found its resources dwindling as it struggled to keep the gold price below $35.20.  At one point, 
early in the year, the Gold Pool operated with a $50 million gold deficit, which the Bank of 
England financed out of its own reserves (FOMC, Minutes, 11 February 1965, p. 6).  Participants 
agreed to continue selling gold, and by June, the Gold Pool had a deficit of $170 million (FOMC, 
Minutes 15 June 1965 p. 2).  Nevertheless, with a good amount of “sheer luck,” the Pool 
recouped its losses by the end of 1965 (Coombs 1976, p. 153).   
  Even though the Gold Pool was able to replenish reserves from time to time through 
supplies from South Africa or Russia, or through additional member contributions, demand 
generally continued to outpace supply through 1966.  As American policy makers feared, 
demand for gold had becoming increasing tied to expectations about British sterling and, by 
extension, to the viability of the official gold price.  Moreover, the French government, as 
Coombs noted, seemed intentionally to hasten the system’s demise:  “The French Government 
continued to harass the market with a succession of announcements designed to cast doubt on the 
official $35 price.  The latest French move in that campaign, announced on January 29, was to 
internationalize the hitherto domestic French gold market.  Those new measures now permitted 
French residents to buy gold on the London market and would encourage the growth of French 
gold custody business for nonresidents.  … [T]he French seemed to have deliberately put 
themselves on a collision course with U.S. policy…”  (FOMC, Minutes 7 February 1967 p. 3).   
  Gold pool losses increased after 5 June 1967 outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, 
requiring participating countries to contribute additional reserves to the pool, yet again.  France, 
however, now balked at making a further commitment and withdrew, and the U.S. agreed to pick 
up their share.  Other participating countries, notably Belgium and Italy, were losing confidence 
in the Gold Pool’s viability and participants began to press the United States for a longer-term, 
fundamental solution to the problem.   
The gold situation only worsened as the speculative attack on sterling continued.  At the 
14 November 1967 FOMC meeting, Coombs predicted that the Gold Pool would post a $600 
million to $700 million deficit for all 1967 (FOMC Minutes 14 November 1967, p. 3).  Since 
September 1966, the member countries had made eight contribution, totaling $670 million in 
gold to the pool, compared with initial contribution of $270 million.  The seventh contribution 
had been negotiated on 8 November and had been virtually exhausted two days later; an eighth 
contribution was negotiated over 11 and 12 November. (FOMC, Minutes November 14, 1967 p. 
4)   
Coombs expected that the British Government would devalue the pound by 10% to 15% 
over the coming weekend unless they obtained massive support in the form of medium term 
credits (FOMC, Minutes 14 November 1967, p.4).  He feared that a British devaluation would 
result in a run on the gold, causing participants to withdraw from the Gold Pool.  He expected 
that a financial flight from sterling would leave other European central banks with huge dollar 45 
 
inflows and add to the drain of U.S. monetary gold.  As the U.S. Treasury lost gold, the market 
would lose confidence in the dollar.   
Coombs predictions did not immediately come true.  Following the devaluation, Gold 
Pool members contributed a cumulative $1,370 million to the operation.  The U.S. Air Force 
cooperated by airlifting gold from the United States to London.  The Paris newspaper Le Monde, 
however, announced that the Bank of France had withdrawn from the pool and that two other 
central banks (those of Belgium and Italy) were about to do the same (FOMC, Minutes 27 
November 1967 pp. 3 – 6).    
Foreign central bank operations in the Gold Pool, however, were only contributing to 
their further accumulation of dollars.  Increasingly Gold Pool participants believed that the 
United States should absorb those dollars through an IMF drawing, rather than swap lines, and 
should take steps to plug the ultimate source of the dollar glut, the U.S. balance of payments 
deficit, through monetary and fiscal policies (FOMC, Minutes 12 December 1967 pp. 17 – 19).  
The United States promised to intervene in defense of the dollar and to pay down any such 
foreign currency debts arising from these operations with drawings on the IMF (Coombs 1976, p. 
171).   
Speculative gold demand remained strong in early 1968, and on 17 March 1968 the 
London Gold Pool suspended operations.  Between the devaluation of sterling (18 November 
1967) and the closing of the London gold market (17 March 1968), the Gold Pool sold $3 billion 
worth of gold in the London market (FOMC Minutes 2 April 1968, p. 4).  “Of that total, the U.S. 
share amounted to $2.2 billion; both Italy and Belgium had replenished their share of pool losses 
during March by buying gold from the U.S. Treasury.” (FOMC, Minutes 2 April 1968 p. 6)   
The seven leading central banks agreed to replace the Gold Pool with a two-tier gold 
market.  Ideally, the existing stock of gold presently held as official reserves would be sealed off 
from the market.  Monetary authorities would continue to buy and sell gold among themselves at 
the official price of $35 per ounce, but they would refrain from transacting in the private market.  
With the establishment of special drawing rights (SDRs), they viewed the existing stock of 
official gold as sufficient for balance-of-payments purposes.  All gold presently in private hands 
and all newly produced gold would remain outside of official reserves.  Hence, the private price 
of gold could deviate substantially from the official price, and would become a highly visible 
barometer of confidence in the dollar and in the Bretton Woods system.  Ironically, once the pool 
dissolved, a large overhang of speculative gold reentered the market, holding the free market 
prices within $37 to $40 per ounce (FOMC, Minutes 2 April 1968 p. 7).    
Most other central banks and governments around the world signaled a willingness to 
cooperate with the two-tiered gold system.  Some, of course, might not adhere strictly if the 
private and official prices greatly diverged.  If the private market price fell below the official 
price, private gold producers would probably pressure their government to buy gold at the 
official price.  Ultimately, however, the success of the venture depended on the triumphant 
adoption of SDRs, which could supply a non-dollar reserve to satisfy future reserve needs, and 
on an improvement in the U.S. balance of payments position, which only could prevent a 




The Devaluation of the French Franc   
  Between 1962 and early 1968, France became increasingly reluctant to cooperate in 
defense of the dollar.  This reluctance stemmed from that country’s fundamental displeasure with 
the dollar’s role in the Bretton Woods system.  The French government had long favored a fixed 
exchange-rate system that relied more heavily on gold for adjustment than did the Bretton 
Woods system and that did not confer unconstrained status on a single reserve-currency (see 
Bordo, Simard, and White, 1994).  As the provider of the reserve currency, the United States had 
sustained a balance-of-payments deficit, but—in accordance with Triffin’s prediction—this made 
the system unstable.  France realized this problem and believed that all countries should link 
their currencies directly to gold, not to the dollar, thereby making them potential reserve 
currencies, and that the United States should redeem dollars in gold (Coombs 1976, pp. 174 – 
175).   
  France attempted leverage U.S. support for its preferred revisions to the international 
financial system by selling dollars back to the United States and sometimes by recommending an 
increase in the official price of gold.  Between 1960 and 1968, France continued to increase the 
share of its official reserves held as gold, largely via dollar sales to the U.S. Treasury.  These 
dollar sales accelerated between early 1965 and the ending of the Gold Pool.  In 1965, for 
example, French purchases accounted for more than two-thirds of the Treasury’s gold sales to 
foreign countries.  After the pound’s devaluation in November 1967, hints of French support for 
an increase in the official gold price kept downward pressures on the dollar (see Bordo, Simard, 
and White, 1994).   
  Between 1962 and collapse of the Gold Pool in March 1968, the Federal Reserve System 
only undertook three, brief, exploratory operations in French francs (see figure 11).  As 
discussed above, in March 1962, the System established a $50 million swap line with the Bank 
of France and drew $50 million equivalent francs from that line largely to “test communications, 
investment procedures, and other operational arrangements.” (Bulletin September 1962, p.1148).  
The System simply held these francs in its portfolio.  After one renewal, the Federal Reserve 
liquidated the swap drawing on 12 August 1962.  In May 1963, the System drew $12.5 million 
equivalent French francs from the swap line and sold them for dollars in the Paris market.  The 
System simultaneously covered this swap drawing by purchasing francs forward from the Bank 
of France.  The Desk was attempting to alter the level of the French franc-dollar exchange rate in 
a market that was not exhibiting compelling evidence of disorderly conditions nor under 
imminent threat of a speculative run.  The U.S. dollar had persistently traded at the lower parity 
band against the French franc, as large financial inflows contributed to a sizable French balance-
of-payments surplus.  The dollar rate, however, “showed no lasting sign of improvement.” 
(Board of Governors, 1966, p. 21)  The System undertook a final operation in October 1963 that 
it financed with a $9.0 million equivalent franc swap drawing.  These operations gave the Bank 
of France discretion to sell francs as agent for the System (Bulletin, March 1964, p. 303).  
“Again, however, the underlying strength of the franc prevailed in the market; the dollar returned 
to the floor;” and the System stopped intervening (see Board of Governors, 1966, p. 21).  These 
operations were also covered through forward purchases of French francs, and the System 
liquidated the drawing in January 1964.
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  Over this same time period, the Treasury acquired French francs in conjunction with IMF 
drawings and briefly from a $25 million swap with the Bank of England in December 1964 (see 
figure 12).   Generally, the Treasury held these French francs or sold them to third parties.  In 47 
 
August 1965, however, the Treasury sold $40 million equivalent francs that it received from an 
IMF drawing to the Bank of France in order to reduce French acquisitions of U.S. monetary 
gold.   
  France’s position as a strong-currency, surplus country came to an abrupt end in May 
1968, when unexpected student rioting and labor strikes produced heavy financial flows out of 
French francs and into stronger currencies, despite the closing of most French financial 
institutions.  The franc, which traded well above par throughout most of the 1960s, weakened 
precipitously.  The Bank of France, whose operations were hampered by the closure of domestic 
financial institutions, asked the Federal Reserve System and the Bank for International 
Settlements to support the franc in the New York and European markets, respectively, for its 
account (Bulletin September 1968, p. 728).  By the end of the month, the French government 
imposed exchange controls on financial outflows and temporary import quotas.  Export subsidies 
soon followed.  In early June, President de Gaulle called for elections, which the Gaullists won.   
Although the immediate political crisis began to subside in early June, the franc remained 
weak under fears that the Bank of France would accommodate the government’s large wage 
concessions, thereby further eroding France’s international competitiveness and forcing a franc 
devaluation.  To finance a defense of the peg, the Bank of France—for the first time—drew the 
full $100 million from its swap line with the Federal Reserve System in June 1968.  In addition, 
France drew $885 million from the International Monetary Fund and sold gold from its reserves, 
including $220 million of gold to the U.S. Treasury.
68  The Bank of France’s net reserve losses 
amounted to $307 million and $203 million in May and June, respectively, but taking the various 
credits into consideration, the Federal Reserve estimated the total cost of supporting the franc 
over these two months at $1.5 billion (Bulletin, September 1968, p. 729).   
  France undertook additional measures in July 1968 to shore up market confidence in the 
franc.  Early in the month, the Bank of France raised its discount rate from 3½ percent to 5 
percent and the French government tightened exchange controls and imposed new taxes.  On 10 
July 1968, the Federal Reserve System in concert with the central banks of Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and with the Bank for International Settlements, extended $1.3 billion in 
additional credits to the Bank of France.  For its part, the Federal Reserve increased its swap line 
by $600 million to $700 million (Bulletin September 1968, p. 729-730).  During July, August 
and September 1968, Bank of France drew an additional $390 million from its swap line with the 
System, and financed the repayment of a small portion ($40 million) in August by selling $80 
million of gold to the U.S. Treasury (Bulletin March 1969, p. 218).  Despite the show of 
international support, speculative pressure persisted, and the Bank of France continued to lose 
reserves in defense of the franc.   
  By the fall of 1968, growing rumors of an impending mark revaluation maintained 
speculation against the franc as some of the earlier credits were coming due.  This forced the 
Bank of France into the awkward position of having to acquire dollars when the franc remained 
weak.  In October, the Bank of France undertook dollar swaps with French commercial banks, 
simultaneously buying dollars spot and selling them forward.  The Bank then used $75 million of 
the proceeds from these market swaps to reduce its official swap debt with the Federal Reserve 
System and to repay other international credits (Desk Report 1969, p. 50).   
  Rumors of an imminent German mark revaluation intensified in November 1968, 
particularly after the Basle meeting of central bank governors, and encouraged huge movements 48 
 
of funds out of French francs and into German marks.  The Bank of France sustained large 
reserve losses in support of the franc, which remained at its lower parity limit (Bulletin, 
September 1969, p. 706).  In response, the Bank of France raised its discount rate 1 percentage 
point to 6 percent, tightened reserve requirements, and imposed credit controls on short-term 
bank lending.  To keep the franc from breaching its floor value, the Bank of France intervened 
heavily during the first nineteen days of November 1968.  In addition to drawing down its 
reserves, the Bank of France drew $275 million on its swap line with the System and $283 
million from other international credits, and sold $110 million in gold to the United States and 
$140 million to other European countries (Desk Report, 1969, pp. 51-53).  In all, the 7-month 
crisis had significantly drained French reserves (Coombs 1976, p. 182).  On 20 November 1968, 
France closed the market in Paris, as the G10 nations convened in Bonn to discuss the current 
situation.   
  At the Bonn meeting, the G10 ministers persuaded France to devalue the franc by 11.1 
percent, but following the Bonn conference, President de Gaulle surprised the exchange market, 
which widely anticipated the devaluation, by rejecting the notion (Solomon 1982, pp. 159-60).  
Instead, de Gaulle outlined a series of belt-tightening policies, including much stricter exchange 
controls.  The G10 provided France with an additional $2 billion in credits at the Bonn meeting.  
The United States’ contribution consisted of a $300 million increase in the System’s swap line 
with the Bank of France (now at $1.0 billion) and a new $200 million credit facility through the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund (Bulletin March 1969, p. 218).   
Governors Brimmer and Maisel worried that if the Treasury provided credits to Bank of 
France through a swap mechanism and subsequently warehoused those francs with the Federal 
Reserve System, the System would in effect be financing the credit to France.  Coombs said that 
he would resist warehousing French francs (Minutes, 26 November 1968, pp. 22-23).   
Largely because of stringent exchange controls, the Bank of France gained reserves from 
late November 1968 and through January 1969, which it used to repay credits.
69  The Bank of 
France reduced its outstanding swap commitments with the System by $220 million and paid 
down international obligations.   
  Expectation of inflation and devaluation persisted, and by February 1969, reserve gains 
attributable to exchange controls were not sufficient to fully finance the franc support operations.  
The situation worsened in March and in April, on renewed labor unrest, and the Bank of France 
again started to lose reserves.  To finance continued interventions, the Bank of France again 
drew $70 million from its swap line in February and an additional $155 million in March 1969.
70  
The Bank also sold $50 million in gold to the U.S. Treasury (Bulletin September 1969, p. 707).   
President de Gaulle’s resignation on 28 April 1969 did not stem the reserve losses, which 
if continued at their current pace, would exhaust the country’s reserves by year’s end.   Many no 
longer believed that the franc’s parity was viable, despite a further tightening of monetary policy 
in mid-June and George Pompidou’s solid election victory.   In May as speculation on a mark 
revaluation intensified, francs sold forward, “with 3-month contracts quoted at discounts as wide 
as 32 per cent per annum before the forward market temporarily dried up completely.” (Bulletin 
September 1969, p. 707)  
  In May 1969, a deadline on swap credits again compounded the Bank of France’s 
intervention operations.  The Bank owed $436 million in swap debts to the System, as well as 
funds from drawings on other European credit arrangements.  To service these obligations, the 49 
 
Bank sold $275 million in gold to the U.S. Treasury and drew the remaining $105 million 
available under the Treasury’s swap arrangement (Bulletin September 1969, p. 708).   
Facing the prospect that its reserve would soon run out, France devalued the franc 11.1 
percent on 8 August 1969, and instituted addition fiscal measures, credit restraints, and price 
controls to back up the new parity.  The country had lost $500 million per month in reserves 
during the last half 1968 and $300 million per month during the first half of 1969 (Bulletin 
September 1969, p. 708).  The Bank of France also received additional international credits and 
applied for a standby credit of $985 million with the IMF (Bulletin September 1969, p.708).  
Despite the devaluation, the franc remained under downward pressure, forcing the France to 
further tighten its monetary policy.   
Speculative pressures on the franc only began to unwind following the mark revaluation 
in October, 1969.  France’s balance-of-payments position then began to shift from a large deficit 
to a surplus, and the franc moved from near its lower parity limit to near its ceiling.  French 
authorities were able to repay $1.5 billion in short-term international indebtedness, in part by 
drawing $985 million from the IMF.  In addition, the Bank of France removed some of its most 
restrictive exchange controls (Bulletin, September 1970, pp.701-703).   
France continued to acquire reserves through 1971.  Although the Bank of France eased 
monetary policy, French interest rates fell at a slower pace than U.S. interest rates and 
consequently, encouraged a financial inflow.  France used the addition reserves to continue to 
pay down its short-term international indebtedness.  On 9 August 1971, the Bank of France paid 
off its IMF debt (Bulletin March 1972, p. 246).  Because France had to repay a portion of this 
debt in gold, that country bought $191 million in gold from the U.S. Treasury.   
The Revaluation of the German Mark   
  During the Bretton Woods period, Germany generally maintained a relative tight 
monetary policy, ran fairly persistent trade surpluses, and experienced inflows of dollar reserves.  
As a means of compensating the United States for the American troops deployed on its soil, 
Germany often refrained from converting dollars reserves into U.S. gold.  To some extent, this 
agreement freed U.S. monetary authorities of the need to provide the Bundesbank with cover for 
excess dollar holdings.  Nevertheless, the U.S. did undertake such cover operations from time to 
time with the U.S. Treasury often playing a leading role.  Instead of generally providing cover 
via swap operations, U.S. operations often focused on influencing spot and forward mark-dollar 
exchange rates through direct interventions.  Perhaps, the U.S. monetary adopted this approach 
to the mark because they generally believed that the mark was fundamentally undervalued.  If so, 
the mark would tend to trade above its par value, making swap repayments very difficult since 
the FOMC’s authorization precluded the Desk from buying currencies in the market above par.   
To create an initial portfolio in early 1962—before the System established its $50 million 
swap line with the Bundesbank—the Federal Reserve purchased $32 million equivalent of 
German marks from the U.S. Treasury (see figures 13 and 14).  On 20 June 1962, with the 
German mark trading above parity, the Federal Reserve System began selling marks spot in the 
New York market.  Between 1962 and 1966, the Desk typically operated in the New York 
market after the European market had closed.  Sometimes, however, the Desk assumed all or part 
of the Bundesbank’s intervention purchases of dollars in the European market (Board 1966, p. 
22).  This relieved the Bundesbank from holding additional dollar reserves.  In late July 1962, 
just as the Treasury began to intervene in concert with the System, the mark began to ease 50 
 
against the dollar and afforded U.S. monetary authorities with an opportunity to reconstitute their 
mark portfolios.  At the end of September, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury held open 
positions in marks equal to $31.2 million and $31.7 million, respectively.
71   The System had not 
drawn on its swap line.   
  During the first half of 1963, improvements in the German trade balance, long-term 
financial inflows, and relatively tight monetary policy exerted almost continuous buying pressure 
on the mark.  Between early April and the end of July 1963, the Bundesbank and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York undertook fairly heavy coordinated interventions to stem the mark’s 
appreciation.  The System financed nearly all of its interventions from two swap drawings.  In 
August, buying pressure on the German mark eased somewhat along with conditions in the 
German money market, but with the mark often trading above par, the Federal Reserve System 
was unable to acquire enough German marks from the market to fully repay its swap drawing.  
Although the German Bundesbank was willing to extend the swap line, the Federal Reserve 
turned to the U.S. Treasury.  Accordingly the Treasury issued $50 million equivalent in two-
year, mark-denominated bonds (Roosa bonds) to the Bundesbank and sold the proceeds to the 
Federal Reserve System.  This was the first instance of a refunding of a System swap drawing 
through medium-term Treasury borrowing.  Earlier in the year, however, the Treasury had 
assumed a role that the System would normally initiate and had sold $200 million equivalent in 
two-year, mark-denominated bonds to the Bundesbank to acquire its excessive dollar holdings 
(Bulletin March 1963, p. 320). Over the next three months, when pressure on the mark eased, the 
System purchased marks off-market from central banks and from the German Defense Ministry, 
which needed dollars to purchase U.S. military equipment (Bulletin March 1964, p. 297).  On 10 
October 1963, with recent swap debt repaid, the Federal Reserve System increased its swap line 
with the Bundesbank to $250 million.   
In November 1963, short-term funds moved back into German marks, prompting the 
Federal Reserve to draw $70 million equivalent marks from its swap line with the Bundesbank.  
The System used part of these funds to intervene in concert with the U.S. Treasury in the New 
York market, but in contrast to earlier episodes of dollar inflows to the Bundesbank, the System 
also used a portion of the proceeds from its swap drawing to cover excess dollar balances at the 
Bundesbank.  Over 1963, foreign-exchange reserves in Germany—presumably all dollars—had 
sharply increased substantially.  In January 1964, the German government, which needed 
additional dollars for the military expenditures, supplied the System with marks to repay its swap 
drawing in full by 9 January 1964.   
In response to rumors of a mark revaluation, the Treasury—in concert with the 
Bundesbank—sold $21 million equivalent marks 3-months forward.  This was the Treasury’s 
first outright forward sale since 1961.  On 23 March 1964, Germany imposed a 25 percent 
withholding tax on nonresidents’ interest income from German fixed-interest securities (Bulletin 
September 1964, p. 1124).  This reduced long-term capital inflows and induced some liquidation 
of investments in German bonds.  In addition, the Bundesbank undertook market swaps with 
German commercial banks (selling dollars spot and repurchasing them forward for delivery in 90 
to 180 days) at preferential rates to encourage these banks to purchase of U.S. Treasury 
securities—a financial outflow.  Market swaps would eventually prove problematic for the 
Bundesbank, because the commercial banks could sell the dollars thus acquired back into the 
market.  The System used the respite that controls afford to buy marks and repay the swap 
drawings made early in March.  In addition to purchases from the market, the System and the 51 
 
Treasury bought $35 million and $45 million equivalent marks, respectively, from the Bank of 
Italy, which the Bank of Italy had acquired through a drawing from the IMF (Desk Report 
February1965, p. 16; Bulletin September 1964, p. 1125).   
Although pressure on the mark-dollar rate had subsided, in April 1964, the U.S. Treasury 
sold $200 million equivalent mark-denominated bonds to the Bundesbank and used the proceeds 
to again buy excess dollar balances from the Bundesbank.
72  The excess dollars resulted from a 
continuing financial flows out of Italy and into Germany in late 1963 and early 1964 that 
simultaneously put downward pressure of the Italian lira and upward pressure on the mark vis a 
vis the dollar.  The Bank of Italy required dollar reserves to intervene in support of the lira.  The 
U.S. Treasury quelled pressure on both currencies by repaying a $200 million equivalent lira 
bond, which it issued in 1962, to the Bank of Italy.  To do so, the Treasury purchase lira from the 
Bank of Italy with the dollars it acquired from the Bundesbank.  In short, the Treasury financed a 
lira support operation with debt issued to the Bundesbank.   
The mark came under renewed upward pressure in June and July, leading to further 
intervention.  On 9 July 1964, the Bundesbank announced an increase in commercial bank 
reserve requirements effective August 1 (Bulletin September 1964, p. 1126).  The Treasury sold 
additional mark-denominated bonds to the Bundesbank to absorb excess dollars. By the end of 
1964, the U.S. Treasury had $678 million equivalent in mark-denominated bonds outstanding.  
In December 1964, the System also drew $50 million equivalent marks on the swap line to 
absorb dollar balances at the Bundesbank.  Germany’s need for dollars to finance military 
purchases again enabled the System to reverse this swap in January 1965.   
  From May 1965 through October 1965, German’s trade balance deteriorated and the 
mark began to trade below its parity.  With pressure off of the German mark, the Federal Reserve 
System and the U.S. Treasury purchased German marks from central banks and from the market 
in order to strengthen their reserve positions and to pay down U.S. Treasury mark-denominated 
bonds.  This was the first liquidation of the bonds since the Treasury issued them in 1963.  At the 
end of 1965, the Treasury still had a total of $602 million equivalent German mark denominated 
bonds outstanding.   
The German balance-of-payments deficit that emerged in 1965 continued through the 
first five months of 1966, largely because higher Eurodollar rates attracted a short-term financial 
outflow from Germany.  The mark generally traded below par and the Bundesbank intervened 
substantially.  During 1965 and 1966, Germany’s foreign exchange balances declined.  The 
Treasury took this opportunity to reduce its mark indebtedness further.  During the first half of 
1966, the Treasury purchased $325 million marks.  In part this was accomplished with the 
System’s help.  The System purchased $53 million equivalent marks from the market and 
European central banks between April and June and sold them to the U.S. Treasury.  The 
Treasury reduced its mark-denominated indebtedness to $350 million equivalent by the end of 
1966.   
  In May 1966, the Bundesbank raised its discount rate (Bulletin September 1966, p. 1322).  
This hike, in conjunction with the renewed wave of sterling selling produced a financial flow 
into German marks that brought the spot rate to parity and resulted in the Bundesbank acquiring 
more reserves than it previously loss.  Tight monetary conditions and upward pressures on the 
mark persisted into the autumn.  Germany announced a cut in reserve requirements effective in 
December, but the Bundesbank continued to acquire dollar reserves.   52 
 
  In December, the System used $15 billion from its own balances and drew $140 million 
equivalent marks from its swap line with the Bundesbank to purchase dollars from the 
Bundesbank.  The System also sold nearly $28 million equivalent marks outright and undertook 
a $17.5 million equivalent swap transaction with the market involving a spot sale of German 
marks and a forward purchase.  The Treasury, which was intent on trying to pay down 
outstanding mark obligations, did not participate in the December interventions.   
  In early 1967, the System acquired sufficient marks from the market and from central 
banks to repay its December swap drawing from the Bundesbank.  Later in the year, however, 
the System bought marks in the market and drew on its swap line to add to its portfolio as a 
precaution.  The System did not intervene again against German mark until November 1967.  As 
the market became unsettled following the depreciation of the pound and as rumors of a mark 
appreciation began to circulate, demand for German marks increased.  The Bundesbank acquired 
$357 million in the spot market (Bulletin March 1968, pp. 277-278).  The Bundesbank then 
undertook market swaps, selling dollars spot against forward purchases with German commercial 
banks to keep dollars in the market and to reduce a widening premium on forward marks.  By 
November 30, the Bundesbank had outstanding market swaps totaling $600 million (Bulletin 
March 1968, p. 278).  On 30 November 1967, the System increased its swap line with the 
Bundesbank from $400 million to $750 million.  In December 1967, the Federal Reserve drew 
$300 million equivalent marks on that line and sold them to the Bundesbank for dollars.  This 
official swap transaction provided the Bundesbank with cover for one-half of its outstanding 
swap commitments with German commercial banks (Bulletin March 1968, p. 278).  In addition, 
as uncertainty about the official gold prices grew, the System sold $7.3 million equivalent marks 
in the New York market.  Late in December 1967, when dollars briefly flowed out of German, 
the Federal Reserve bought marks.   
  After the closing of the Gold Pool in March 1968, speculative financial flows into 
Germany increased and the Bundesbank quickly acquired $800 million.  The Bundesbank 
immediately offered most of these dollars to commercial banks on an attractive swap basis.  This 
swap offering was intended to provide dollar liquidity to the Eurodollar market and thereby to 
take pressure off of the British pound.  The Federal Reserve absorbed $300 million through its 
swap line, thereby providing some cover for the forward leg of Bundesbank’s swap transactions 
(Bulletin, September 1968, p. 731).   
  In May 1968, Bundesbank President Karl Blessing reiterated Germany’s intention not to 
convert dollars into gold.  That same month, as unrest was erupting in France, the German mark 
came under downward pressure following an April increase in the Federal Reserve’s discount 
rate.  At the time, the Bundesbank had announced an easing in German monetary policy.  The 
Federal Reserve used the opportunity afforded by the financial outflow from Germany to buy 
marks in the New York market and to repay its outstanding mark obligations.  In May 1968, the 
Federal Reserve also purchased $25.2 million equivalent marks from Canada, which had recently 
floated a bond in Germany, and in June the System acquired $50 million equivalent marks from 
the Bundesbank when the latter sought to replenish dollar reserves following a sale of dollars to 
France.  In late June, the System acquired an addition $125 million equivalent marks from the 
U.S. Treasury, which had just issued special mark-denominated securities to German banks as 
part of an agreement with the Germany to absorb dollars associated with stationing troops there 
(Bulletin, September 1968, p. 732).  By the end of August 1968, these mark acquisitions enabled 
the System to repay all of its swap obligations to the Bundesbank and to the BIS.  In that same 53 
 
month, the Treasury issued the first of a new series of mark-denominated securities to the 
Bundesbank designed to absorb troop dollars in addition to the securities already issued to 
German commercial banks.
73  By early September, the Treasury had outstanding nearly $1.1 
billion equivalent mark-denominated securities.   
In late August 1968, however, rumors of a mark revaluation resurfaced.  After permitting 
an unprecedented one-day appreciation of the mark to its ceiling, the Bundesbank acquired $820 
million as the Labor Day weekend approached, with half of that amount coming on Friday alone 
(Desk Report, 1969, p. 34).  Between August 27 and September 6 the Bundesbank purchased 
$1.6 billion (Bulletin March 1969, p.214).  The Bundesbank also undertook market swaps to 
encourage German commercial banks to hold dollars.  In cooperation with the Bundesbank, the 
Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury each sold $17 million equivalent German marks forward 
in the New York market during August and early September, but despite the concerted actions to 
limit speculation, the Bundesbank acquired an additional $840 million in the three days ending 6 
September 1968.    
Speculation dramatically intensified in November, after a brief respite in October.
74  At 
the Basle Meeting, the central bank governors recommended a 7.5 percent revaluation of the 
mark (Solomon 1982, p. 2).  Instead the Bundesbank intensified its intervention efforts, making 
very large dollar purchases (over $1 billion in two days ending Friday, 15 November 1968 and 
$2 billion since the beginning of the month) and undertaking approximately $1 billion in swaps 
with German commercial banks (Desk Report, 1969, p. 37; Bulletin March 1969, p.215).  Rather 
than invest the swap proceeds in interest earning assets, however, these commercial banks resold 
the now-covered dollars in the market, thereby negating the effects of the swap and leaving the 
Bundesbank with a forward obligation to sell marks.  The Bundesbank responded by issuing 
swaps only to banks that used the proceeds to acquired U.S. Treasury securities, but it soon had 
to sell marks through outright forwards (Bulletin March 1969, pp. 215-16).  German banks 
wanted outright cover for their dollar position; they did not want cover on a swap basis, which 
eventually had to be rolled and therefore left them with some exposure.  Bundesbank forward 
mark sales in late November amounted to $246 million equivalent (Bulletin March 1969, p. 216).  
The System drew $111.3 million equivalent marks on its swap line with the Bundesbank and 
sold $47 million equivalent marks spot in New York.  With the remaining marks from the swap 
drawing as partial cover, the System also sold $72 million equivalent marks forward in New 
York.  In December, as the mark temporarily weakened, the System bought marks spot as 
additional cover for its forward position.   
After acquire $850 million over two days—November 18 and 19, 1968—the German 
authorities announce that they would not revalue the mark.
75  They then undertook a faux 
revaluation by adjusting value-added tax rates to raise export prices and lower import prices 
(Solomon 1982, p. 158).  In addition, the Bundesbank impose 100 percent reserve requirements 
on new foreign-owned mark deposits at German banks, reinforcing the previous ban against 
interest payments on such deposits (Bulletin, March 1969, p. 216).   
These policies were sufficient to encourage a financial outflow by the end of November 
1968, enabling the System to acquire, once again, sufficient marks to repay its swap drawings by 
January 1969.
76  Nevertheless, in 1968, Germany had acquired a little more than $1billion in 
foreign exchange reserves.  In January, as the mark moved below par, the Bundesbank sold large 
amounts of dollars in the market and reduced the attractiveness of its swaps with commercial 
banks.  Even larger sales of dollars continued in February and March.  U.S. monetary authorities 54 
 
made heavy market purchases of German marks between December 1968 and March 1969.  In 
addition to paying down its swap drawings, the System used the newly acquired marks to meet 
forward obligations as they matured, and to increase balances.  In February, 1969, the Treasury, 
which also had been acquiring small amounts of marks from the market and from the 
Bundesbank, redeemed a $50 million equivalent outstanding mark-denominated note.   
The outflow of funds from Germany reversed itself in April 1969, when President de 
Gaulle’s resignation heightened speculation of a French franc devaluation.  Concurrent rumors 
that some members of the German cabinet favored an 8 to 10 percent mark revaluation as part of 
a multilateral exchange rate re-adjustment augmented the speculative flows into marks (Desk 
Report, 1970, p. 9).  Moreover, a tightening of monetary and fiscal policies to combat growing 
inflationary forces only worsened Germany’s balance-of-payments situation (Desk Report, 1970, 
9-10).   
The mark rose sharply, forcing the Bundesbank to buy dollars late in April.  Speculative 
flows became massive at the end of the month, so much so that in the three days prior to Friday, 
2 May 1969, the Bundesbank acquired $860 million (Bulletin September 1969, p.702).  On May 
7, the Bundesbank discontinued its swap operations, since commercial banks were now placing 
the funds into the Eurodollar market where they were recycled into the foreign exchange market 
and again converted into marks.  On May 8, the Bundesbank received very heavy inflows of 
dollars, much of it in the New York market through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
The Bundesbank then limited its support operations in the New York market to only DM 400 
million, an amount that quickly proved inadequate.  Although IMF rules oblige a country to 
defend its currency in its own market, a member country was not obliged to defend its currency 
in a foreign market.  To assist in the defense of the mark, the U.S. Treasury sold $106 million 
equivalent marks into the New York market.  To undertake this defense operations, the U.S. 
Treasury acquired virtually all ($165 million equivalent) of the System’s mark balances.  The 
following day, speculation was equally intense, “the heaviest flow in international financial 
history.” (Bulletin September 1969, p. 703.)   
“The speculative onslaught between the end of April and May 9 increased German 
monetary [international] reserves by some $4.1 billion—including $2.5 billion on May 8 and 9 
alone—to a record level of $12.4 billion.” (Bulletin September 1969, p. 703)  After Germany 
emphatically dismissed revaluation rumors, speculation subsided.  With inflationary pressures 
now emerging, Germany tightened fiscal and monetary policies.  Absorbing domestic liquidity in 
this situation, however, could only encourage additional inflows.  Revaluation now seemed a 
certainty; only the timing remained unclear.   
Speculation intensified again as the September 28 election approached.  The Bundesbank 
acquired increasing amounts of dollars, but was simultaneously selling dollars on a swap basis.  
Again the funds were spilling into the Eurodollar market.  “[O]n September 18, after such sales 
had reached $0.7 billion over a 10-day period, the [Bundesbank] raised its swap rate, thus 
bringing to a virtual halt the covered movements of German funds into the Euro-dollar market.” 
(Bulletin, March 1970, p. 230)  A further tightening of monetary policy in mid-September only 
intensified the financial inflows.  The Government closed the foreign exchange market for the 
two days prior to the elections and suspended official foreign-exchange operations.  In New 
York, the mark traded above parity.  When the election was inconclusive, the Bundesbank 
briefly returned to the market, took in $245 million in the first hour and a half of trading, and 
then allowed the mark to float.  The mark appreciated 7¼ percent by mid-October, with the 55 
 
Bundesbank gradually raising its buying rate to keep a floor just below the market rate (Desk 
Report, 1970, p. 20).  The Federal Reserve also bought marks.  The coalition government that 
took office on 21 October 1969, revalued the mark 9.3 percent on 24 October 1969, and 
eliminated the special taxes on exports and imports that created the faux revaluation of 
November 1968.  “The revaluation was larger than had generally been anticipated, thus 
decisively removing the mark from the realm of speculation…” (Bulletin March 1970, p. 231)   
The revaluation led to a severe outflow of funds from Germany, which depleted official 
reserves and drained liquidity.  To stem the movement out of mark, the Bundesbank eliminated 
discriminatory reserve requirements on foreign deposits.  The Bank also raised its Lombard rate, 
and in December 1969, German authorities removed the prohibition on paying interest of 
foreign-owned deposits.  The Federal Reserve took advantage of the financial outflows to rebuild 
its depleted mark balances.  In late October and November 1969, the System bought $59.3 
million equivalent marks.  The U.S. Treasury activated revaluation clauses covering its mark-
denominated securities.  This allowed the Treasury to purchase marks at a substantial discount 
either to hold in its depleted portfolio or to resell for a substantial profit.  The Bundesbank had 
depleted most of its liquid dollar holdings.  To recoup these, Germany sold mark-denominated 
U.S. Treasury securities back to the Treasury for dollars, sold $500 million in gold to the U.S. 
Treasury, and drew $1.1 billion in credits from the IMF (Bulletin March 1970, p. 232).   
8.  Breakdown of Bretton Woods 1970 – 1973
77   
  Much of the exchange-market turmoil from 1967 through 1969 stemmed from the 
adjustment problems of individual currencies.  While these raised uncertainties about the 
underlying Bretton Woods parity structure and created undesirable reshufflings of dollar 
reserves, they did not directly reflect problems with the dollar.  Inflation in the United States, 
however, was accelerating, and the nature of the international financial problem was changing.  
By 1970, the market viewed exchange-market disorder as a dollar crisis and not, as was the case 
earlier, a problem of unsustainable cross rates (Solomon 1982, p. 182).   
  According to Coombs (1976, pp. 204 – 211), the Nixon administration, which came to 
office in January 1969, believed that our major trading partners were deliberately discriminating 
against the United States.  Consequently, the administration adopted a practice of “benign 
neglect” about the growing balance-of-payments deficit and the United State’s commitments 
under Bretton Woods.  A subsequent U.S. focus on domestic growth and employment and the 
emergence of inflation flooded foreign economies with dollar reserves, put upward pressures on 
their currencies and price levels, and ultimately lead to the demise of the Bretton Woods system.      
Closing the Gold Window 1970 - 1971 
Despite some tightening in U.S. monetary policy, the U.S. inflation rate continued to 
accelerate through 1969, reaching nearly 6 percent by year’s end.  The on-set of a recession 
induced the Federal Reserve to again loosen monetary policy and to maintain an accommodative 
stance in 1970 and 1971 (figure 6).  Interest rates in the United States fell, and as U.S. banks 
repaid earlier borrowings from foreign affiliates, so did Eurodollar rates.  Many European 
countries, however, were tightening monetary policy to ward off inflationary pressures by 1969.  
Even when European countries lowered interest rates, as they eventually had to do, their 
movements typically lagged those in the United States during this period.  This interest-rate 
pattern induced heavy financial flows out of dollar-denominated assets.  Initially, much of the 
dollar reflow went to countries like the United Kingdom and France that needed to rebuild dollar 56 
 
reserve positions and to repay debts (Bulletin, September 1971, p. 783).  The dollar reflows, 
however, quickly became problematic for countries like Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland.  Dollar inflows pushed their currencies to their upper parity limits 
vis-á-vis the dollar, forcing their central banks to intervene.  In many cases, the acquisition of 
dollar reserves offset domestic monetary restraint programs designed to reduce inflationary 
pressures.  Attempts to tighten policy further only aggravated the inflow of funds.  By early 
1971, as Coombs (1976, p. 212) notes, the process developed a self reinforcing aspect as 
“…overt speculation further swelled the torrent of dollars flowing to foreign markets.”   
By the summer of 1971, confidence in U.S. monetary policy was rapidly evaporating and 
a crisis atmosphere was emerging.  Inflation in the United States remained around 4.4 percent, 
despite slow economic growth and a high unemployment rate.  Moreover, the U.S. balance-of-
payments position continued to deteriorate.  Expecting further revaluations, speculators began 
borrowing Eurodollar funds to buy foreign currencies (Bulletin, September 1971, p. 812).  On 6 
August 1971, a congressional subcommittee identified the dollar as overvalued and called for a 
realignment of currency rates, including a dollar devaluation.  On that same day, the U.S. 
Treasury reported a loss of gold and reserves of $1 billion, largely as Britain and France 
exchanged dollars to repay IMF debts.  Over the next week, $3.7 billion in gold and reserve 
assets moved abroad (Coombs 1976, p. 215).  Gold moved to $44 per ounce in London, and 
speculative flows out of dollars and into foreign central banks intensified.  On 15 August 1971, 
President Nixon closed the gold window.  Acting under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 
he ordered a 90-day freeze on wages and prices and recommended new tax measures to stimulate 
investment and employment.  He also introduced a temporary 10 percent surcharge on dutiable 
imports.   
Although Chairman Burns told the FOMC that suspending the dollar’s convertibility 
would be temporary, Charles Coombs appreciated the action’s real significance:  “[T]he decision 
to close the gold window had demolished with one stroke the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
system.” (FOMC Minutes, 24 August 1971, p. 27)  The announcement surprised the major 
European governments, who closed their exchange markets and sought—unsuccessfully—a joint 
policy response to the U.S. measures (Bulletin, September 1971, p. 786).  They reopened their 
markets on Monday, August 23, and although they formally adhered to their parities—with the 
exception of France—they suspended their commitments to defend them.  Japan had initially 
attempted to defend its parity, and took in $2 billion on 15 August 1971.  With substantial 
inflows of dollars continuing, Japan suspended its official intervention on August 28.  All of the 
major currency appreciated against the dollar during the next two months—except the fixed 
French commercial franc—as speculative flows continued.  At the high end was the German 
mark, which rose 9.5 percent above its previous ceiling.  At the low end was the French financial 
franc, which rose 1.7 percent (Bulletin, September 1971, p. 786).
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The foreign currencies appreciated despite heavy foreign interventions, and foreign 
central banks continued to accumulate large amounts of unwanted dollar reserves, which 
contributed to their inflationary pressures.  As a consequence monetary authorities began to 
tighten controls on financial inflows.  “The exchange rate structure thus emerging after August 
15 was, in most instances, the product of controlled rather than free floating.” (Bulletin, October 
1971, p.786)  Europeans and Latin American countries argued that the U.S. import surcharge 
was also distorting exchange-rate relationships (Solomon 1982, p. 189).  They lodged a formal 
complaint with the GATT.   57 
 
In 1971 prior to the closing of gold window, the Federal Reserve frequently initiated 
large swap drawings to forestall foreign central banks from converting excessive dollars reserves 
into U.S. monetary gold.  On 1 January 1971, the System had outstanding swap commitments of 
$810 million.  By July 1971, the System had reduced this to $605 million often with the aid of 
U.S. Treasury sales of gold and SDR’s, borrowings from the IMF, and the issuance of foreign-
currency denominated securities.  As funds move rapidly abroad, the System then drew $2.2 
billion—with assurances of a Treasury backstop—to provide further cover to central bank 
through 13 August 1971 (Coombs 1976, p. 217 and Bulletin, September 1971, p. 787).   
After 13 August 1971, the System made no further drawings on its swap lines.  The 
System encountered difficulties in repaying outstanding swaps because most foreign central 
banks did not want the System buying their appreciating currencies in the market.  They 
preferred to roll-over existing swaps, expecting that new parities would soon be established and a 
reversal of financial flows would follow (FOMC Minutes, 16 November 1971, p. 15; Bulletin, 
September 1971, p. 787).  In contrast, the Belgian National Bank asked the System to repay a 
$35 million swap drawing that had been outstanding for seven months.  This required the System 
to purchase Belgian francs at a premium and to incur an overall loss of $1.9 million on the 
transaction.  The U.S. Treasury preferred the System’s taking a loss on this transaction to 
financing the operation through official reserves (FOMC Minutes, 19 October 1971, p. 18).  By 
14 October 1971, the System had outstanding swap commitments of $3.0 billion.   
  Despite this heavy use of swaps, the United States lost large amounts of official reserves 
to foreign central banks in 1971.  “From January 1, through mid-August a total of $3.1 billion in 
such assets was paid out, including $864 million of gold, $394 million of foreign exchange, $480 
million of SDR’s, and $1,362 million taken down against the U.S. IMF position.” (Bulletin, 
September 1971, p. 789)  In addition, the Treasury issued $582.7 million in new Swiss franc 
denominated securities between 1January 1971 and 13 October 1971 (Bulletin, September 1971, 
789).  
First to Float: Canada  
  Following the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, the Canadian dollar came under 
heavy speculative attack.  The market feared that the recently announced U.S. restraints on 
financial flows might adversely affect U.S. direct investments into Canada and short-term 
financial flows between the two countries (Bulletin August 1968, p. 739).  Canadian reserve 
losses were heavy in January and February 1968, causing Canadian monetary authorities to 
reinforce their position by drawing $250 million on the $750 million swap facility with the 
Federal Reserve and $426 million from the IMF (Bulletin August 1968, p. 740).  Canada also 
increased its discount rate.   
Pressures on the Canadian dollar persisted and intensified in March 1968, as speculative 
funds moved out of Canadian dollars and into gold.  Canada sought and received additional 
international credits amounting to $900 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the German 
Bundesbank, the Bank of Italy, and the Bank for International Settlements.  These credits did not 
include the $500 million still available to Canada through the Federal Reserve swap line, which 
the System subsequently increased to $1.0 billion (Bulletin August 1968, p. 740).  In addition, 
the U.S. exempted Canada completely from the restraints on financial flows that it imposed in 
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balances—in U.S. Government securities (Bulletin August 1968, p. 740).  Canada again raised its 
bank lending rate when the Federal Reserve Bank hiked the discount rate.   
  The situation, briefly improved in the spring of 1968, enabling Canada to acquire 
reserves and repay international credits.  In 1969, however, the United States tightened monetary 
policy.  High interest rates in the United States and in the Eurodollar market encouraged a 
financial outflow from Canada and prompted the Bank of Canada to tighten its monetary policy 
and its restrictions on financial outflows.   
  With the on-set of a recession in early1970, the United States eased monetary policy, and 
the financial tide quickly reversed.  Strong inflows of both long-term and short-term funds now 
pushed the Canadian dollar to the top of its trading range.  The Bank of Canada—as agent for the 
federal government—bought large amounts of U.S. dollars to keep the Canadian dollar within it 
parity range, adding unwanted domestic liquidity to the Canadian market at a time when the 
Bank of Canada was trying to contain inflationary pressures.  Inflation was currently running at 
approximately 4 to 5 percent and wage settlements reached 9.1 percent (Powell 2005 p. 71, fn 
90).  Although the Bank of Canada favored a new par value with wider parity bands, the 
government rejected the idea out of a concern that it would provide only temporary relief and 
would not be credible.  The government also considered asking the United States to rescind its 
Canadian exemption under the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax, but the exemption helped reduce 
the borrowing costs of provincial governments (Powell 2005, p. 72).   
On Sunday, 31 May 1970, Finance Minister Benson announced that the Bank of Canada 
would no longer defend the upper limit for the Canadian dollar, effectively allowing it to 
appreciate.  Benson intended to re-fix the exchange rate as soon as possible.  The Bank of 
Canada intervened on June 1 when the Canadian market opened to smooth the increase in the 
rate.  Over the following weeks, the Bank of Canada intervened to dampen the swings, especially 
excessive increases in the exchange rate (Bulletin September 1970, p. 695).  The Canadian 
dollar, however, was now floating.
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  Coombs viewed the Canadian float as a serious threat to the Bretton Woods system.  He 
noted that the ability of central banks to defend their parities against speculative attacks was 
increasing “suspect.”  Nevertheless, “[u]ntil the Canadian decision to let their rate float, the 
market had not taken seriously official discussions of rate flexibility.” (FOMC Minutes, 23 June 
1970 p.42)  Reflecting his overall attitude towards floating rates, Coombs viewed financial flows 
under the Canadian float as destabilizing:  “…the rise in the rate tended to be self-reinforcing in 
that it encouraged an increasing tendency to cover Canadian dollar commitments.  Another factor 
in the market, starting toward the end of July, was the appearance of professional traders, mainly 
European banks, who would move in and out of the Canadian dollar within a single day to take 
advantage of the wide fluctuations in the rate, their actions clearly aggravating those 
fluctuations.” (Bulletin September 1970, p. 695)  The early float, however, insulated the Canada 
dollar from much of the exchange-market chaos of 1971.   
The German Mark Example. 
  Germany’s experience in 1970 and 1971 provides the clearest example of the problem 
with fixed exchange rates when domestic and international objectives conflict.
80  In the spring of 
1970, the Bundesbank began to tighten monetary policy to counteract growing inflationary 
pressures.  Germany’s GNP deflator increased 7.3 percent in 1970 and 7.7 percent in 1971 (see 
IMF 1972, p. 7).  With interest rates on dollar-denominated assets falling—the U.S. experienced 59 
 
a recession in 1970—funds began to flow into Germany.  The mark, which had been trading near 
its floor value ever since the October 1969 revaluation, began to rise sharply.  By mid-May 1970 
with the mark now trading at its upper limit, the Bundesbank began acquiring substantial 
amounts of dollars through its interventions.  The floating of the Canadian dollar in June 1970 
only added to speculative pressures against the mark.  On 10 June 1970, the Bundesbank, in “the 
most hectic day of trading since the fall of 1969,” purchased $640 million at the upper parity 
band, but the rate moved even higher that afternoon in New York after the close of business in 
Frankfurt (Bulletin September 1970, p. 697).  During the whole of the second quarter of 1970, 
the Bundesbank acquired $1.4 billion in reserves (Bulletin March 1971, pp. 189-207).   
Germany next attempted to fine tune its monetary policy and to supplement it with other 
measures.  In July 1970, the German government tightened fiscal policy.  The Bundesbank cut its 
discount and Lombard rates hoping to take pressure off of market rates, but the bank also 
instituted heavy reserve requirements on bank liabilities.  Although short-term rates fell briefly, 
they quickly turned around.  The net effect was that inflows of reserves continued and in the 
third quarter of 1970, the Bundesbank acquired almost $2.5 billion (Bulletin March 1971, p. 
198).  In late October 1970, the Bundesbank converted its reserve requirements into a form of 
capital controls by directing them to certain interest-arbitrage transactions and to dealings related 
to foreign borrowing.  Continued pressure on the mark, however, forced the Bundesbank to 
lower its discount and Lombard rates again in early November 1970.  Despite these maneuvers, 
funds continued to flow into Germany.  In December, following a cut in the U.S. discount rate, 
the Bundesbank again lowered its official lending rates, and German interest rates fell more 
closely in line with Eurodollar interest rates.  Nevertheless, in the fourth quarter of 1970, the 
Bundesbank acquired $2.3 billion in reserves, and remained hampered in adopting an anti-
inflation policy stance.  
  Despite cuts in German interest rates, the spread vis-á-vis Eurodollar rates continued to 
attract funds into Germany during early 1971.  The spot rate remained at, or near, the upper 
parity band and the Bundesbank continued to acquire dollars.  “During the period February – 
April 1971, German corporate borrowing abroad amounted to roughly $2.5 billion, nearly 
equivalent to total business lending by the entire German banking system over the same period.” 
(Bulletin October 1971, p. 784.)  In February and March 1971, the Bundesbank undertook a 
series of forward German marks sales through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in an 
effort to offset the attractive interest-rate differential on marks by forcing the mark to a 
substantial forward discount.  The sales failed to stop the dollar inflow, and in mid-March 1971, 
after $537 million equivalent in forward mark sales, the Bundesbank halted these operations 
(Bulletin October 1971, p.791).   
  The Bundesbank again tried to fine tune its credit conditions.  On 31 March 1971, the 
Bundesbank cut its discount and Lombard rates a full percentage point, but simultaneously 
reduced banks rediscount quotas by 10 percent (Bulletin October 1971, p. 791).  Credit 
conditions were little changed and speculative pressures on the mark intensified.  “Within 3 days, 
the Federal Bank [Bundesbank] took in more than $1.3 billion in holding the spot mark at the 
ceiling and swapped some $600 million of this inflow out in the market for 3 months’ delivery.” 
(Bulletin October 1971, p. 792.)  The funds swapped out likely ended up back in the market.   
  In April the Bundesbank re-instituted 3-month forward sales of German marks.  This 
time, however, the Bundesbank operated in the Frankfurt market, and the Federal Reserve 
undertook similar forward mark sales for the System’s account in the New York market.  At this 60 
 
time, Eurodollar interest rates began to increase, while German rates also began to ease.  The 
spot mark rate moved off of its ceiling.  The System continued concerted forward interventions 
nearly every day through April 1971, with the Bundesbank selling a total $1.5 billion equivalent 
marks and the System selling $75.7 million equivalent marks (Bulletin October 1971, p. 792).  
The System covered its operations with existing mark balances and with a $60 million swap 
drawing on the Bundesbank (Bulletin October 1971, p. 792).  The Bundesbank ceased these 
operations on 28 April 1971 (Solomon 1982, 179).  Although the operations “calmed” the market 
and may have brought the spot rate off of the ceiling, strong pressure on the mark quickly 
resumed.  In part, reports of an EEC meeting on 16 April 1971 fanned speculative embers.  At 
this meeting, German Minister Schiller proposed that the European currencies float or revalue 
together against the dollar, and Minister d’Estaing favored a dollar devaluation (Solomon, 1982, 
p. 179).  During the first four months of 1971, Germany acquired $3.0 billion and at the end of 
April, had outstanding forward commitments of $2.7 billion (Bulletin October 1971, p. 792).   
  In early May, leading German economic research institutes recommended floating or 
revaluing the mark, and many German officials gave their suggestion a sympathetic ear (Coombs 
1976, p. 213).  Speculative flows into Germany then intensified.  “The German central bank was 
forced to buy dollars in mounting volume: more than $1 billion on May 3 and 4 and a further $1 
billion in the first 40 minutes of trading on May 5, at which point it withdrew from the market.” 
(Bulletin September 1971, p. 784.)  The Bundesbank stopped intervening.  Foreign exchange 
trading in Frankfurt effectively ended for the next week.  Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland also ceased official operations.  The mark began to appreciate in other markets.  On 
9 May 1971, Germany indicated that it would no longer defend the parity limits although 
formally Germany kept the parity in place.  Germany would now focus policy on keeping 
inflation low.  The mark continued to appreciate until early June.   
In June, the mark started to turn around, and the Bundesbank began a series of spot dollar 
sales.  These helped German monetary authorities to tighten monetary policy.  “By mid-June the 
authorities had sold $1.7 billion, considerably more than they had taken in under maturing 
forward contracts from the operations in February and March…” (Bulletin October 1971, p. 
793).  With the exchange rate less of a constraint on domestic policy, the Bundesbank 
substantially increased reserve requirements on banks’ domestic and foreign liabilities.  Interest 
rates in Germany rose.  “Overall, from June 3 through the end of July, the Federal Bank 
[Bundesbank] sold $4.8 billion in the spot market while it took in a total of $2.7 billion through 
maturing forward contracts.” (Bulletin September 1971, 793)   
This respite in foreign exchange market proved short-lived, and the Bundesbank stopped 
selling dollars.  By early August 1971, the spot mark reached a level 7.6 percent above its 
previous parity ceiling.   
The Unraveling: 1971 – 1973  
  Global monetary authorities viewed the 15 August 1971 closing of the gold window as 
confirmation that the dollar was overvalued.  European exchange markets remained closed for a 
week, and when they reopened, European governments did not defend their par values.  With 
respect to a future international monetary system, leaders wanted a return to fixed exchange 
rates, although in a system based on a ‘neutral reserve instrument’ rather than on the dollar.  In 
addition, world monetary authorities wanted a system in which all parties must participate in any 
exchange-rate adjustment.  They thought that the world was in danger of creeping protectionism 61 
 
and recession, in large part because of the administration’s import surcharge, which they viewed 
as a major impediment to realignment (FOMC Minutes, 21 September 1971, p. 5).     
  Uncertainty pervaded exchange markets during the months leading up to the Smithsonian 
Agreement of the Group of Ten countries on 18 December 1971.  At the Smithsonian, 
participants agreed to an 8.57 percent hike in the official gold price from $35 per ounce to $38 
per ounce.  The Swiss franc, the Italian lira, and the Swedish krona were also devalued slightly 
against gold, while the German mark, Japanese yen, Dutch guilder, and Belgian franc were 
revalued somewhat.  The British pound and the French franc remained at their previous parities, 
and the Canadian dollar continued to float.  In addition, the Smithsonian Agreement specified 
wider margins for currencies around their new central parities.  Any currency could move 2¼ 
percent on either side of its central parity relative to its intervention currency—typically U.S. 
dollars.  This implied that currencies could diverge by as much as 4½ percent against most other 
currencies.   
Funds did not immediately return to the United States; other countries continued to 
accumulate reserves through the middle of 1972 (IMF, 1972, p. 2).  Uncertainty pervaded the 
market well into 1972 because local governments still had to approve the Smithsonian 
agreement, and doubts about trade restraints and overall monetary reform persisted.  The 
prospects of another dollar devaluation also lingered.  Central banks intervened, but speculation 
drove many European currencies near the tops of their new parity ranges (Coombs 1976, p. 233).  
Germany and Japan also imposed further controls on financial flows.  On 3 March 1972, French 
Finance Minister Giscard d’ Estaing implied that European authorities would neither accumulate 
dollars nor allow their currencies to float, but would instead impose restraints of financial flows 
(Bulletin September 1972, p. 774).   
  The Federal Reserve System was unable to repay swap obligations during the first quarter 
of 1972 because foreign exchange rates had generally climbed above their parity levels.  The 
System instead rolled over outstanding swaps.  As of March 1972, the Fed had outstanding 
commitments of nearly $2.9 billion equivalent (Bulletin, March 1972 pp. 228 – 256).  Between 
mid May and early June, the System undertook a series of small Swiss franc purchases in New 
York and through the BIS.  The System used these francs together with direct dollar purchases 
from the Swiss National Bank to pay down its swap lines with the latter and with the Bank for 
International Settlements.  The System also bought Belgian francs from the Belgian National 
Bank and paid down a portion of that line and an outstanding BIS obligation.    
  Over this period, speculative pressure largely focused on the British pound as Britain’s 
current-account position deteriorated and its labor unrest worsened.  Between, 16 June 1972 and 
23 June 1972, Britain allowed the pound to float relative to the dollar.  Over these six days, 
however, Britain spent $2.6 billion in non-dollar reserves to keep the pound within a 2¼ percent 
band relative to the Continental European currencies (Bulletin, September 1972, p. 757).  The 
European Community (EC) had instituted the “snake in the tunnel” in March 1972, whereby EC 
countries agreed to keep their currencies within a 2¼ percent band, while also maintaining a 4½ 
percent band vis à vis the dollar.  The EC countries also agreed that they would undertake all 
intervention to maintain the EC bands in European currencies, while still intervening in dollars to 
defend the Smithsonian parities.  Britain intervened, selling European currencies—mostly 
German marks—that had appreciated 2¼ percent above the pound, while Britain’s EC partners 
bought pounds with their currencies.  This slowed the pound’s depreciation and simultaneously 
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bands.  The mechanism, however, seemed to attract heavy speculation out of dollars and out of 
British pounds.  “In this straining pattern of rates, the markets may have sensed a two-way 
speculative opportunity to go short of sterling and long of continental currencies in the hope of 
profiting on both.” (Bulletin, September 1972, p. 758)  On 23 June 1972, Britain suspended its 
participation in both the Smithsonian and EC agreements and let the pound float.   
   Following the British float, European monetary authorities closed their currencies 
markets and called a meeting of EC finance ministers in Luxembourg.  Denmark withdrew from 
the EC joint float, and Italy received permission to intervene temporarily in dollars.  “By Friday, 
July 14, [1972] the sterling crisis had generated not only the…flight of $2.6 billion of funds from 
sterling into other Common Market currencies but also additional flows totaling over $6 billion 
from dollars into various European currencies and the yen.” (Bulletin, September 1972, p. 758)  
  U.S. monetary authorities had suspended their intervention operations following the 15 
August 1971 closing of the gold window.  This action seemed to fuel expectations that the 
Smithsonian parities would not hold.  On 19 July 1972, U.S. monetary authorities offered 
German marks through a series of sizable transactions (Bulletin, September 1972, p. 758).  The 
initiative came from the Federal Reserve; Treasury officials remained reluctant to intervene 
(Coombs 1978, p. 226).  The System sold $10.7 million equivalent marks.  The Treasury 
announced: “The action reflects the willingness of the United States to intervene in the exchange 
markets on occasion when it feels it is desirable to help deal with speculative forces.  The action 
indicates absolutely no change in our basic policy approach toward monetary reform and the 
necessary efforts on all fronts to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in our balance of payments.” 
(Bulletin, September 1972, p. 759)  On August 10, the System began a series of heavy Belgian 
franc sales ($9.4 million equivalent), which brought the franc down off of its parity ceiling 
Between July and September, the Desk intervened on nine days selling $31.5 million in foreign 
currencies.  (Bulletin, September 1972, p. 759)  Fears that the Smithsonian parities would not 
hold then receded for awhile.  
  During this period, the System reduced its outstanding swap debt by nearly $1.9 billion 
equivalent bringing the outstanding total to $1.8 billion equivalent.  Most of this was a 
repayment of the British swap line, which the System accomplished through regular market 
purchases of sterling, through direct sterling acquisitions from the Bank of England, and from 
purchases of sterling from the U.S. Treasury, which previously drew it from the IMF (Bulletin, 
September 1972, p. 759).  The System also repaid a $300 million swap debt with the Swiss 
National Bank, through purchases of francs both from the Swiss National Bank and the market.  
The Treasury, likewise, redeemed two mark-denominated notes and renewed other foreign-
currency denominated securities.  As of 8 September 1972, the Treasury had $2.0 billion 
equivalent in outstanding foreign-currency securities.  In 1972 and in 1973, the Treasury did not 
participate in U.S. interventions to support the dollar, because it needed foreign exchange to 
service outstanding foreign currency debts.   
  In late 1972, the dollar strengthened as the U.S. inflation rate temporarily cooled while 
inflation rates elsewhere rose.  In October, the Swiss used the opportunity to sell dollars and 
drain liquidity from Swiss markets.  “In general, European monetary authorities saw the 
improvement of the dollar as providing them with an opportunity to move more forcefully in the 
fight against increasingly virulent inflation.  Thus, over the course of the fall monetary policy in 
Europe was tightened progressively, both through changes in reserve requirements and through 
increases in discount rates.” (Bulletin, March 1973, p. 143.)  Despite a rise in U.S. interest rates, 63 
 
Europeans became concerned that the United States would not go far enough to prevent 
inflationary pressures in this country.   
  By early 1973, confidence in the Smithsonian agreement was again rapidly waning.  
Markets were concerned about the prospects for creeping protectionism and the lack of progress 
on reform of the international monetary system.  On 20 January 1973, Italy instituted a two-tier 
exchange rate system.  Italian banks then began buying Swiss francs to cover outstanding 
currency obligations.  This bid up the Swiss franc, which was already close to its upper parity 
limit, and it forced the Swiss National Bank to acquire $270 million.  Fearing a continued inflow 
that would undermine its anti-inflation policy, the Swiss allowed the franc to float.  The currency 
quickly moved well above its Smithsonian ceiling and speculation shifted to the German mark.  
Germany accumulated reserves as the mark appreciated.   
  On 24 January 1973, the System, in concert with Germany, sold $30 million marks in the 
New York market, and over the next two days the Desk made modest mark sales, which 
apparently moved the mark “slightly lower.” (Bulletin, March 1973, p. 144)  System mark sales 
in all of January amounted to $98.7 million equivalent.  Pressure on the mark, however, 
intensified following the release of German trade data and began to affect the Dutch guilder as 
well.  The System began selling guilder and marks in New York.     
  Between January 24 and February 2, 1973, all interventions in marks and guilder were for 
the System’s own account.  The System sold on net $173.3 million equivalent marks in February 
1973.  When the System’s holdings of marks ran out, the Treasury began mark sales from its 
account.
81  The Treasury sold $46.6 million equivalent marks in February.  In addition the 
System sold $20.4 million worth of guilder, exhausting its holdings of guilder.  Interventions 
continued, but the market came to believe that the Smithsonian parities would not last.  The 
Bundesbank acquired $6.0 billion during the first week of February (Bulletin, March 1973, pp. 
144-45).   
  On 12 February 1973, with European and Japanese markets closed, the United States 
devalued the dollar 10 percent.  This second dollar devaluation brought the official gold price to 
$42 per ounce.  When the markets reopened, Japan allowed the yen to float temporarily.  The 
dollar temporarily strengthened, allowing the System to purchase foreign exchange to cover 
maturing swap commitments.  The transactions, however, were ill-timed from the perspective of 
signaling to the market.  The flow of funds into European currencies soon continued despite the 
devaluation of the dollar, and the dollar dropped to its floors against the German mark, French 
franc, Dutch guilder, and Belgian franc by February 23, 1973.  Dollar holders were shaken, and 
the flow of funds into Europe accelerated.  On 1 March 1973, an unprecedented $3.6 billion 
moved into European central banks, inducing authorities closed their exchange markets (Coombs 
1976, p. 229).    
On 10 March 1973, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark agreed to 
maintain fixed exchange rates among themselves with a band of 2¼ percent around the central 
parity, and to float jointly against the dollar.  Germany also devalued 3 percent.  Norway and 
Sweden subsequently joined the joint float, but the Italian lira, Swiss franc, British sterling, and 




9.  Outstanding Obligations from Swaps and Bonds   
At the end of August 1971, the System had outstanding swap obligations totaling 
approximately $3.0 billion in U.K. pounds, German marks, Swiss francs and Belgian francs 
(Task Force Paper #10, p. 21).  The Treasury had outstanding obligations totaling nearly $1.8 
billion in German marks and Swiss francs, which with the closing of the gold window, the 
Treasury could not extinguish with gold sales (Task Force Paper #10, p. 21).  The revaluations 
clauses that were typical in swap drawings and Roosa bonds did not apply to a move from fixed 
parities to floating rates, since it was hard to determine if a creditor country appreciated or if a 
debtor country depreciated.  The revaluation clauses only pertained to situations in which the 
creditor country revalued its currency.  In 1972, the position emerged that if all of the G10 
currencies appreciated together, that would imply a dollar deprecation (FOMC Minutes, 21 
March 1973, p 63).  Suppose, however, that one currency appreciated by more or less than the 
G10 average.  Should the revaluation clause apply?  The situation was unclear.  Without the 
revaluation clauses or some form of risk sharing, the United States faced a substantial loss on its 
outstanding obligations.    
The System did not experience much difficulty in paying down its German mark and 
U.K. pound obligations (see above).  It had acquired marks through a swap drawing in May 1971 
to cover some current forward positions.  The Desk acquired marks both from the market and 
from a central bank to pay off its swap debt by July 1972.  Likewise, the System bought sterling 
in the market and extinguished it debts when the pound came under strong downward pressure in 
July and August 1972 (FOMC Minutes 18 July 1972, p. 17 – 18).   
The System had more difficulty in extinguishing its Belgium and Swiss franc obligations.  
In part, this resulted because the Belgium franc and Swiss franc were often strong in the market, 
and National Bank of Belgium and the Swiss National Bank did not want market purchases that 
would encourage further appreciation.  Some of the $600 million Belgian debt was repaid in 
1971 and 1972, when the System made small periodic franc purchases at the request of the 
National Bank of Belgium.  In December 1973, however, the System halted such purchases, 
when the Treasury sought to clarify the issue of risk sharing with both of these central banks and, 
therefore, the terms of debt repayment.  The Treasury wanted equal sharing, but the Belgians 
“interpreted this request as a change in the original agreement and felt no obligation to comply.”  
(Task Force Paper #10, p. 23).   
After delaying, the System reached an agreement with the National Bank of Belgium.  
“In December 1975, the System and the National Bank of Belgium agreed to adjust the 
outstanding swap debt to take into account the revaluation of the Belgian franc in 1971, and the 
two devaluations of the dollar in 1971 and 1973.” (Task Force Paper #10 1990, p. 23)  As a 
consequence, the System’s outstanding swap debt was increased by $54.1 million.  Near the end 
of 1975, with the Belgian franc-U.S. dollar exchange rate at a level that made losses associated 
with the remaining liability small, the System began a series of Belgian franc purchases.  By 
November 1976, the System had liquidated the Belgian franc debt.  
In August 1971, the System had $1.0 billion in outstanding swap obligations with the 
Swiss National Bank, the full amount of the line, and $600 million in outstanding Swiss franc 
swap obligation to the BIS.  Over the next four years, the System made periodic purchases of 
Swiss francs both in the market and from the Swiss National Bank to retire this debt.  In 
December 1975, the System added $196 million equivalent francs to its outstanding swap debt 65 
 
with the SNB to reflect losses associated with two dollar devaluations.
82  Shortly, thereafter, the 
System and Treasury reached a loss sharing agreement with the Swiss National Bank.  In 
February 1976, the System drew $600 million on the SNB swap line to pay down the BIS Swiss 
franc line completely.  Then in October 1976, the System undertook an unusual transaction to 
pay down the entire line with the Swiss National Bank.  The System negotiated a new “special” 
swap line with the SNB that embodied the risk sharing agreement and set three-year timetable 
for repayment.  The Swiss National Bank also agreed to sell the System and the U.S. Treasury 
Swiss francs if necessary.  The System paid off the original swap with a drawing on this special 
swap, and paid off the special line by April 1979.  The Treasury also paid off its outstanding 
Swiss franc obligations in April 1979.   
The System and the Treasury took seven and a half years to pay off its pre-August 1971 
swap obligations.  The estimated losses to the System and to the Treasury on these outstanding 
debts was $986 million and $1.5 million respectively (Task Force Paper #10 1990, p. 25). 
10.  Conclusion 
  Triffin’s paradox fundamentally threatened the Bretton Woods system.  Although efforts 
to repair this basic flaw—to provide a source of liquidity not based on U.S. balance-of-payments 
deficits—got underway in the mid-1960s, a high U.S. inflation rate and inevitable cross-rate 
adjustment problems overtook these efforts.  By 1971, Bretton Woods was quickly unraveling.  
By 1973, it was gone.  Floating exchange rates were the predictable consequence of countries’ 
unwillingness to make domestic economic objectives—price stability and full employment—
subservient to the maintenance par values.   While U.S. foreign-exchange-market operations may 
have delayed the disintegration of Bretton Woods, they did not address the system’s deep-seated 
weaknesses, and they arguably prolonged an inevitable breakdown.  
  The U.S. institutional mechanisms for foreign-exchange-market interventions survived 
the collapse of Bretton Woods and would adapt to a floating exchange-rate regime.  The 
fundamental reservations about these operations—their uncertain effectiveness, their interaction 
with monetary policy, and their potential threat to Federal Reserve independence—would also 
remain.  Attitudes about them would evolve along with thoughts on the proper role of monetary 
policy.   
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Figure 4: U.S. Gold Stock, 1951-1976
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1  For an overview of Bretton Woods see:  Meltzer (1991), Bordo (1993), and James (1996).  
Previous discussions of U.S. intervention during the period include Coombs (1976), Pauls 
(1990), Todd (1992), and Hetzel (1996).   
2  Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement authorized restrictions on financial flows.   
3   To construct the real price of gold, we deflate the official price using the nonseasonally 
adjusted consumer price index, 1982-84 =100.   
4   All U.S. balance-of-payments data are from the U.S. Commerce Department as reported in the 
Economic Report of the President, 1969.   
5  Coombs (1976, p. 48) notes:  “By the late fifties Washington officials were already dropping 
hints of government concern over the erosion of our gold stock, which further sensitized the 
qualms already felt by many European officials.”    
6  Triffin (1960) suggested creating a source of non-dollar international reserves through the 
IMF.  The IMF first issues Special Drawing Rights in January 1970.   
7   Unless otherwise indicated, data on gold in this section are from Board of Governors (1976) 
tables 14.1 & 14.3.   
8  These figures include a $344 million payment (gold subscription) to the IMF in 1959.   
9  Until 1968, U.S. law mandated a 25% gold reserve requirement on outstanding notes and 
liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks.   
10   Chapter 5 discusses the Great Inflation in more detail.   
11   Meltzer 1991, Hetzel 1996, and Pauls 1990 also discuss the issues raised in this section.   
12   Hetzel (1996, p. 22) notes that most key European currencies were undervalued relative to 
the dollar.    
13  Budget deficit data are from the Economic Report of the President (2005), Table B-78, and 
include on-budget and off-budget balances.   
14  The data in this section appear in Bordo and Eichengreen (2008) appendix 2.   
15  See the discussions of FOMC decisions in Bordo and Eichengreen (2008).   
16   Eventually, policy makers referred to this program as “Operation Nudge” and later still as 
“Operation Twist.”   
17   Unless otherwise indicated, the information and data in this section about Treasury 
interventions come from: “Treasury Experience in the Foreign-Exchange Market,” and is 
hereafter referred to as “U.S. Treasury, Experience” See References.  See also Bulletin 
September 1962, pp. 1138-1153.   
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18  Congress established the Exchange Stabilization Fund under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 
for the purpose of foreign-exchange-market intervention.  We discuss the ESF in chapter 2.   
19   U.S. Treasury Experience, (1962, p. 721).   
20  This statement, of course, ignores the cost of financing and covering the transactions.   
21  Debt prepayments stemmed from negotiations between the Eisenhower administration and 
Germany over the cost of troop deployment.   
22  We report data from the Desk Report (1963, p. 7 and p. B-23), which differ from the Bulletin 
(September 1962, p. 1144).   
23  The Treasury swaps were on an ad hoc basis.  Unlike the Federal Reserve System, which we 
discuss below, the Treasury did not maintain formal reciprocal swap lines that reverted to a 
standby basis when not drawn down.   
24  The analysis in this section draws on the Federal Open Market Committee Minutes of 
September 12, 1961 and December 19, 1961.  See also Hetzel (1996), Todd (1992), and FOMC 
Task Force Paper #1.   
25  These data on the ESF are discussed in U.S. Treasury, Memorandum (1962, p. 2).  U.S. 
Treasury, Experience (1962) also contains a table showing foreign currency holdings.   
26  Whether the impetus for the Federal Reserve’s participation in U.S. foreign-exchange 
operations originated with the Treasury or with the Federal Reserve System is not entirely clear.  
The Treasury’s website suggests that the Treasury “invited” the Federal Reserve to participate in 
the interventions in 1962, and this is the conventional view (see  
www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/esf/history).  The FOMC, Minutes, (January 9, 
1962, p. 66-67), however, seem to suggest that the Federal Reserve System considered foreign-
exchange intervention on its own initiative.  Coombs (1976 p. 71) suggests that Chairman Martin 
wanted to intervene.   
27   Todd (1992, pp. 134 -135) argues that Hackley set out to interpret the Federal Reserve Act in 
a way that would support intervention, rather than to provide an objective interpretation of the 
statute.   
28  Although open-market operations, including foreign-exchange interventions, fell under the 
purview of the FOMC, these associated activities fell under the Board of Governor’s jurisdiction.   
29  In 1920s and 1930s, however, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was providing 
stabilization funds to foreign central banks; it was not directly defending the dollar’s exchange 
value.   
30  Warehousing refers to a swap transaction between the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. 
Treasury in which the Treasury sells foreign currency to the System for dollars spot and buys it 
back forward at a specific rate and settlement date.  See chapter 5 on warehousing.   
31  Hackley (1962, 19 – 20), however, did not believe that the Federal Reserve could deal directly 
with the IMF in any way other than in its capacity as an agent of the Treasury.   
32  Why the Treasury did not seek to increase the ESF’s appropriation is unclear.  The Treasury 
may have feared that Congress would only increase the ESF’s appropriation if the Treasury 85 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
would agree to some type of Congressional oversight.  The ESF is unusual in that only the 
president and the secretary of the treasury can review its actions (see Schwarz, 1997).   
33  A copy of this letter is found in Task Force #2, 1990, appendix A.   
34   Robert H. Knight, General Counsel of the Treasury, had warned Hackley that the System 
should move forward without legislation in part because “there was a range of ideas on the Hill 
with regard to the Federal Reserve System, including varying views with respect to the operation 
and organization of the System.  Legislation, if sought, might become a vehicle for adding 
various amendments the nature of which could not be foretold.”  See FOMC Minutes, 9 January 
1962, p. 61.   
35   Governor Robertson expressed the reasons for his dissent at the 5 December 1961 FOMC 
meeting.  See FOMC Minutes, 5 December 1962, pp. 57-62.  See also Task Force #2, pp. 3-4.   
36  In 1982, with the onset of developing-country-debt problems, some members of Congress 
expressed concern that the Fed might use its authority to invest in foreign securities as a means 
of providing financial assistance to debtor countries (FOMC Task Force #1, pp. 23-24)   
37   This section is based on the discussion that appears in the FOMC Minutes 13 February 1962, 
pp. 82 – 95.  See also Bulletin September 1962, pp. 1150 – 1153, and Task Force Paper #2, 1990.   
38  It is not clear when or how the System obtained these accounts.   
39  The Treasury also has maintained swap lines, but typically on an ad hoc basis.  With the 
exception of a Mexican swap line, Treasury swaps were not reciprocal.  Often the Treasury 
established swap with developing countries to provide those countries with temporary loans.  
The Treasury’s first swap line was with Mexico in 1936.   
40   Moreover, the liquidity that swap drawings provided did not add to the U.S. balance-of-
payments deficit.   
41   The System sometimes undertook “third party swaps” in which it would swap one foreign 
currency for another.  These were typically used to pay down an outstanding balance on swap 
line.   
42   In the late 1970s, as discussed in chapter 5, conditionality with respect to swap drawings 
became a problem and encouraged the United States to accumulate a large portfolio of foreign 
exchange.   
43  “All this may seem to be an excessively roundabout way for the Federal to borrow foreign 
currencies.  But apparently when the Federal Reserve Act was drafted, no one had contemplated 
such a need, and no explicit statutory provision for such borrowing was made.  The swap 
technique, on the other hand, was clearly authorized and yielded precisely the same results as a 
direct borrowing from a foreign central bank.” (Coombs 1976, p.77)   
44   Coombs (1976, p. 75-76) reprints the original swap agreement with the Bank of France.   
45  The European central banks include those of Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.   
46  In 1967, the FOMC did not accept a proposal to extend a swap line the Venezuela because 
that country did not meet IMF Article VIII requirements (FOMC Minutes 4 April 4, 1967, p. 10-86 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
13; Holland, 28 February 1967).   In 1969, the FOMC did not accept a proposal to extend a swap 
line to Ireland because of its relatively small size (Reynolds 16 December 1969).   
47  See the previous discussion of the “Guidelines For System Foreign Currency Operations.”   
48  The data in this paragraph come from Solomon 13 August 1971, pp. 3-4.  We do not have 
comparable data for the entire 1962 through 1971 period.   
49  For background see Bordo and Schembri( 2004) and Yeager (1966).   
50  Much of the information in this section is from MacLaury (30 January 1969) and pertains to 
operations prior to 1968.  We have no information on such operations after 1968.   
51  Although U.S. monetary authorities did not undertake very many spot market transactions 
with the objective of affecting the exchange rate, they frequently made spot market purchase and 
sales of foreign exchange in conjunction with other activities.  They might, for example, buy 
foreign currency in the spot market to repay a swap or to meet forward exchange commitments.   
52  Actually, the Bundesbank sold marks against dollars in Germany and the System “took over” 
the Bundesbank transactions.   
53  At this time the Netherlands bank, which maintained a fairly rigid limit on dollar 
accumulation, was also selling dollars spot into the market, so these transaction amounted to a 
market swap with the dollars reverting to the United States.   
54  The Treasury undertook similar transactions in 1962 or 1963.   
55  The G10 were: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Sweden.  Switzerland joined the GAB in 1964.   
56   Modern warehousing involves a spot purchase of foreign exchange from the Treasury 
coupled with a forward sale back to the Treasury.  Chapter 5 discusses warehousing.   
57   The narrative in this section draws on the Bulletin 1963-1968.   
58   In fact, the U.K. pound experienced several crises between 1945 and 1962.  Bordo et. al. 
(2010) offers a brief discussion and references.   
59  In early January 1963, the Federal Reserve drew $25 million equivalent British pounds from 
its swap line with the Bank of England and sold $5.6 million equivalent of this drawing to 
support the dollar.   
60  The System used its holdings of sterling to obtain other currencies during the year.  On 31 
March 1964, the System sold $10 million equivalent sterling to the U.S. Treasury, which used 
these fund to acquire Swiss francs through a sterling-Swiss franc swap with the BIS.  In 
September and December, both the System and the U.S. Treasury swapped sterling for Dutch 
guilder.  System and Treasury swaps of sterling for Swiss francs were reversed in December.   
61   The banks lent dollar reserves.   
62   See chapter 5 for a discussion of intervention tactics.   
63   As discussed below, France would not participate in a scheme that it equated with 
maintaining the reserve status of a specific currency, but offer a general line of credit to the 
United Kingdom (Coombs 1976, p. 134).   87 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
64  After some cantankerous negotiation, other central banks reluctantly agreed to $400 million in 
credits (Coombs 1976, p. 143).   
65  Estimates of the gold points appear in the Desk Report (1964) and.  Coombs (1976, p. 47).   
66   On the collapse of the Gold Pool see also: Coombs 1976, pp. 152-173.   
67  “…Mr. Coombs said that the swap line with the French was useless.  The only purpose in 
continuing the swap line was to symbolize some continuing link between the Bank of France and 
the Federal Reserve, and to avoid an overt disruption of relationships which might lead to market 
disturbances.”  (FOMC Minutes 23 August 1966, p. 21).   
68  The Netherlands Bank also sold $30 million in gold to the U.S. Treasury (FOMC Minutes, 8 
June 1968, p. 3).   
69  The controls actually required French banks to break outstanding forward contracts with their 
customers and turn over to the Bank of France the spot foreign exchange held as cover for those 
contracts.   
70  The Bank of France also repaid $45 million of its swap debt in February and $12 million in 
March.   
71   The Treasury swapped nearly its entire mark portfolio for Swiss francs during the Cuban 
missile crisis.   
72   See  Coombs, et al. 1963, pp. 114-21.   
73  In 1968, the Treasury issued $625 million equivalent mark-denominated securities to the 
Bundesbank as part of an agreement reached with the German government in 1967 and renewed 
in 1968 to neutralize the costs of U.S. troops stationed in Germany.  In the year, the Treasury 
redeemed a $50 million mark-denominated security held by the Bundesbank.  In addition, the 
Treasury issued $125 million equivalent medium-term securities to German banks as part of the 
1968 agreement.  The total U.S. Treasury, mark-denominated securities increased $700 million 
in 1968 to $1.3 billion.   
74  In October, the U.S. Treasury bought a modest amount of marks to meet coming forward 
commitments.   
75  The possibility of an imminent mark revaluation left the Treasury, with outstanding forward 
commitments to sell marks, exposed.  On November 18, the System sold the Treasury $52.3 
million to provide partial cover.   
76  At their Bonn meeting on November 20, 1968, the G10 countries recommended that Germany 
revalue the mark.   
77   The narrative in this section draws on the Bulletin 1963-1968.   
78   Following the closing of the U.S. gold window, the French foreign exchange market closed 
until August 23, when it re-opened on a two-tier basis.  The Bank of France would defend an 
official rate for trade and related transactions.  All other transaction would occur at a floating 
market rate.  Pressure continued on the official rate, and French reserves increased $1.1 billion in 
August 1971.   88 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
79  Canada allowed the dollar to float from September 1950 to 3 May 1960; see Bordo, et al. 
(2010).   
80   Germany’s experience was far from unique.  Other countries, including Belgium, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom had similar experiences with reserve 
accumulations.   
81  At the end of January 1973, the System held only $67.4 million equivalent marks in its 
portfolio.  It financed most of the February sales through the direct acquisitions of marks from a 
central bank.  The System also drew on its swap lines, but repaid the drawing within the month.   
82   In July 1973, most of the swap lines were increased to allow for renewed U.S. foreign 
exchange interventions, see chapter 5.  At this time the line with the Swiss National Bank 
increased from $1.0 billion to $1.4 billion and the Swiss franc line with the BIS rose from $1.0 
billion to $1.25 billion.   